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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and its aftermath have 
accelerated a powerful consolidation trend in the U.S. banking 
industry. During the past three decades, the number of community 
banks and their share of the industry’s assets have fallen by more 
than half, and the largest banks have captured much of the industry’s 
assets. The federal government’s response to the financial crisis 
encouraged further consolidation by ensuring the survival of the 
biggest institutions while doing little to help community banks. 
Federal regulators allowed only one large depository institution 
(Washington Mutual) to fail, but they stood by while more than 450 
community banks failed between 2008 and 2012. 
In addition to the fact that community banks received very 
limited assistance during the financial crisis, they must now comply 
with costly new regulatory burdens imposed by the Dodd–Frank Act. 
These developments threaten the viability of community banks, which 
provide essential services to small businesses, consumers and local 
economies. At the same time, Dodd–Frank does not provide an 
adequate solution to the growing risks posed by megabanks to our 
national and global economies. Dodd–Frank has not ended the “too 
big to fail” (TBTF) status of megabanks. In addition, big banks and 
their political allies have succeeded in weakening the 
implementation of even the relatively mild reforms called for by 
Dodd–Frank. 
This Article proposes a two-tiered system of regulation to 
correct the perverse effects of our current regulatory regime. The 
first tier of my proposed system would reduce regulatory burdens on 
community banks and encourage them to maintain their traditional 
business model of relationship-based intermediation. The second tier 
of my proposed system would seek to remove the TBTF subsidy for 
megabanks and other systemically important financial institutions 
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(SIFIs). SIFIs would be required to conduct their deposit-taking 
activities within “narrow banks,” which would be barred from 
transferring their safety net subsidies to nonbank affiliates. SIFIs 
would also be required to pay risk-based premiums to prefund the 
Orderly Liquidation Fund, in order to shield taxpayers from the 
future costs of resolving failed SIFIs. 
By removing the TBTF subsidy, my proposal would enable 
financial markets and regulators to exercise more effective discipline 
over our largest financial institutions. In addition, SIFIs would be 
obliged to pay at least half of their compensation to senior executives 
and key employees in the form of contingent convertible bonds 
(CoCos). CoCos would help to align the personal incentives of 
executives and other key employees of SIFIs with the interests of 
creditors, the FDIC, and taxpayers. 
My proposed two-tiered system of regulation would help to 
restore a more balanced, diverse, and resilient banking industry. 
Community banks have compiled a superior record of meeting the 
needs of their customers while maintaining a stable business model 
that serves the longer-term interests of their stakeholders and 
communities. In contrast, megabanks have shown a strong and 
persistent tendency to pursue short-term, high-risk strategies that 
produce boom-and-bust cycles and impose tremendous costs on our 
economy and taxpayers. If the TBTF subsidy for megabanks were 
removed, those banks would have strong incentives to spin off risky 
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and its aftermath have 
accelerated a consolidation trend that has transformed the U.S. 
banking system during the past three decades. During that period, the 
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number of community banks and their share of the banking 
industry’s assets have fallen by more than half, while the largest 
banks have succeeded in capturing much of the industry’s assets.1 In 
responding to the financial crisis, the federal government encouraged 
further consolidation by adopting extraordinary assistance programs 
and forbearance measures designed to help the biggest institutions. 
In contrast, federal officials gave relatively little help to community 
banks and subjected them to strict supervision and enforcement 
policies. Similarly, the monetary policy followed by the Federal 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I would
like to thank GW Law School, Dean Blake Morant, and Interim Dean Greg Maggs 
for a summer research grant that supported my work on this Article. I am indebted to 
Velika Nespor, a member of GW Law School’s Class of 2016, and Germaine Leahy, 
Head of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library, for excellent research 
assistance. I am grateful to participants in the “Community Banking in the 21st 
Century” conference, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors in September 2014, for helpful comments and 
conversations. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article includes developments 
through December 31, 2014. 
1. See infra notes 10-12, 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
impact of consolidation within the banking industry on community banks and 
megabanks). Two definitions of “community bank” are generally used in banking 
studies. Some studies define community banks as including all banks with assets 
under $10 billion. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Gunther & Kelly Klemme, Community Banks 
Withstand the Storm, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, SPECIAL REPORT—
FINANCIAL STABILITY: TRADITIONAL BANKS PAVE THE WAY, DALLASFED 2012
ANNUAL REPORT 19, 19 (2012) [hereinafter DALLAS FED. 2012 REPORT], available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/documents/ar12.pdf; 
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, COMMUNITY BANKING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 12 (2013) [hereinafter 
CSBS COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY], available at http://www.csbs.org/news/ 
csbswhitepapers/Documents/FINALPUBLICATION.pdf. In contrast, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) defines community banks to encompass most 
banks with assets under $1 billion as well as some larger banks that meet criteria 
designed to identify a strong orientation toward traditional banking activities (e.g., 
high loan-to-asset and deposit-to-asset ratios) and limited geographic scope (e.g., 
operations in not more than three states). FDIC, FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY 
1-1 to 1-2 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY], available at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbi-full.pdf. Under the FDIC’s
criteria, 330 banks with assets between $1 billion and $10 billion were classified as
“community banks” at the end of 2010, while 206 banks in that size range were
classified as “noncommunity banks.” Id. at 1-4. For purposes of this Article, the
term “community banks” generally refers to banks with assets under $10 billion
unless the supporting citations are drawn from or rely on FDIC studies.
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Reserve (Fed) in response to the crisis benefited megabanks while 
suppressing the earnings of community banks.2 
Federal regulators stood by while more than 450 community 
banks failed between 2008 and 2012. In contrast, regulators allowed 
only one depository institution larger than $100 billion—Washington 
Mutual (Wamu)—to fail during that period. In that one case, the 
FDIC arranged for the immediate transfer of Wamu’s assets and 
deposits to JPMorgan Chase (Chase), the largest U.S. bank, which 
later received a $25 billion capital infusion from the Treasury 
Department.3 In February 2009, federal regulators announced that the 
Treasury Department would provide any capital assistance needed to 
ensure the survival of the nineteen largest banking organizations, 
each with assets of more than $100 billion.4 No such guarantees were 
provided to smaller banks. 
In July 2010, Congress responded to the financial crisis by 
enacting the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).5 Community banks must comply with 
many of Dodd–Frank’s regulatory burdens, even though community 
banks did not play any substantial role in causing the financial crisis. 
In addition, the Basel III international capital accord, as implemented 
by federal bank regulators, will impose costly new requirements on 
community banks.6 
The foregoing developments threaten the viability of 
community banks, which provide essential services to small 
businesses, consumers, and local economies.7 At the same time, 
Dodd–Frank does not provide an adequate solution for the growing 
                                                 
 2. See infra Part I (describing how the federal government’s response to 
the financial crisis helped megabanks and hurt community banks). 
 3. See infra notes 65-69, 85 and accompanying text (discussing bank 
failures between 2008 and 2012); see also DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN 
BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 218-19, 236-40 (2009) (discussing Chase’s 
acquisition of Wamu and receipt of a $25 billion capital infusion from the Treasury 
Department). 
 4. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (describing the public 
announcement by federal banking agencies in February 2009 that they would ensure 
the survival of the nineteen largest banking organizations). 
 5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 6. See infra Part II (discussing community banks’ lack of responsibility for 
the financial crisis and the new compliance burdens they face under Dodd–Frank 
and Basel III). 
 7. See infra Section III.A (discussing growing doubts about the ability of 
community banks to maintain their crucial role in supporting small businesses and 
local communities). 
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risks posed by megabanks to our national and global economies. 
Dodd–Frank does not require large financial conglomerates to 
change their fundamental business model, which promotes conflicts 
of interest, excessive complexity, and speculative risk-taking. Nor 
has Dodd–Frank ended the “too big to fail” (TBTF) status of 
megabanks. Instead, big banks and their political allies have 
succeeded in weakening even the relatively mild reforms called for 
by Dodd–Frank.8 
A two-tiered system of regulation is urgently needed to correct 
the perverse effects of our current regulatory regime. The first tier of 
my proposed system would reduce regulatory burdens on community 
banks and would encourage them to maintain their traditional 
business model of relationship-based intermediation. The second tier 
of my proposed system would seek to remove the TBTF subsidy for 
megabanks and other systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs). SIFIs would be required to conduct their deposit-taking 
activities within “narrow banks” that would be barred from 
transferring their safety-net subsidies to nonbank affiliates. SIFIs 
would also be required to pay risk-based premiums to prefund the 
Orderly Liquidation Fund in order to shield taxpayers from the future 
costs of resolving failed SIFIs. By removing the TBTF subsidy, my 
proposal would enable financial markets and regulators to exercise 
more effective discipline over our largest financial institutions. In 
addition, SIFIs would be obliged to pay at least half of their total 
compensation for top executives and key employees in the form of 
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). CoCos would help to align 
the personal incentives of executives and key employees of SIFIs 
with the long-term interests of creditors, the FDIC, and taxpayers.9 
My proposed two-tiered system of regulation would help to 
restore a more balanced, diverse, and resilient banking industry. 
Community banks have compiled a superior record of meeting the 
needs of their customers while maintaining a stable business model 
that serves the long-term interests of their stakeholders and 
communities. In contrast, megabanks have shown a strong and 
persistent tendency to pursue short-term, high-risk strategies, which 
produce boom-and-bust cycles and impose tremendous costs on our 
                                                 
 8. See infra Part IV (explaining why Dodd–Frank does not end TBTF 
treatment for megabanks, and discussing successful efforts by megabanks and their 
supporters to weaken Dodd–Frank’s reforms). 
 9. See infra Part V (describing my proposal for a two-tiered system of 
regulation). 
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economy and taxpayers. If their TBTF subsidy were removed, 
megabanks would have strong incentives to spin off risky activities 
and adopt more conservative and transparent business policies. 
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
ACCELERATED THE CONSOLIDATION TREND BY GIVING MASSIVE 
ASSISTANCE TO MEGABANKS WHILE DOING LITTLE TO HELP 
COMMUNITY BANKS 
The U.S. banking industry has experienced far-reaching 
consolidation during the past thirty years. Between 1984 and 2011, 
the number of community banks fell by more than one-half,10 and the 
share of commercial banking assets held by community banks 
declined by almost two-thirds.11 During the same period, the share of 
banking assets held by the four largest U.S. banks mushroomed from 
6.2% to 44.2%.12 Many factors have driven this consolidation trend, 
including federal deregulation of geographic and product markets for 
banks, relaxation of federal antitrust standards governing bank 
mergers, transformative changes in banking technologies, and the 
large numbers of bank failures that occurred between 1984 and 1991 
and again between 2008 and 2012.13 
The federal government’s response to the recent financial crisis 
has given further impetus for the consolidation trend. The federal 
                                                 
 10. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-6 (showing that 
the number of community banking organizations, as defined by the FDIC, declined 
from 14,408 in 1984 to 6,356 in 2011, while the number of community bank 
charters fell from 15,663 to 6,799 during the same period); see also CSBS 
COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that the number of banks 
smaller than $10 billion declined from 10,300 in 1994 to about 6,000 in 2012). 
 11. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-7 (showing that 
the percentage of banking industry assets held by community banks, as defined by 
the FDIC, declined from 38% in 1984 to 14% in 2011); see also Jeffrey W. Gunther 
& Kelly Klemme, Small Banks Squeezed, in DALLAS FED. 2012 REPORT, supra note 
1, at 31, 33 (showing that banks smaller than $10 billion held less than 17% of 
commercial banking assets in 2011 and 2012). 
 12. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-4. 
 13. Id. at 2-1 to 2-12; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation 
of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, 
and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 250-57, 312-15 [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Transformation] (describing factors encouraging consolidation during the 
1980s and 1990s); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: 
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 963, 975-81, 1011-15 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dark Side] 
(discussing factors encouraging further consolidation during the 2000s). 
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government provided extraordinary assistance to ensure the survival 
of the biggest banks while doing relatively little to help community 
banks. In addition, the Fed’s monetary policy since 2008 has 
benefited big banks while hurting community banks. 
The federal government pursued a similarly lopsided approach 
to supervision and enforcement during the financial crisis and its 
aftermath. As described below in Sections I.A and I.B, federal 
agencies adopted a policy of leniency and forbearance with regard to 
big banks, and only one depository institution larger than $100 
billion failed during the crisis. In contrast, federal regulators issued 
hundreds of capital directives and other enforcement orders against 
community banks, and allowed more than 450 community banks to 
fail. Little wonder that the largest banks have achieved even greater 
dominance within the banking industry since the outbreak of the 
crisis in 2007 while the position of community banks has 
deteriorated. 
A. The Federal Government Provided Extraordinary Assistance to 
Large Banks but Gave Little Help to Community Banks 
The federal government responded to the financial crisis by 
providing massive and disproportionate financial help to the largest 
financial institutions. Federal agencies provided more than $850 
billion of financial assistance to ensure the survival of Citigroup and 
Bank of America (BofA)—two of the three largest U.S. banks. The 
bailout packages for Citigroup and BofA included capital infusions, 
asset guarantees, emergency short-term loans, debt guarantees, and 
commercial paper funding.14 
                                                 
 14. The federal government provided $543 billion of financial assistance to 
Citigroup and $315 billion of financial aid to BofA. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 
69, 71, 110-14 (2014) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Citigroup] (explaining that the federal 
government gave Citigroup $45 billion of capital infusions, $300 billion of asset 
guarantees, $100 billion of emergency loans (measured by the peak amount 
outstanding), $65 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt, and $33 billion of commercial 
paper funding); id. at 109 n.326, 114 n.362 (stating that the federal government gave 
BofA $45 billion of capital infusions, $120 billion of asset guarantees, $91 billion of 
emergency loans (measured by the peak amount outstanding), and $44 billion of 
FDIC-guaranteed debt); Linus Wilson & Yan Wendy Wu, Does Receiving TARP 
Funds Make It Easier to Roll Your Commercial Paper onto the Fed? 29 (Aug. 22, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911454 
(showing that the Fed gave BofA $15 billion of commercial paper funding). 
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The federal government’s bailout of BofA enabled that 
institution to absorb Countrywide, the second-largest thrift, and 
Merrill Lynch (Merrill), the third-largest securities firm. Regulators 
also provided financial assistance to support (1) emergency 
takeovers of two other failing megabanks (Wells Fargo’s purchase of 
Wachovia and PNC’s acquisition of National City); (2) Chase’s 
emergency acquisition of Wamu, the largest thrift, and Bear Stearns 
(Bear), the fifth-largest securities firm; and (3) emergency 
conversions of the two largest securities firms—Goldman Sachs 
(Goldman) and Morgan Stanley—into bank-holding companies.15 
Meanwhile, U.S. Bancorp became the fifth-largest bank by acquiring 
a large failed thrift (Downey Federal) and more than a dozen smaller 
failed institutions with support provided by a capital infusion from 
the Treasury Department and loss-sharing agreements with the 
FDIC.16 
                                                 
 15. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd–Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 958 & 
n.15, 959, 978-79, 984-85 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank] (discussing 
how the federal government assisted the takeovers cited above); see also Bob Ivry, 
Bradley Keoun & Philip Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion 
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 27, 2011, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-
to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income (describing how the Fed’s emergency 
loans helped JPMorgan Chase to acquire Bear, BofA to acquire Merrill, and Wells 
Fargo to acquire Wachovia). 
 16. Michael Rudnick, U.S. Bancorp Nabs First Community, DAILY DEAL, 
Jan. 31, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3459001 (reporting that “U.S. Bancorp 
ha[d] added about $36.6 billion in assets since late 2008 via failed bank 
acquisitions” assisted by the FDIC); Kevin Dobbs & Bonnie McGeer, Thrift Buys 
Give U.S. Bancorp California Boost, AM. BANKER (Nov. 25, 2008, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_241/-367510-1.html (reporting that 
U.S. Bancorp acquired two failed California thrifts, including Downey Financial 
with nearly $13 billion of assets, and noting that “[w]hen U.S. Bancorp announced . 
. . that it would receive $6.6 billion under the Treasury Department’s Capital 
Purchase Program, Mr. Davis said the infusion would give his company new 
flexibility to ‘invest in future growth’”); Heather Landy, Davis Comes into His Own 
as U.S. Bancorp’s Chief, AM. BANKER (Dec. 1, 2010, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/special-reports/175_22/davis-banker-of-the-year-
1029285-1.html (explaining how Richard Davis, the chief executive of U.S. 
Bancorp, built the bank into “the fifth-largest U.S. commercial bank”); Trefis Team, 
U.S. Bancorp’s Appetite for Failed Banks Shows Its Strength, FORBES (Mar. 14, 
2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/03/14/u-s-
bancorps-appetite-for-failed-banks-shows-its-strength/ (reporting that U.S. Bancorp 
had acquired 14 failed banks from the FDIC since 2008, “more . . . than any [other] 
competitor”). 
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Moreover, the federal government injected more than $70 
billion of capital and provided $110 billion of further assistance to 
bail out American International Group (AIG), the world’s largest 
insurance company.17 The federal government’s rescue of AIG 
provided a conduit for funneling large payments to the world’s 
leading financial institutions. With federal approval and 
encouragement, AIG used federal bailout funds to pay about $90 
billion to major U.S. and foreign banks and securities firms, thereby 
satisfying 100% of the obligations that AIG owed to those 
counterparties under credit default swaps (CDS) and securities 
lending agreements.18 Goldman received the largest total payment 
from AIG while Merrill, BofA, and Citigroup also received 
substantial payments.19 
Thus, federal agencies ensured that AIG could pay all of the 
obligations it owed to large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs). 
                                                 
 17. Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the Collapse 
of AIG 39-45 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435161; CONG. 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON 
MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 19-20, 84-99 (2010) 
[hereinafter COP AIG REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-716, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: THE 
GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO AIG FOLLOWING THE COMPANY’S RECAPITALIZATION 
8-11 (2011). 
 18. Peirce, supra note 17, at 44 (citing an AIG report showing that AIG 
paid $93.4 billion to counterparties after receiving federal assistance). A report by 
the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) indicated a somewhat smaller amount for 
such payments. According to the COP, after AIG received federal assistance, it paid 
$43.8 billion to counterparties to discharge securities lending obligations and $43.7 
billion to counterparties to discharge CDS obligations. See COP AIG REPORT, supra 
note 17, at 71-72, 90. The COP stated that AIG had previously used its own funds to 
post $18.5 billion of collateral under its CDS deals. Id. at 76. There is no dispute 
that, with the approval of federal officials, AIG used federal assistance to pay its 
counterparties 100% of the amounts owed under its CDS and securities lending 
deals and that AIG did not demand concessions from those counterparties. Id. at 87-
88, 92-93, 147-52; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 376-79 (2011) [hereinafter 
FCIC REPORT], available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report.  
 19. Peirce, supra note 17, at 44 (citing an AIG report showing that AIG 
paid Goldman $12.9 billion after receiving federal assistance, while other recipients 
of the largest AIG payments included Société Générale ($11.9 billion), Deutsche 
Bank ($11.8 billion), Barclays ($8.5 billion), Merrill ($6.8 billion), BofA ($5.2 
billion), UBS ($5.0 billion), BNP Paribas ($4.9 billion), HSBC ($3.5 billion), and 
Citigroup ($2.3 billion)). 
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The federal government adopted a much harsher policy for smaller 
investors (including community banks) when the Treasury 
Department (Treasury) seized control of Fannie Mae (Fannie) and 
Freddie Mac (Freddie) in September 2008. After establishing 
conservatorships for both government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
Treasury declared that the GSEs would no longer pay dividends to 
existing preferred stockholders. That decision destroyed the value of 
the GSEs’ outstanding preferred stock, much of which Fannie and 
Freddie had issued at the urging of federal officials in late 2007 and 
early 2008. Many community banks purchased that preferred stock 
with the approval (and, allegedly, the encouragement) of federal 
bank regulators.20 The sudden collapse in value of the GSEs’ 
preferred stock inflicted $2 billion of losses on community banks and 
led to the failures or forced sales of more than a dozen community 
banks.21 The federal government thus made a deliberate decision not 
to provide AIG-type protection for community banks when it seized 
Fannie and Freddie. 
                                                 
 20. Tara Rice & Jonathan Rose, When Good Investments Go Bad: The 
Contraction in Community Bank Lending After the 2008 GSE Takeover 5-10, 37-38 
(Mar. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2409328 (explaining that Fannie and Freddie had $36 billion of 
outstanding preferred stock in September 2008, of which $22 billion had been sold 
in late 2007 and early 2008). For allegations that federal regulators encouraged 
banks to buy the GSEs’ preferred stock, see Housing Finance—What Should the 
New System Be Able to Do?: Part II—Government & Stakeholder Perspectives: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 39 (2010) (statement of 
Jack E. Hopkins, President & Chief Executive Officer, CorTrust Bank, N.A.); 
Donna Block, FDIC Grilled on Community Bank Seizures, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 21, 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 1681342. 
 21. Rice & Rose, supra note 20 (manuscript at 3-4, 20); see also id. 
(manuscript at 3, 13-14) (reporting that 483 community banks owned $2.3 billion of 
the $8 billion of GSE preferred stock held by all banks); id. (manuscript at 8, 10) 
(“[A] belief in the low risk of these securities was widespread among investors 
(including banks and other financial institutions) and regulators. . . . [T]he decision 
to wipe out the preferred shareholders was not an obvious one and while 
considerable uncertainty surrounded the fate of the GSEs, most parties assumed up 
until the [federal] takeover that the preferred shareholders would be made whole.”); 
FCIC REPORT, supra note 18, at 320-21 (discussing bank failures that were caused 
by the Treasury’s decision to cut off dividend payments on Fannie’s and Freddie’s 
preferred stock); see also Julie Andersen Hill, Shifting Losses: The Impact of 
Fannie’s and Freddie’s Conservatorships on Commercial Banks, 35 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 343, 362-68 (2012) (explaining how the collapse in value of the GSEs’ 
preferred stock caused significant investment losses, triggered bank failures, and 
forced bank sales within the community banking sector).  
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In February 2009, as federal regulators prepared to conduct the 
first “stress test” for the nineteen largest banks, the agencies 
announced that they would provide any additional capital needed to 
ensure the survival of those companies. The announcement 
proclaimed the “determination” of federal regulators “to preserve the 
viability of systemically important financial institutions so that they 
are able to meet their commitments.”22 The federal government 
thereby made clear to investors and the general public that the 
nineteen largest banks (each holding more than $100 billion of 
assets) “were . . . TBTF, at least for the duration of the financial 
crisis.”23 
The nineteen largest banks and AIG received $290 billion of 
federal capital infusions and issued $235 billion of FDIC-guaranteed 
debt. In contrast, banks smaller than $100 billion received only $41 
billion of capital infusions and “issued only $11 billion of FDIC-
guaranteed debt.”24 Within the latter group, banks smaller than $10 
billion received just $16 billion of capital infusions and issued very 
little FDIC-guaranteed debt.25 
                                                 
 22. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Joint 
Statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS, and the Federal Reserve (Feb. 23, 
2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm. 
 23. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the 
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 713 & n.12, 737, 743 (2010) 
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation]; see also Joe Adler, In 
Focus: Stress Tests Complicate ‘Too Big to Fail’ Debate; There’s a Number, $100B, 
but It’s Not Just a Matter of Size, AM. BANKER (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-199879300.html (“By drawing a line at $100 
billion in assets, and promising to give the 19 institutions over that mark enough 
capital to weather an economic downturn, the government appears to have defined 
which banks are indeed ‘too big to fail.’”). 
 24. Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation, supra note 23, at 737-38 
(discussing the capital infusions and debt guarantees provided to the largest banks 
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other federal programs); see 
also id. at 738 n.122 (stating that the nineteen largest banks received $220 billion of 
capital infusions from the Treasury, while AIG received $70 billion of capital 
assistance); supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that much of the 
financial assistance provided to AIG was used to pay off AIG’s obligations to large 
United States and European financial institutions). 
 25. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: SMALL BANKS IN 
THE CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM 13 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT57212/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT57212.pdf. The FDIC’s debt 
guarantee program was “geared towards aiding the larger banks by guaranteeing 
newly issued senior unsecured debt through 2012,” and the program provided “a 
windfall for the largest financial institutions.” HOVDE, HOVDE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS MONTHLY OVERVIEW 2-3 (2009), available at 
http://www.hovdecapital.com/re/documents/HovdeMonthlyOverviewAugust2009.p
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The Fed also took unprecedented actions as lender of last resort 
(LOLR) by establishing a series of emergency lending programs that 
provided huge amounts of credit to LCFIs. The Fed’s emergency 
lending programs reached a single-day peak of $1.2 trillion in 
December 2008. More than half of that peak amount was extended to 
the ten largest U.S. banks and securities firms, and most of the 
remainder was lent to large U.S. and foreign banks.26 If one adds up 
all the individual transactions included in the Fed’s emergency 
lending programs, the Fed provided a cumulative total of $19.5 
trillion of emergency credit to banks between 2007 and 2010.27 
Almost 90% of that cumulative total—$16.4 trillion—was extended 
to a group of fourteen large U.S. and foreign LCFIs.28 
The federal government provided the foregoing capital 
infusions, asset guarantees, debt guarantees, and emergency loans to 
                                                                                                       
df. The nineteen largest banks issued $235 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt, and GE 
Capital issued an additional $55 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt, while other 
financial institutions issued only $11 billion of such debt. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP 
AND RELATED PROGRAMS 35-38, 58, 65 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT53348/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT53348.pdf. Most small and 
medium-sized banks did not participate in the FDIC’s debt guarantee program 
because those banks generally do not issue publicly traded debt securities. Id. at 30 
n.156. 
 26. Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion 
in Secret Loans, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 21, 2011, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-21/wall-street-aristocracy-got-1-
2-trillion-in-fed-s-secret-loans (reporting that the Fed’s emergency lending programs 
reached a “$1.2 trillion peak on Dec. 5, 2008” and $669 billion of that amount was 
lent to the ten largest U.S. banks and securities firms). 
 27. James Felkerson, $29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s 
Bailout by Funding Facility and Recipient 31-33 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., 
Working Paper No. 698, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970414 
(finding that, in addition to the $19.5 trillion of emergency loans provided to banks, 
the Fed extended $10 trillion of credit to foreign central banks through currency 
swap lines). 
 28. Id. at 32-33 (showing that the top nine recipients of Fed emergency 
credit—Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, AIG, Barclays, BofA, BNP 
Paribas, Goldman, and Bear—collectively received $13.4 trillion, while the next five 
most highly ranked recipients—Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, RBS, Chase, and 
UBS—collectively received $3.0 trillion); see also Kyle D. Allen, Scott E. Hein & 
Matthew D. Whitledge, The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction 
Facility and Community Bank Utilization 3-11, 16-19, 37 (Jan. 16, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2251021 (finding 
that between December 2007 and March 2010, the Fed provided $1.75 trillion of 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) credit to large United States banks and made nearly 
1,400 additional TAF loans to foreign banks, but the Fed provided less than $70 
billion of TAF credit to United States community banks). 
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LCFIs on very generous terms. As a result, those programs 
“represented very large transfers of wealth from taxpayers to the 
shareholders and creditors of the largest US LCFIs.”29 The federal 
government’s extraordinary support for the largest banks—as well as 
their acquisitions of troubled institutions—produced a domestic 
banking system in which megabanks now possess even greater 
dominance than they enjoyed prior to the crisis. The four largest U.S. 
banks—Chase, BofA, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo (the Big Four)—
increased their share of commercial banking assets from 32% in 
2005 to 44.2% in 2011 and 47.7% in 2013.30 In addition, the eleven 
                                                 
 29. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That 
Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Regulation of 
Financial Conglomerates, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 
1, 3, 5, 20 n.40 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Narrow Banking], available at 
htto://ssrn.cin.abstract=2050544 (citing four studies documenting the significant 
gains in wealth that the largest banks received as a result of federal assistance 
programs during the financial crisis); Mark Gongloff, Banks Profit from U.S. 
Guarantee: Lenders’ Earnings Reap the Benefit of FDIC Backing on Company 
Debt, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009, at C1 (estimating that the FDIC’s debt guarantee 
program provided interest savings of $24 billion to the eight largest issuers of 
guaranteed debt, which included the six biggest United States banks, GE Capital, 
and American Express); Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 15 (finding that the 
“Fed’s below-market rates” on its emergency lending programs generated estimated 
profits of $13 billion for the recipient banks, including $4.8 billion of profits for the 
six biggest United States banks); see also Nicola Matthews, How the Fed 
Reanimated Wall Street: The Low and Extended Lending Rates That Revived the Big 
Banks 24-25 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 758, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233939 (showing that the average interest 
rates paid by Citigroup, Merrill, Morgan Stanley, BofA, and Goldman for the 
emergency Fed loans they received ranged from a low of 0.7999% (for BofA) to a 
high of 1.412% (for Goldman)); Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 26 (noting that the Fed 
agreed to provide “28-day loans through its Term Auction Facility at a rate of 1.1 
percent” on October 20, 2008, while large banks were then charging 3.8% for one-
month interbank loans). 
 30. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-4 to 2-5 
(providing 2005 and 2011 figures); James R. Barth & Moutusi Sau, The Big Keep 
Getting Bigger: Too-Big-to-Fail Banks 30 Years Later 4 (Sept. 24, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510041 (providing 
2013 figure); see also Harvey Rosenblum, Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why 
We Must End Too Big to Fail—Now, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 3, 6-7 (2011) [hereinafter DALLAS FED. 2011 REPORT], available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/fed/annual/2011/ar11.pdf. (showing that 
“the share of banking industry assets controlled by the five largest U.S. institutions 
has more than tripled to 52 percent from 17 percent” since 1970). 
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largest U.S. banks controlled two-thirds of commercial banking 
assets by the end of 2012.31 
The federal government’s massive support for the largest U.S. 
financial institutions helped them to expand their leading positions in 
broader segments of the financial markets. The Big Four and 
Goldman controlled total banking and nonbanking assets equal to 
56% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, up from 
43% five years earlier.32 The dominance of the Big Four is even 
greater when their off-balance-sheet activities are taken into account. 
Consider what would happen if U.S. accounting principles were 
changed to force the Big Four to include on their balance sheets their 
gross (rather than net) derivatives positions as well as the securitized 
mortgages they sell to GSEs with recourse, as international 
accounting rules would require. In that case, the Big Four’s total 
assets would nearly double (as of 2012) from $7.6 trillion to $14.7 
trillion, an amount equal to 93% of the U.S.’s GDP.33 
                                                 
 31. Examining How the Dodd–Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-
Funded Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 76 
(2013) [hereinafter Fisher June 2013 Testimony], available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81769/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg81769.pdf (statement of 
Richard W. Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas). 
 32. David J. Lynch, Banks Seen Dangerous Defying Obama’s Too-Big-to-
Fail Move, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16, 2012, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-16/Obama-bid-to-end-too-big-to-
fail-undercut-as-banks-grow (reporting that the Big Four and Goldman held total 
assets of $8.5 trillion); see also Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 15 (stating that the 
Big Four, Goldman, and Morgan Stanley held total banking and nonbanking assets 
of $9.5 trillion in 2011, up from $6.8 trillion in 2006). 
 33. Yalnan Onaran, U.S. Banks Bigger than GDP as Accounting Rift Masks 
Risk, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2013-02-20/u-s-banks-bigger-than-gtp-accounting-rift-masks-risk 
(explaining the contrasting treatment of big bank assets under United States and 
international accounting principles); see also Andrew Cunningham, World’s Biggest 
Banks 2012: The Big Get Bigger, 26 GLOBAL FIN. MAG., Oct. 2012, at 44, 44 
(showing that the Big Four had total assets of $7.6 trillion at the end of 2011). For 
example, after netting their offsetting derivatives exposures with various 
counterparties, Chase and Citigroup recorded less than 1% of their total derivatives 
contracts as assets on their balance sheets in mid-2014. Dakin Campbell, Citigroup 
Embraces Derivatives as Deals Soar After Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 17, 2014, 
12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news.articles/2014-09-17/citigroup-
embraces-derivatives-as-deals-soar-after-crisis (reporting that Chase and Citigroup 
reported $49.1 billion and $44.5 billion, respectively, of derivatives assets on their 
balance sheets as of June 30, 2014, while their gross derivatives contracts were $68 
trillion and $62 trillion, respectively). By allowing netting treatment for derivatives, 
U.S. accounting principles permit U.S. banks to assume that all of their 
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The Fed provided additional help to the largest financial 
institutions by maintaining a zero-interest-rate policy (ZIRP) for 
short-term debt and by engaging in three rounds of quantitative 
easing (QE) to push down interest rates on longer-term debt, 
including home mortgages.34 Under QE1, which lasted from 
November 2008 until March 2010, the Fed purchased (1) $1.4 
trillion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt obligations 
issued by Fannie and Freddie, and (2) $300 billion of Treasury 
securities.35 Under QE2, the Fed purchased $600 billion of Treasury 
securities during 2010 and 2011.36 Under QE3, which lasted from 
2012 to 2014, the Fed purchased more than $1.6 trillion of additional 
Treasury securities and MBS.37 As a result of the QE programs, the 
                                                                                                       
counterparties will pay their obligations. However, “‘netting could break down’” if 
counterparties cannot perform during a financial crisis, as occurred with AIG in 
2008. Id. (quoting Craig Pirrong, Finance Professor at the University of Houston). 
Consequently, United States accounting principles “‘are hiding fragilities’” by 
permitting banks to report net rather than gross derivatives positions. Onaran, supra 
(quoting Anat Admati, Finance Professor at Stanford University). 
 34. See, e.g., Stefania D’Amico et al., The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale 
Asset Purchase Programs: Rationale and Effects 1-3, 10-11, 29-30 (Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Working Paper No. 2012-85, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2197519 (discussing the Fed’s QE programs, and finding that QE1 and 
QE2 reduced yields on longer-term Treasury securities by thirty-five basis points 
and forty-five basis points, respectively); John C. Williams, Will Unconventional 
Policy Be the New Normal?, FRBSF ECON. LETTER, Oct. 7, 2013, at 1-3, available 
at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2013/ 
october/federal-reserve-unconventional-monetary-policy-large-scale-asset-
purchases-forward-guidance/ (describing the purpose of the Fed’s QE programs); 
William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the Japan Society, New York City: Lessons at the Zero Bound: The 
Japanese and U.S. Experience (May 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130521.html (same). 
 35. Michael D. Bauer, Fed Asset Buying and Private Borrowing Rates, 
FRBSF ECON. LETTER, May 21, 2012, at 1-2, available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2012/may/fed-
asset-buying-private-borrowing-rates/el2012-16.pdf (describing QE1); D’Amico et 
al., supra note 34, at 10-11 (same). 
 36. Bauer, supra note 35, at 2 (describing QE2); D’Amico et al., supra note 
34, at 11 (same). 
 37. John C. Williams, The Economic Recovery and Monetary Policy: The 
Road Back to Ordinary, FRBSF ECON. LETTER, June 2, 2014, at 4, available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2014/june/ 
economic-recovery-monetary-policy-normalization/el2014-16.pdf (describing QE3); 
Andrew Flowers, We Still Don’t Know What $1.6 Trillion Bought Us, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHTECON. (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/we-still-dont-know-what-1-6-trillion-bought-us/ (stating that the Fed had 
purchased more than $1.6 trillion of Treasury bonds and MBS under QE3); Robin 
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Fed’s balance sheet “ballooned to $4.42 trillion” in September 
2014,38 a dramatic increase from the $924 billion of assets that the 
Fed held in September 2008.39 
The Fed’s ZIRP and QE policies conferred major benefits on 
the largest banks. Unlike community banks, big banks (1) obtain 
much of their funding by issuing market-sensitive, short-term 
wholesale liabilities, and (2) earn a much higher proportion of their 
revenues from noninterest (fee) income as opposed to interest 
income from loans.40 Big banks also held large volumes of risky 
mortgage-related securities on their balance sheets when the 
financial crisis began in 2007.41 By pushing down short-term and 
longer-term interest rates, ZIRP and QE lowered big banks’ interest 
costs on their market-sensitive liabilities and also increased the 
market values of their mortgage-related securities.42 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                       
Harding, Fed Eyes First Rate Rise After End to QE, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:13 
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c778256a-5f95-11e4-988c-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz3SKfA1Gne (reporting that the Fed made its final purchase of assets under QE3 
in October 2014). 
 38. Jeff Kearns & Steve Matthews, Fed Keeps ‘Considerable Time’ Pledge 
as Growth ‘Moderate,’ BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 17, 2014, 6:29 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.con/news/articles/2014-09-17/fed-keeps-considerable-time-
pledge-as-growth-is-moderate-. 
 39. Bob Ivry, Fed’s $4 Trillion Rescue Helps Hedge Fund as Savers Hurt, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-12-20/fed-s-4-trillion-rescue-helps-hedge-fund-as-savers-hurt. 
 40. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 4-2 to 4-5; see also 
Christine M. Bradley & Lynn Shibut, The Liability Structure of FDIC-Insured 
Institutions: Changes and Implications, 18 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 2, 2006, at 1, 
18, 20; Gerald Hanweck & Lisa Ryu, The Sensitivity of Bank Net Interest Margins 
and Profitability to Credit, Interest-Rate, and Term-Structure Shocks Across Bank 
Product Specializations 24-25, 28 (FDIC, Working Paper No. 2005-02, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886727. 
 41. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 13, at 1028-35 (describing the large 
volumes of private-label MBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) held by 
major banks in 2007); Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 971-75 (same). The 
term “private-label” refers to residential MBS that were underwritten and issued by 
LCFIs and did not conform to the underwriting guidelines of Fannie and Freddie. 
Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 13, at 988. 
 42. Andrew Huszar, Confessions of a Quantitative Easer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
12, 2013, at A17; Jesse Eisinger, In U.S. Monetary Policy, a Boon to Banks, 
PROPUBLICA (June 29, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/in-
u.s.-monetary-policy-a-boon-to-banks; see also Kearns & Matthews, supra note 38 
(reporting that the QE programs were “intended to hold down long-term interest 
rates”). Andrew Huszar, a former Fed official, also argued that QE provided “fat 
commissions” to the big banks that acted as primary dealers for the Fed because 
those banks earned substantial fees for executing the Fed’s QE purchases. Huszar, 
supra; Ben Eisen, Meet Andrew Huszar, the Ex-Fed Insider Who Hates QE, 
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low mortgage rates produced by QE spurred a mortgage refinancing 
boom in 2012, which generated big profits for four of the five largest 
banks.43 Those four banks dominated the home mortgage market 
after acquiring competing lenders with federal assistance during the 
financial crisis.44 Chase, BofA, and Wells Fargo earned additional 
profits by entering into interest-rate swaps in which they took the 
fixed side of the trades and successfully wagered that ZIRP and QE 
would keep floating rates below the fixed rates specified in the 
swaps.45 
While liability-sensitive big banks benefited from ZIRP and 
QE, community banks suffered. Community banks are less liability-
sensitive and more asset-sensitive than larger banks because (1) 
community banks obtain most of their funding from demand deposits 
and other core deposits, and (2) the interest rates community banks 
pay on their core deposits move much more slowly in response to 
changes in market interest rates than the yields they earn on loans.46 
                                                                                                       
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/ 
capitolreport/2013/11/14/meet-andrew-huszar-the-ex-fed-insider-who-hates-qe/. 
 43. Peter Eavis, With Rates Low, Banks Increase Mortgage Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 9:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/with-rate-
twist-banks-increase-mortgage-profit/ (reporting that “[b]anks are making unusually 
large gains on mortgages [by] . . . taking profits far higher than the historical norm,” 
due in part “to the concentration of mortgage lending in the hands of a few big 
banks, primarily Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and U.S. 
Bancorp”); Kathleen M. Howley & Dakin Campbell, Banks Pad Profits as U.S. 
Prolongs Refinancing Boom: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 5, 2012, 12:54 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-05/banks-pad-profits-as-u-
s-prolongs-refinancing-boom-mortgages; Jody Shenn, Fed Helps Lenders’ Profit 
More than Homebuyers: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-25/fed-helps-lenders-profit-
more-than-homebuyers-mortgages. 
 44. Kathleen Pender, Red Flags as Wells Fargo Mortgages Grow, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 2, 2012, at G1 (showing that Wells Fargo, Chase, U.S. Bancorp, and 
BofA controlled 54% of the mortgage origination market during the first half of 
2012); supra notes 3, 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing how federal 
agencies provided assistance during the crisis that enabled those big banks to acquire 
competing lenders). 
 45. Dakin Campbell, Rising Rates Seen Squeezing Swaps Income at Biggest 
Banks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2013-09-26/rising-rates-seen-squeezing-swaps-income-at-biggest-
banks (reporting that the three big banks had earned $42 billion on interest-rate 
swaps since 2008 by taking the fixed side of those trades). 
 46. Charles S. Morris & Kristen Regehr, What Explains Low Net Interest 
Income at Community Banks?, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 59, 62, 65 (2014), available at www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/ 
pdf/14q2Morris-Regehr.pdf; see also William Bednar & Mahmoud Elamin, Rising 
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Community banks are also more asset-sensitive because they earn 
most of their profits from the net interest margin (NIM) between 
their loan yields and their deposit costs.47 ZIRP and QE significantly 
reduced the NIM for community banks, and the decline in NIM has 
been the most important factor behind the deterioration in the 
relative performance of community banks compared to larger 
banks.48 
When the federal government finally did promise to help 
community banks, it failed to deliver. In September 2010, President 
Obama signed the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Jobs Act).49 The 
Jobs Act required the Treasury Department to establish the Small 
Business Lending Fund (SBLF), which would invest up to $30 
billion in community banks and thereby enhance their ability to 
make small business loans.50 Treasury received applications for 
SBLF funding from 935 community banks.51 
However, Treasury shut down the SBLF program in September 
2011, after investing only $4.2 billion (just 14% of the authorized 
capital funds) in 332 community banks.52 Thus, Treasury approved 
                                                                                                       
Interest Rate Risk at US Banks, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, ECONOMIC 
COMMENTARY (2014), available at https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/Files/ 
Commentary%20PDFs/2014/2014-12-economic-commentary-rising-interest-rate-
risk-at-us-banks.pdf?la=en (showing that changes in interest rates would have 
different impacts on big banks and smaller banks, as rising interest rates would 
primarily affect the liabilities of the fifty largest banks but would affect both the 
liabilities and assets of smaller banks). 
 47. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 4-2 to 4-4; Morris 
& Regehr, supra note 46, at 59, 62, 65. 
 48. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 4-3 to 4-4, 4-9; 
Benjamin R. Backup, Community Bank Developments in 2012, 7 FDIC Q., no. 4, 
2013, at 27, 34-35, available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/ 
2013_vol7_4/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol7No4.pdf. 
 49. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504. 
 50. Id. § 4103, 124 Stat. 2585; see OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 80, 
157 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 SIGTARP REPORT], available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_25_2012_Report_to_Congress.
pdf (describing the Jobs Act and the SBLF); see also Kate Davidson, SBLF Left 
Weak Banks Behind in Tarp, Watchdog Agency Says, AM. BANKER (Apr. 25, 2012, 
12:03 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_79/SBLF-Tarp-repayment-
weak-banks-SIGTarp-Christy-Romero-1048710-1.html. (reporting that the Jobs Act 
authorized SBLF to “provide[] $30 billion to institutions with less than $10 billion 
of assets”). 
 51. 2012 SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 50, at 80, 157. 
 52. Kevin Wack, Lending Fund Puts Geithner on the Defensive, AM. 
BANKER, Oct. 19, 2011. 
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only about one-third of the applications it received from community 
banks for SBLF funding.53 Members of Congress sharply criticized 
Treasury for the onerous conditions it imposed on community bank 
applicants and for its long delays in approving SBLF applications.54 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner asserted that the Treasury did 
not have authority to help community banks under the Jobs Act 
unless they were “‘viable.’”55 He therefore claimed that Treasury 
“‘had to be careful to make sure that taxpayer resources were going 
to banks that were viable.’”56 
However, the Jobs Act did not require community banks to 
demonstrate that they were “viable” in order to receive SBLF 
funding. Rather, the Jobs Act specified that banks were barred from 
receiving SBLF investments if they were seriously troubled banks 
included on the FDIC’s “problem bank list.”57 Treasury’s insistence 
on a more exacting standard of “viability” for community banks, as a 
precondition for giving them SBLF aid, stood in sharp contrast to 
Treasury’s approach in February 2009, when Treasury and other 
federal agencies promised to provide all capital assistance necessary 
to ensure the viability of the nineteen largest banks.58 
B. Federal Regulators Provided Extensive Forbearance to the Largest 
Banks but Applied Stringent Enforcement and Examination 
Policies to Community Banks 
In addition to providing extraordinary assistance to the biggest 
banks, federal regulators followed a policy of leniency and 
                                                 
 53. 2012 SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 50, at 157-58 (stating that Treasury 
approved SBLF funding for only 332 of the 935 community banks that submitted 
applications). 
 54. Kate Davidson, Geithner: Regulators at Fault in SBLF Delays, AM. 
BANKER, June 23, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Treasury did not approve a single 
application for SBLF funding during the first nine months of the program’s 
existence); Wack, supra note 52. 
 55. Davidson, supra note 54 (quoting Secretary Geithner’s testimony 
during a congressional hearing in June 2011, where he said that community banks 
must be “viable” to receive SBLF funding under the Jobs Act). 
 56. Wack, supra note 52 (quoting Secretary Geithner’s statement during a 
congressional hearing in October 2011). 
 57. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 4103(d)(4), 
124 Stat. 2504, 2588 (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining the FDIC’s 
“problem bank list” to include “the list of depository institutions having a current 
rating of 4 or 5” based on the federal regulators’ examination rating system). 
 58. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the federal 
agencies’ announcement on Feb. 23, 2009). 
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forbearance with respect to those banks. During a Senate committee 
hearing on February 24, 2009—the day after regulators pledged to 
ensure the survival of the nineteen largest banks—Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke told committee members that “regulators would not 
employ ‘prompt-corrective-action’ tools” against any of those banks, 
even if the first stress test revealed that they were undercapitalized.59 
Senator Corker responded by questioning whether it was a good 
policy to send a “‘signal to the markets . . . that there are institutions 
in this country that absolutely will not fail and we will go to 
whatever lengths necessary’” to prevent their failure.60 Chairman 
Bernanke replied that “‘[w]e are committed to ensuring the viability 
of all of the major financial institutions.’”61 
The “prompt-corrective-action” (PCA) regime, to which 
Chairman Bernanke referred, was enacted in 1991. The PCA regime 
is not discretionary. It mandates that federal regulators must impose 
an escalating series of sanctions (including capital directives and 
other enforcement orders) against all undercapitalized banks.62 
Nevertheless, consistent with Chairman Bernanke’s statement, 
federal regulators did not issue PCA orders or other formal capital 
enforcement orders against any of the largest banks, even though (1) 
emergency acquisitions were needed to prevent the disorderly 
failures of Wamu and Wachovia, and (2) Citigroup and BofA 
required extraordinary assistance to survive.63 Instead of issuing 
public enforcement orders against Citigroup and BofA, federal 
                                                 
 59. Steven Sloan, Bernanke: ‘Don’t Need’ to Nationalize Weak Banks, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 25, 2009, at 1 (paraphrasing and quoting Chairman Bernanke). 
 60. Id. (quoting Senator Corker). 
 61. Id. (quoting Chairman Bernanke). 
 62. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: 
The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 325-48 (1993) 
(explaining that the PCA regime “requires regulators to impose increasingly 
stringent restrictions and requirements on an institution as its capital declines below 
required levels”). 
 63. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An 
Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 690-93 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a 
Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1283, 1346-47 (2013) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Blind Eye]. Citigroup’s tangible 
common equity (TCE) ratio fell to 1.5% or less in early 2009, indicating that it was 
seriously undercapitalized, while BoA’s TCE ratio declined to 2.8% at the end of 
2008. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra, at 1346-47 n.289; Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra 
note 14, at 112-13; see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining 
that the federal government provided $850 billion of assistance to ensure the 
survival of Citigroup and BofA and also provided support for Chase’s takeover of 
Wamu and Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia). 
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“regulators entered into confidential memoranda of understanding” 
(MOUs) with those banks, as regulators had also done when the 
same banks were in deep trouble during the banking crisis of the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, before the PCA regime took effect.64 
The federal government allowed only one depository institution 
larger than $100 billion—Wamu—to fail between 2008 and 2012.65 
Most regulators viewed Wamu with disdain as a poorly managed 
thrift that acted recklessly in originating large volumes of risky 
subprime mortgages and option adjustable-rate mortgages (option 
ARMs). Regulators decided to let Wamu fail in September 2008, 
after the FDIC arranged for Chase to acquire Wamu’s assets and to 
assume all of Wamu’s deposits (including its uninsured deposits).66 
Wamu was clearly an outlier in terms of the regulators’ 
willingness to tolerate a large failure that imposed any losses on 
creditors.67 After Wamu failed, federal agencies (1) took all 
necessary measures in late 2008 to prevent the failures of Wachovia, 
Citigroup, and BofA, even though all three megabanks engaged in 
                                                 
 64. Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation, supra note 23, at 744 
(discussing the MOUs that regulators arranged with Citigroup and BofA in 2008 and 
2009); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 304-05 (discussing the MOUs 
that regulators arranged with BofA and Citicorp during the late 1980s and early 
1990s). 
 65. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining that Wamu, with 
$307 billion of assets, was the only depository institution larger than $100 billion 
that failed between 2008 and 2012). 
 66. FCIC REPORT, supra note 18, at 20, 107-08, 117-18, 172, 305-07, 365-
66 (describing Wamu’s reckless lending practices and the decision to allow Wamu 
to fail in September 2008); WESSEL, supra note 3, at 218-21 (same). Only one 
agency—the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the primary regulator of Wamu—
criticized the decision to let Wamu fail. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 18, at 382 
(quoting a statement by OTS Director John Reich in November 2008, in which he 
questioned the decisions by federal regulators to allow IndyMac and Wamu to fail). 
In 2010, OTS Acting Director John Bowman similarly criticized the decisions to 
permit IndyMac and Wamu to fail. Mr. Bowman declared: “‘Institutions much 
larger than Washington Mutual—for example, Citigroup and Bank of America—
collapsed . . . . [T]he OTS did not regulate the largest banks that failed; the OTS 
regulated the largest banks that were allowed to fail.’” Cheyenne Hopkins, On 
Foreign Soil, Acting OTS Head Attacks Dodd–Frank Act, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 
2010, at 7 (quoting John Bowman, Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision). 
 67. The terms for Wamu’s failure were controversial because the FDIC 
refused to protect Wamu’s unsecured bondholders, a decision that the Treasury 
Department and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner strongly opposed. After 
Wamu’s failure triggered an immediate run by Wachovia’s uninsured creditors, 
federal regulators decided that they would not permit any other large depository 
institution to fail without arranging a transaction that protected all creditors. FCIC 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 365-86; WESSEL, supra note 3, at 218-41, 259-63. 
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reckless subprime lending,68 and (2) declared in February 2009 that 
regulators would ensure the survival of all banks larger than $100 
billion.69 
Federal regulators arranged additional generous forbearance 
measures for big banks. During the spring of 2009, regulators and 
members of Congress pressured the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) to issue interpretations that significantly relaxed 
FASB’s fair value accounting rules. Those interpretations allowed 
major banks to avoid reporting further mark-to-market losses on their 
holdings of risky MBS, CDOs, and other illiquid securities.70 For 
example, Citigroup held $55 billion of subprime mortgages, MBS, 
and CDOs in its trading accounts in the fall of 2007, and Citigroup 
recorded $26 billion of losses on those assets by the fall of 2008.71 
Citigroup and other major U.S. and European banks probably would 
have suffered further significant mark-to-market losses if FASB had 
not relaxed its rules for valuing illiquid securities in April 2009.72 
Federal regulators also helped megabanks by granting a one-year 
postponement (until 2011) of the effective date for new FASB rules 
requiring banks to bring securitized assets held in off-balance-sheet 
conduits back onto their balance sheets.73 
Moreover, regulators allowed megabanks to defer taking large 
losses on home equity loans and other second-lien loans secured by 
                                                 
 68. FCIC REPORT, supra note 18, at 19, 71-72, 113-18, 130-34, 137-39, 
168-69, 260-65, 302-07, 366-71, 379-82; see also infra note 104 (discussing 
irresponsible lending by Citigroup and BofA). 
 69. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 70. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1348-49; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-71, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RECENT BANK FAILURES 73-84, 98-102 (2013) [hereinafter GAO 
BANK FAILURE REPORT] (describing fair value accounting rules and discussing the 
impact of changes that FASB made to those rules in April 2009). 
 71. Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 99-100, 110-12 (explaining that 
Citigroup held $55 billion of subprime mortgages, MBS, and CDOs related to its 
securitization business in the fall of 2007 and, after recording large write-downs, 
still held $29 billion of such assets in November 2008). 
 72. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1348-49; see also Michael 
Corkery & Al Yoon, Crisis Plus Five: A Toxic Bond’s Legacy Lives On, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 13, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the market value of an issue of subprime 
RBMS underwritten by Countrywide in 2006 “was down by more than half in value 
by the summer of 2009”); Maud Van Gaal & Corina Ruhe, Dutch Sell ING’s U.S. 
Mortgage Bonds for $8.9 Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:32 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-06/dutch-sell-ing-s-u-s-mortgage 
-backed-bonds-for-8-9-billion (stating that the market value of private label MBS 
backed by option ARMs declined to “as low as 33 cents [on the dollar] in 2009”). 
 73. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1349-51. 
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“underwater” homes whose first mortgages exceeded their fair 
market value.74 The Big Four “held $475 billion of second-lien loans 
at the end of 2008,” but regulators did not require banks to begin 
taking substantial write-downs on those loans until 2012.75 
Regulatory forbearance for second-lien loans held by big banks 
evidently persisted after 2012. In March 2014, BofA, Wells Fargo, 
and Chase—the “three biggest home equity lenders”—still held $250 
billion of second-lien loans, and a news report warned that many of 
those loans were at increased risk of default because their payment 
terms would soon “switch from interest-only to include principal” 
installments.76 
Federal regulators did not grant any similar type of forbearance 
to community banks during the recent financial crisis and its 
aftermath. Regulators issued more than 1,400 PCA directives and 
other formal capital enforcement orders against banks smaller than 
$30 billion between 2008 and 2010.77 Federal regulators also did not 
allow community banks to postpone taking write-downs on impaired 
loans. After reviewing recent bank failures, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) determined that federal bank 
examiners forced many community banks to recognize losses on 
commercial real estate (CRE) loans after market values for the 
underlying real estate collateral fell below the outstanding balances 
of the loans. When calculating the magnitude of collateral shortfalls, 
some examiners reportedly challenged the validity of appraisals 
obtained by community bank lenders and required larger write-
downs.78 A former Comptroller of the Currency remarked that “the 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 1353 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1351-55 (observing that (1) “[i]n 2011, BofA still carried second-
lien loans on its books at 93% of their face value, even though investors typically 
discounted such loans by 50%”; and (2) the Big Four still held $400 billion of 
second-lien loans on their books in March 2012). 
 76. John Gittelsohn, Default Risk Rises on 20% of Boom-Era Home-Equity 
Loans, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 7, 2014, 10:09 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-07/default-risk-rises-on-20-of-
boom-era-home-equity-loans. 
 77. Hill, supra note 63, at 658-62, 668-77, 691 (stating that Colonial Bank 
was the largest bank that received a formal capital order between 2008 and 2010); 
infra note 85 (showing that Colonial Bank failed in August 2009 with $25 billion of 
assets). 
 78. GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra note 70, at 29-34. The GAO 
determined that, with respect to CRE loans that were not likely to be repaid by 
projected cash flows from the project, federal regulators “would direct the bank to 
write down the loan balances to the fair value of the collateral.” Id. at 32. Thus, 
“federal banking regulators required banks to use the fair value of collateral method 
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flexibility the regulatory community has shown vis-à-vis the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ banks—roughly defined as [the nineteen] banks subject 
to the [first] stress test—has not been in evidence for the community 
banking sector.”79 
The sharp disparity in regulatory treatment for megabanks and 
community banks is also reflected in the very different examination 
practices followed by federal regulators with respect to the two 
categories of banks. For megabanks, regulators “focused on 
evaluating the risk management policies and procedures . . . as well 
as the banks’ ‘internal [risk] models’ and ‘credit risk metrics,’” but 
they “stopped doing traditional ‘full scope’ examinations.”80 In 
contrast, for community banks, regulators applied “‘transaction 
testing’” with a vengeance, as shown by the GAO’s report on bank 
failures and a similar report prepared by the FDIC’s Inspector 
                                                                                                       
when determining the appropriate impairment amount of a collateral-dependent 
loan.” Id. at 33. The GAO cited a report received from one state banking association, 
which claimed that federal bank “examiners questioned some of the appraisals banks 
had obtained and made adjustments to them, driving larger valuation allowances, 
and when required, larger write-downs, than may have been warranted.” Id. at 31-
32. For other reports of complaints by community banks about unduly harsh 
examination practices by federal regulators, see Thecla Fabian, Bank Supervision: 
House Financial Services Panel Analyzes Complaints of Bank Examination 
Practices, 97 BNA’S BANKING REP. 62 (2011); Thecla Fabian, Small Business: 
Small Business Lending Return Complicated by Underwater Collateral, New 
Examinations, 94 BNA’S BANKING REP. 463 (2010); see also Thecla Fabian, 
Community Banks: Large Banks, Shadow Banks Caused Crisis, Community Banks 
Still Lend, ICBA Tells FCIC, 94 BNA’S BANKING REP. 103 (2010) (paraphrasing 
testimony by C.R. “Rusty” Cloutier, a community bank president, who said that 
“field examiners are overzealous and unduly overreaching and are, in some cases, 
second guessing bankers and professional independent appraisers and demanding 
overly aggressive write downs and reclassification of [CRE] loans and other 
assets”). 
 79. Eugene A. Ludwig, Viewpoint: Time to Help Community Banks in 
Crisis, AM. BANKER, Sept. 18, 2009, at 9. 
 80. Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 130 (quoting Memorandum from 
Richard Spillenkothen, Former Dir., Banking Supervision & Regulation, Fed. 
Reserve Bd. 10-11 (May 31, 2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-05-31%20FRB%20Richard%20S 
pillenkothen%20Paper-%20Observations%20on%20the%20Performance%20of%20 
Prudential%20Supervision.pdf); see also id. at 131 (quoting testimony at a 
congressional hearing in May 1997 by Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, where he 
stated that the Fed was seeking to avoid “‘unduly intrusive’ supervision” and was 
“following ‘a more risk-focused/less transaction-testing approach’” to examinations 
by giving primary attention to “‘risk management and control systems’” within large 
banking companies). 
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General.81 Both reports documented the exacting scrutiny that bank 
examiners gave to individual CRE loans made by community 
banks.82 
FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig recently criticized 
federal regulators for abandoning “‘full-scope examinations’” of 
major banks, and he proposed “that bank examiners should ‘spend 
more time studying individual [transaction] files to verify the quality 
of a [large] bank’s internal reports about its risk management 
capability.’”83 However, federal banking agencies evidently have not 
adopted Mr. Hoenig’s proposal to apply rigorous “‘transaction-
testing’” to big banks.84 
The ultimate divergence in regulatory treatment for megabanks 
and community banks is shown by the fact that federal regulators 
guaranteed the survival of the nineteen largest banks but stood by 
while more than 450 community banks failed between 2008 and 
2012.85 During the banking crisis of the 1980s, prior to the enactment 
                                                 
 81. See authorities cited infra at note 82.  
 82. GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra note 70, at 29-34; see also FDIC 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EVAL-13-002, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE FAILURE OF INSURED DEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTIONS 48-58, 68-84 (2013), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/ 
reports13/13-002EV.pdf. 
 83. Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 131 (quoting Mr. Hoenig’s 
comments during a speech in November 2012 and a subsequent interview in 
February 2013). 
 84. Id. at 131 & n.493 (citing a news report indicating that “some ‘D.C. 
policy watchers’ were ‘skeptical’ about Hoenig’s proposal for full-scope 
examinations for big banks” (quoting Joe Adler, FDIC’s Hoenig Proposes ‘Full 
Scope’ Big Bank Exams, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 2013, at 1)); see also Tracy Ryan, 
The Man Who Has Wall Street Banks on Edge, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2014, at C1 
(describing opposition by Wall Street banks against Mr. Hoenig’s proposals for 
other measures that would impose stronger controls on megabanks). 
 85. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (describing the federal 
agencies’ guarantee of survival for the nineteen largest banks in February 2009). 
According to FDIC records, 465 banks failed between January 2008 and December 
2012. FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile: Fourth Quarter 2012: Highlights from the 
2012 Summary of Deposits, 7 FDIC Q., no. 1, 2013, at 17, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2013_vol7_1/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol7
No1.pdf. Of those failed banks, only nine institutions had assets of more than $10 
billion and only two institutions had assets of more than $30 billion. See Bank 
Failures in Brief: 2010, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/ 
bank/2010/index.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015) (showing that Westernbank failed 
in April 2010 with $11.9 billion of assets); Bank Failures in Brief: 2009, FDIC, 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2009/index.html (last updated Jan. 5, 
2015) (showing that AmTrust Bank failed in December 2009 with $12 billion of 
assets; United Commercial Bank failed in November 2009 with $11.2 billion of 
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of PCA, federal regulators acted much differently and adopted a 
policy of forbearance for small agricultural banks. Regulators sought 
to avoid unnecessary write-downs on restructured agricultural loans 
and also provided “capital forbearance” to 301 community banks.86 
More than three-quarters of the banks that received forbearance 
either survived the crisis or entered into mergers without FDIC 
assistance.87 The FDIC later determined that (1) the various bank 
forbearance programs of the 1980s (including those for agricultural 
banks and savings banks) would not have been consistent with the 
subsequently enacted PCA regime, and (2) a strict application of the 
PCA regime during the banking crisis of the 1980s would have 
forced regulators to close more than 200 banks that ultimately 
survived that crisis.88 During the recent financial crisis, as shown 
above, federal regulators rigorously followed PCA’s no-forbearance 
regime with respect to community banks but suspended PCA 
treatment for the largest banks (even though regulators lacked 
statutory authority for that suspension).89 
II. COMMUNITY BANKS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS, BUT THE OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS HAS RAISED 
DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO CONTINUE PROVIDING CRUCIAL 
SUPPORT FOR SMALL BUSINESSES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
As shown below, there is wide agreement that large, complex 
financial institutions (LCFIs) and credit ratings agencies (CRAs) 
bear primary responsibility within the private sector for the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009. However, the crisis triggered a severe and 
                                                                                                       
assets; Guaranty Bank and Colonial Bank failed in August 2009 with $13 billion and 
$25 billion of assets, respectively; and BankUnited failed in May 2009 with $12.8 
billion of assets); Bank Failures in Brief: 2008, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015) (showing that 
Downey Savings failed in November 2008 with $12.8 billion of assets; Wamu failed 
in September 2008 with $307 billion of assets; and IndyMac Bank failed in June 
2008 with $32 billion of assets). 
 86. FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 49 (1997) 
[hereinafter FDIC BANKING HISTORY], available at https://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/historical/history/. 
 87. Id. at 49-50, 117-18 (describing the regulatory forbearance program for 
agricultural banks and explaining that, of the 301 banks granted forbearance under 
that program, 201 banks survived the crisis and another thirty-five merged without 
FDIC assistance, while sixty-five failed). 
 88. Id. at 51-55 (estimating that the PCA regime would have required the 
FDIC to close 209 banks that ultimately survived the crisis). 
 89. See supra notes 59-64, 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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prolonged recession that caused hundreds of failures among 
community banks. In turn, those failures have raised doubts about 
the continued ability of community banks to fulfill their central role 
in supporting small businesses and local communities. The future 
viability of community banks has also been called into question 
because of (1) the highly preferential TBTF treatment that 
megabanks received during the financial crisis, and (2) the costly 
new compliance requirements that Dodd–Frank and the Basel III 
capital accord have imposed on community banks. 
A. Community Banks Were Not Responsible for the Financial Crisis, 
but They Suffered Devastating Losses During the Ensuing 
Recession  
Most analysts and policymakers agree that LCFIs—including 
the biggest banks, the largest securities firms, and AIG—were the 
most important private-sector catalysts for the financial crisis of 
2007–2009. With the active assistance of CRAs, LCFIs created the 
marketing, funding, and securitization programs that financed 
trillions of dollars of subprime mortgages and option ARMs, and 
thereby precipitated an unsustainable and catastrophic housing 
boom.90 Megabanks used securitization, along with highly automated 
marketing and loan approval techniques, to become the unchallenged 
leaders in residential mortgage lending and other forms of retail 
lending by 2007, and they further increased their dominance by 
acquiring troubled lenders (with the federal government’s help) 
during the crisis.91 
                                                 
 90. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 13, at 1002-46; Wilmarth, Dodd–
Frank, supra note 15, at 963-79; accord SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 
BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 5-6, 
10-12, 120-74 (2010); Tanya D. Marsh & Joseph W. Norman, The Impact of Dodd–
Frank on Community Banks 22-26 (Wake Forest Univ., Legal Studies Paper No. 
2,302,392, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302392; see also DALLAS 
FED. 2011 REPORT, supra note 30, at 3, 7, 11 (“TBTF institutions were at the center 
of the financial crisis”); id. at 14 (“TBTF banks remain at the epicenter of the 
foreclosure mess and the backlog of toxic assets standing in the way of a housing 
revival”); THOMAS M. HOENIG, PRESIDENT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, 
REGULATORY REFORM AND THE ECONOMY: WE CAN DO BETTER 8 (2009), available 
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/Denver.Forums.10.06. 
09.pdf (stating that the “largest [financial] firms . . . were central to this crisis as it 
expanded and became a global recession”). 
 91. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 13, at 988-91, 1008-24; Wilmarth, 
Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 958-59, 984-85; see also FDIC COMMUNITY 
BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 5-1 to 5-2; GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra 
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In contrast, community banks had very little involvement in 
subprime lending or other forms of securitized lending.92 Unlike big 
banks, community banks typically did not sell substantial 
percentages of their residential mortgages for securitization and 
instead held most of those loans in their portfolios.93 In addition, 
most community banks originated home mortgages through their 
own loan officers and did not rely on mortgage brokers.94 
This personalized, portfolio-based lending approach gave 
community banks strong incentives and a superior ability to screen 
and monitor their home mortgage loans carefully.95 As a result, their 
residential mortgages had a much lower default rate between 2009 
and 2012, compared with mortgages made by larger banks.96 A 
recent study found that (1) counties in which community banks had a 
                                                                                                       
note 70, at 9. Between 1984 and 2011, retail loans (including residential mortgages 
and other consumer loans) declined from 61% to 36% of all loans held by 
community banks. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 5-1. During 
the same period, retail loans rose from 35% to 54% of all loans held by 
noncommunity banks. Id. 
 92. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 23-25 (stating that “community 
banks were very minor players in the subprime lending market” and “participated in 
only 0.07 percent of residential mortgage securitization activities between 2003 and 
2010”); see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the 
North Carolina Bankers Association Annual Convention: Large Banks and Small 
Banks in an Era of Systemic Risk Regulation (June 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20090615a.htm (“The 
financial crisis did not originate in smaller banks . . . .”). 
 93. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 14; Elizabeth A. Duke, Governor, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Community Bankers Symposium: Community 
Banks and Mortgage Lending (Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Duke Nov. 9, 2012 
Speech], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke 
20121109a.pdf. A recent survey of community banks by the Independent 
Community Bankers of America (ICBA) determined that “50 percent of 
respondents . . . hold all of their mortgage loans in portfolio, and 72 percent of 
respondents hold at least half of their mortgage loans in portfolio.” INDEP. CMTY. 
BANKERS OF AM., COMMUNITY BANK REGULATORY RELIEF WILL GROW ECONOMY 
AND CREATE JOBS 4 (2014) [hereinafter ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS], 
available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test040814a.pdf (citing 
results of Sept. 2012 survey). 
 94. Kathy Fogel, Raja Kali & Tim Yeager, Have Community Banks 
Reduced Home Foreclosure Rates?, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2498, 2500 (2011). 
 95. Id. at 2498, 2500. 
 96. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 24-25 (“Since 2009, portfolio 
default rates [for residential mortgages] have averaged 0.23 percent at community 
banks versus 3.62 percent at all [banking] institutions”); see also Gunther & 
Klemme, supra note 1, at 3, 7 (showing that “within the beleaguered residential real 
estate category, . . . community banks exhibited performance far superior to the 
nation’s largest financial institutions”). 
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larger than average presence experienced significantly lower rates of 
home foreclosures from 2005 to 2008, and (2) the foreclosure-
reducing impact of greater community bank presence became even 
more significant as the mortgage crisis deepened after 2006.97 
As the highly automated systems of big banks captured a 
steadily increasing share of retail lending markets (including home 
mortgages) after the mid-1980s, community banks were forced to 
shift more of their lending activities to the CRE market. Community 
banks significantly expanded their holdings of CRE loans between 
1984 and 2011.98 Applications by borrowers for CRE loans increased 
as the housing boom and a stronger economy created rising demand 
by tenants for retail and office space during the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, the sudden collapse of the housing market in 2007 had 
disastrous spillover effects on the CRE market. The housing bust 
plunged the U.S. economy into a deep recession, causing many retail 
stores and business offices to close. Widespread closures of stores 
and offices bankrupted CRE owners and triggered a cascade of 
falling market values for shopping malls and office buildings.99 
CRE loans made by community banks during the 1990s and 
2000s were typically secured by smaller, less glamorous commercial 
properties located in towns, smaller cities, and suburbs of larger 
cities. Most insurance companies, real estate investment trusts, and 
other institutional investors (including investors in commercial 
MBS) did not invest in the types of properties that served as 
collateral for CRE loans made by community banks. Consequently, 
when owners of those commercial properties fell behind in their 
                                                 
 97. Fogel, Kali & Yeager, supra note 94, at 2498-99, 2503-09. 
 98. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE LOSSES AND THE RISK TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 19 (2010) [hereinafter 
COP CRE REPORT], available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/ 
20110402035627/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-021110-report.pdf; FDIC 
COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 5-1 (stating that between 1984 and 
2011, CRE loans doubled from 21% to 42% as a share of total loans held by 
community banks). 
 99. Tanya D. Marsh, Too Big to Fail vs. Too Small to Notice: Addressing 
the Commercial Real Estate Debt Crisis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 321, 322-24, 328-31, 344-
48 (2012); COP CRE REPORT, supra note 98, at 18-36, 80-81; see also Ari Levy & 
Daniel Taub, Defaulting Commercial Properties Hit Banks on Vacancy-Rate Rise, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2009, 8:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?sid=aR72TKlxCQ7A&pid=newsarchive (reporting that “U.S. banks, battered 
by record losses from the worst housing slump since the Great Depression, now 
must weather increasing loan delinquencies from owners of skyscrapers and 
shopping malls” because the severe recession was forcing many retail outlets and 
business offices to close). 
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payments on loans from community banks, there were very few, if 
any, options for refinancing or selling those properties.100 Community 
banks incurred large losses as growing numbers of their CRE loans 
defaulted, and losses on CRE loans proved to be a leading cause for 
many community bank failures.101 
As Tanya Marsh has pointed out, “[t]here was no systemic 
fraud” and “no subprime aspect” in the CRE loans originated by 
community banks during the period leading up to the financial 
crisis.102 The CRE crisis was the direct result of the bursting of a 
catastrophic housing bubble—a bubble that LCFIs generated without 
any meaningful involvement from community banks. In January 
2010, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair observed that “traditional 
[banking] institutions . . . suffered . . . collateral damage from the . . 
. economic undertow created by the collapse of the housing 
bubble.”103 Professor Marsh has criticized federal agencies—
justifiably, in my view—for “allow[ing] community banks to fail due 
to circumstances that were ultimately beyond their control, 
particularly after stepping in to stabilize ‘systemically important’ 
financial institutions like Citigroup and Bank of America,” which 
were deeply implicated in the irresponsible lending practices that 
fueled the housing boom.104 
                                                 
 100. Marsh, supra note 99, at 348-57, 373-79; COP CRE REPORT, supra note 
98, at 38, 42-44, 62-64, 78-80. 
 101. Marsh, supra note 99, at 371-72 (noting that 86% of the 322 banks that 
failed between January 2008 and December 2010 had high concentrations in CRE 
lending); see also GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra note 70, at 29-31 (discussing 
evidence that “declining collateral values of impaired collateral-dependent loans—
particularly CRE and [acquisition, development, and construction] loans—drove 
both credit losses and charge-offs” that led to the failures of many community 
banks). 
 102. Marsh, supra note 99, at 375. 
 103. Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC, Statement Before the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission: The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis (Jan. 14, 
2010) [hereinafter Bair FCIC Testimony] (emphasis added), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2010/spjan1410.html. 
 104. Marsh, supra note 99, at 375 & n.252 (quoting a comment during a 
2010 congressional hearing by Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL), who stated that “‘our 
larger institutions . . . have been protected and insulated, when, really, a lot of the 
risk-taking and what happened was a direct result of some of their activities, [while] 
our smaller banks and our businesses and commercial real estate is [sic] more of a 
victim of what they did[, a]nd it is really not a fair approach that has been taken’” 
(quoting Alternatives for Promoting Liquidity in the Commercial Real Estate 
Markets, Supporting Small Businesses, and Increasing Job Growth: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 26 (2010) (statement of Rep. Spencer 
Bachus))); Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 90-105 (describing Citigroup’s 
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As explained above, federal regulators allowed more than 450 
community banks to fail, but they aggressively intervened to ensure 
the survival or assisted acquisition of all but one institution that was 
larger than $100 billion.105 Community banks did not deserve their 
much harsher fate because their overall performance during the 
financial crisis was significantly better than the performance of 
larger banks. In fact, community banks recorded substantially lower 
levels of noncurrent loans and charged-off loans throughout the 
crisis, compared with bigger banks.106 Decisions by federal officials 
to rescue big banks but not community banks were ultimately driven 
by regulators’ concerns about maintaining financial stability, and 
regulators gave no weight to the relative performance of larger and 
smaller banks.107 
                                                                                                       
reckless subprime lending and securitization practices); Victoria Finkle & Joe Adler, 
Three Takeaways from Citi’s $7B Mortgage Settlement, AM. BANKER (July 14, 
2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/ArticlePreview?client_id= 
americanbanker_ab&story_id=1068646 (reporting on Citigroup’s agreement to pay 
$7 billion to “resolve a whole host of state and federal claims over how the bank 
packaged and sold mortgage-related assets that soured during the crisis” and 
defrauded investors); Tom Schoenberg, Hugh Son & David McLaughlin, BofA to 
Pay $16.7 Billion to End U.S. Mortgage Probes, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 21, 2014, 
9:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-21/bofa-agrees-to-
pay-16-65-billion-to-end-u-s-mortgage-probes (reporting on BofA’s $16.7 billion 
agreement with federal and state agencies to settle claims that “Bank of America and 
its Merrill Lynch and Countrywide Financial units sold billions of dollars of 
mortgage securities backed by toxic loans and misrepresented the risks to 
investors”); Bonnie Sinnock, What Bank of America Actually Did Wrong, NAT’L 
MORTGAGE NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014, 3:42 PM), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/blogs/hearing/what-bank-of-america-
actually-did-wrong-1042482-1.html (reporting that the “30-page statement of facts” 
issued by the United States Department of Justice in connection with BofA’s 
settlement “shows how Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, both of which B of A 
acquired—as well as B of A itself—removed an increasing number of [mortgage] 
underwriting requirements over time without clear disclosure to investors”). 
 105. See supra notes 22-23, 65-69, 85 and accompanying text. 
 106. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 4-5 to 4-6; 
Gunther & Klemme, supra note 1, at 3, 6; see also FDIC, Quarterly Banking 
Profile: Fourth Quarter 2014, 9 FDIC Q., no. 1, 2014, at 11 [hereinafter FDIC 
Fourth Quarter 2014 Report], available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/quarterly/2015_vol9_1/FDIC_4Q2014_v9n1.pdf (showing that, at the end 
of 2014, banks larger than $10 billion still reported the highest percentages of “Total 
loans and leases” that were delinquent (thirty to eighty-nine days past due) or 
noncurrent or charged-off, compared with banks in the smaller size categories, 
except that banks with assets under $100 million reported the highest percentage of 
delinquent loans). 
 107. See supra Part I. As economist James Barth has noted, “‘Many 
[community] banks were too small to save. . . . Other banks were too big to allow to 
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B. Community Banks Face Costly New Compliance Burdens Under 
the Dodd–Frank Act and Basel III 
Some provisions of Dodd–Frank help community banks either 
by granting exemptions from particular statutory requirements or by 
giving more favorable treatment to smaller banks. For example, the 
provisions of Titles I and II dealing with systemically significant 
financial institutions (SIFIs) apply only to bank holding companies 
larger than $50 billion.108 Title X exempts banks smaller than $10 
billion from direct supervision and enforcement by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), although Title X still requires 
smaller banks to comply with the CFPB’s rules.109 
Two provisions of Title III assist community banks by raising 
the per-account deposit insurance ceiling from $100,000 to $250,000 
and by requiring the FDIC to amend its deposit insurance assessment 
formula so that larger banks pay a higher (and fairer) percentage of 
deposit insurance assessments.110 Two other sections of Dodd–Frank 
benefit smaller banks by (1) removing a requirement that previously 
compelled small publicly traded banks to include in their annual 
audits a report on the effectiveness of their internal controls over 
financial reporting,111 and (2) exempting banks smaller than $10 
                                                                                                       
fail. There is an inequity there.’” Steve Matthews, ‘Ring of Death’ Throttles Georgia 
as Small Banks Close: Economy, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 19, 2014, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-19/-ring-of-death-throttles-
georgia-as-banks-too-small-to-save (quoting James Barth, Finance Professor at 
Auburn University). 
 108. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 29-30; Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, 
supra note 15, at 993-98, 1006-09. 
 109. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1026, 124 Stat. 1376, 1993-95 (2010); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: IMPACT OF THE 
DODD–FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS 30-35 (2012) 
[hereinafter GAO DODD–FRANK IMPACT STUDY] (discussing § 1026 and other 
provisions of Title X that apply to community banks); see also Marsh & Norman, 
supra note 90, at 32-33 (same). 
 110. Dodd–Frank §§ 331, 335; see also GAO DODD–FRANK IMPACT STUDY, 
supra note 109, at 22-25 (discussing §§ 331 and 335, and noting the FDIC’s views 
that (1) the new deposit insurance assessment formula mandated by § 331 has 
“shifted some of the overall assessment burden from community banks to the largest 
institutions” and “has resulted in a sharing of the [deposit insurance fund] 
assessment burden that better reflects each group’s share of industry assets,” and (2) 
the higher deposit insurance coverage limit of $250,000 “should help community 
banks attract and retain core deposits”). 
 111. Dodd–Frank § 989(G); see also GAO DODD–FRANK IMPACT STUDY, 
supra note 109, at 25-27 (discussing § 989(G)). 
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billion from the Durbin Amendment’s limitation on debit card 
interchange fees.112 
The foregoing provisions of Dodd–Frank reflect a growing 
congressional appreciation of the need for a two-tiered approach that 
would establish separate regulatory regimes for community banks 
and larger banks.113 However, Dodd–Frank does not go far enough in 
establishing different standards for small and large banks. Instead, 
Dodd–Frank imposes complex and costly new compliance burdens 
on community banks.114 
In 2013, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University 
conducted a survey of community bankers (the Mercatus Small Bank 
Survey) to determine the impact of Dodd–Frank on small banks.115 
According to the results of that survey, (1) over four-fifths of 
respondents stated that Dodd–Frank had increased their banks’ 
compliance costs by more than 5%; (2) many respondents said that 
their banks would need to hire additional staff members to meet their 
new compliance requirements; and (3) over four-fifths of 
respondents viewed Dodd–Frank as being even more burdensome for 
their banks than the Bank Secrecy Act.116 Other anecdotal reports 
indicate that growing compliance burdens and costs are major factors 
leading community bankers either to abandon traditional lines of 
business or to sell their institutions to larger banks.117 
                                                 
 112. Dodd–Frank § 1075; see also GAO DODD–FRANK IMPACT STUDY, supra 
note 109, at 27-30 (discussing the Durbin Amendment, but noting concerns among 
community bankers that the two-tiered interchange fee structure established by the 
Durbin Amendment might not prove to be viable and therefore might not provide 
lasting benefits to community banks); Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 27-28 
(same). 
 113. Jeff Bater, Regulatory Reform: Senators Raise Questions of Two-Tiered 
Regulatory System for Banks Big and Small, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1071, 1071 
(2013); Rob Braswell, The Case for Tiered Regulation, AM. BANKER (June 11, 2014, 
12:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/the-case-for-tiered-
regulation-1068007-1.html. 
 114. Bater, supra note 113, at 1071; Braswell, supra note 113; Marsh & 
Norman, supra note 90, at 35-40. 
 115. Hester Peirce, Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, How Are Small 
Banks Faring Under Dodd–Frank? 16-19 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/how-
are-small-banks-faring-under-dodd-frank (describing the survey). 
 116. Id. at 34-37. 
 117. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 35-38; Jackie Stewart, Ranks of 
Tiny Banks Shrinking as Challenges Mount, AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 2014, at 2, 
available at 2014 WLNR 4711820; see also Jackie Stewart, A Quarter of 
Community Banks Expect to Sell Next Year: KPMG, AM. BANKER, Nov. 22, 2013, at 
2, available at 2013 WLNR 29274403. 
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New residential mortgage lending rules mandated by Title XIV 
of Dodd–Frank create particularly difficult obstacles for community 
banks. Section 1411 requires residential mortgage lenders to 
determine that their borrowers have “a reasonable ability to repay” 
their loans together with associated taxes, insurance, and mortgage 
guarantee costs.118 Home mortgage lenders that fail to satisfy the 
“ability to repay” (ATR) requirement are subject to enforcement 
actions and sanctions by regulators as well as civil claims for 
damages by borrowers.119 If a residential mortgage meets the criteria 
for a “qualified mortgage” (QM), as specified in the CFPB’s QM 
regulation, § 1412 creates a presumption that the lender has satisfied 
the ATR requirement.120 Unfortunately, the CFPB’s “QM regulation 
is so complex that an inadvertent failure to comply with the QM 
requirements may become a significant problem,”121 particularly for 
community banks that do not have large compliance staffs.122 
Respondents to the Mercatus Small Bank Survey expressed “general 
confusion . . . about how the mortgage rules apply to them,” and they 
described the QM regulation and Dodd–Frank’s other new 
                                                 
 118. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142-45 (2010); see also Marsh & Norman, 
supra note 90, at 33 (discussing § 1411). 
 119. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 34; Raymond Natter, What 
Happens If a Mortgage Is Not a QM Loan? 2-3 (Dec. 5, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371938. 
 120. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 34. The CFPB’s QM regulation 
provides a conclusive presumption in favor of QMs that have an interest rate within 
1.5% of the Average Prime Offer Rate (APOR) for first-lien loans, or within 3.5% 
of the APOR for junior-lien loans. Kevin L. Petrasic & Michael A. Hertzberg, 
Complying with the CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage Rule: Issues for Implementation, in 
PAUL HASTINGS, STAY CURRENT: A CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS 1, 4 (2013), 
available at http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=b516de69-
2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded. However, higher-priced QMs qualify only for a 
rebuttable presumption that the lender has satisfied the ATR requirement. Id. 
 121. Natter, supra note 119, at 1. 
 122. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 34 (stating that “the consequences 
for failing to understand, implement, or document” the CFPB’s QM regulation “are 
high,” and “community banks largely lack the in-house expertise to protect 
themselves from mistakes that could lead to costly litigation”). The CFPB has issued 
a “small entity compliance guide” that seeks “to provide an easy-to-use summary of 
the ATR/QM rule,” but that guide has a length of fifty pages. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE: SMALL ENTITY 
COMPLIANCE GUIDE 9 (2014) [hereinafter CFPB ATR/QM COMPLIANCE GUIDE], 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_atr-qm_small-entity-
compliance-guide.pdf. 
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requirements for home mortgages as creating onerous and costly 
compliance burdens.123 
Dodd–Frank’s new ATR and QM standards also present a 
direct challenge to the traditional business model of community 
banks. Many community banks provide customized mortgages that 
are designed to meet the special needs of small business owners and 
farmers, and many of those mortgages do not satisfy the standard 
QM criteria with regard to employment, income, and collateral. In 
addition, community banks cannot sell most of their customized 
mortgages to GSEs because they do not meet the GSEs’ prescribed 
criteria for “conforming” mortgages.124 Community banks must 
therefore retain customized mortgages for entrepreneurs and farmers 
in their portfolios. To mitigate the interest rate risk of retained 
mortgages, many community banks include balloon payment terms 
in their mortgages that require full repayment after three or five 
years.125 The ICBA recently estimated that community banks hold 
more than $400 billion in balloon payment mortgages that have been 
extended to over five million borrowers.126 
The CFPB’s QM regulation has a strong tendency “to 
homogenize the market for housing credit by incentivizing lenders to 
provide mortgage products that favor standard, prime borrowers, or 
mortgage products that conform to Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
standards.”127 The QM regulation’s incentives for “standardized” 
residential mortgages conflict with the business model followed by 
community banks, “which emphasizes relationship banking, 
personalized underwriting, and customization of financial products 
to meet the specific needs of customers and communities.”128 The 
QM regulation does include a “small creditor” exception, which 
provides QM treatment for mortgage loans originated by smaller 
                                                 
 123. Peirce, Robinson & Stratmann, supra note 115, at 49-52. Some 
respondents stated that their community banks had already decided to discontinue 
offering home mortgages because of the new Dodd–Frank rules. Id. at 49. 
 124. ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 3-6; see also 
Duke Nov. 9, 2012 Speech, supra note 93, at 8-10. 
 125. ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 3-5. 
 126. Id. at 4-5. 
 127. Petrasic & Hertzberg, supra note 120, at 7. 
 128. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 39; see also Peirce, Robinson & 
Stratmann, supra note 115, at 14 (“‘[M]any [community] bankers felt that the move 
toward standardized products and a “one-size-fits-all” supervisory approach were 
taking away one of the strongest advantages of community banks: the ability to 
tailor products to fit individualized needs.’” (quoting CSBS COMMUNITY BANKING 
STUDY, supra note 1, at 15)). 
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banks that operate primarily in “rural” or “underserved” counties if 
their loans satisfy a number of requirements designed to protect 
borrowers.129 However, the “small creditor” exception is far too 
narrow to accommodate the mortgage lending practices of many 
community banks.130 As a result, the “QM rule poses a daunting 
challenge” for community banks that wish to continue making 
customized mortgages to entrepreneurs and farmers.131 
Community bankers have also expressed great concerns about 
Dodd–Frank’s adverse impact on their mortgage servicing activities. 
Community banks typically retain mortgage servicing rights for a 
high percentage of the mortgages they originate. Community banks 
view mortgage servicing rights as an essential component of their 
business strategy to build long-term relationships with their 
customers.132 However, the CFPB’s new mortgage servicing rules 
under Dodd–Frank impose highly detailed and costly requirements.133 
The CFPB’s mortgage servicing rules include a “small servicer” 
exception, which exempts small servicers from some but not all of 
the prescribed requirements for mortgage servicing.134 However, the 
small servicer exception applies only to companies (including all 
affiliates) that service 5,000 or fewer mortgages, and it therefore fails 
to cover many community banks that are active in making and 
servicing home mortgages.135 
Section 171 of Dodd–Frank requires community banks to 
comply with new capital standards that federal regulators have 
                                                 
 129. CFPB ATR/QM COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 122, at 33-36 
(describing the small creditor exception, which applies to banks with less than $2 
billion of assets that originate mortgages predominantly in rural or underserved 
areas). 
 130. ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 6-7. 
 131. Id. at 3-10; accord Duke Nov. 9, 2012 Speech, supra note 93, at 5-14. 
 132. ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 8-9. 
 133. The CFPB has issued a “small entity compliance guide” that seeks “to 
provide an easy-to-use summary of the Mortgage Servicing Rules,” but that guide is 
more than 100 pages in length. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
(REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING FINAL RULES: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE 
GUIDE 11 (2014) [hereinafter CFPB MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPLIANCE GUIDE], 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_small-entity-
compliance-guide_tila-respa.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 16-19 (describing the small servicer exception). 
 135. ICBA REGULATORY RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 8-9; see also 
CFPB MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 133, at 16-19 
(explaining the small servicer exemption). 
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adopted to implement the Basel III capital accord.136 In July 2013, the 
federal banking agencies issued a new capital regulation under Basel 
III,137 and that regulation imposes much higher capital charges on 
mortgage servicing rights retained by banks. Under the new 
regulation, which takes effect in 2015, any bank (including a 
community bank) with mortgage servicing assets (MSAs) that 
exceed 10% of its “common equity tier 1 capital”138 will be required 
to deduct the excess amount from its regulatory capital. In addition, 
MSAs below the 10% threshold will be subject to a 250% risk 
weight.139 Consequently, beginning in 2015, community banks that 
service substantial numbers of home mortgages will be compelled to 
report “starkly lower capital ratios . . . or [will] be forced to raise 
new capital, a significant challenge for community banks in the 
current environment.”140 
Increased compliance costs under the new mortgage rules and 
higher capital charges under the new capital rule will probably cause 
many community banks to shrink or abandon their mortgage lending 
and servicing businesses.141 That outcome would be very harmful to 
consumers, entrepreneurs, farmers, and local communities because 
                                                 
 136. Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 30. 
 137. For a detailed overview of the new capital regulation issued in July 
2013, see SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, BANK CAPITAL RULES: FEDERAL RESERVE 
APPROVES FINAL RULES ADDRESSING BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION AND, FOR ALL 
BANKS, SUBSTANTIAL REVISIONS TO BASEL I-BASED RULES (2013), available at 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Bank_Capital%20_
Rules_Basel_III_7_3_13.pdf. The federal banking agencies have issued a guide “to 
help small, non-complex community banking organizations understand the sections 
of the capital rule . . . most relevant to their operations.” BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., FDIC & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NEW 
CAPITAL RULE: COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE 1 (2013) [hereinafter CAPITAL RULE 
COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ 
basel/files/capital_rule_community_bank_guide_20130709.pdf. 
 138. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 223-24 (5th ed. 2013) (describing the 
calculation of “common equity tier 1 capital” under federal capital regulations 
implementing Basel III). 
 139. CAPITAL RULE COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE, supra note 137, at 3; see also 
Examining Regulatory Relief Proposals for Community Financial Institutions, Part 
II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 4 (July 15, 2014) (statement of Samuel A. 
Vallandingham, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am.) [hereinafter Vallandingham 
Testimony], available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ 
test071514a.pdf. 
 140. Vallandingham Testimony, supra note 139, at 5. 
 141. Peirce, Robinson & Stratmann, supra note 115, at 49-52. 
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community banks originate almost one-fifth of all new residential 
mortgage loans each year.142 As discussed below, federal regulators 
should revise their mortgage rules and their new capital regulation to 
reduce Dodd–Frank’s burdens on community banks.143 
III. THE PRESERVATION OF A VIBRANT COMMUNITY BANKING 
SECTOR SHOULD BE A NATIONAL PRIORITY 
A. Community Banks Play Crucial Roles in Supporting Small 
Businesses and Local Communities 
The small business sector is a highly important sector in our 
economy. The health of the small business sector depends in large 
part on the ability of community banks to fulfill their traditional role 
as relationship lenders. Small businesses (those with fewer than 500 
employees) account for almost half of U.S. private-sector jobs and 
private-sector output.144 Small firms created more than three-fifths of 
all net new U.S. jobs between 1993 and 2013.145 Small businesses 
(particularly start-up and younger firms) have spurred much of the 
innovation and dynamism in the U.S. economy over the past three 
decades.146  
Banks are, and have long been, the most important providers of 
external credit to small businesses.147 Within the banking industry, 
                                                 
 142. Duke Nov. 9, 2012 Speech, supra note 93, at 5-14; ICBA REGULATORY 
RELIEF PROPOSALS, supra note 93, at 2-7; Vallandingham Testimony, supra note 
139, at 2-6; see also Marsh & Norman, supra note 90, at 13-14, 33-39. 
 143. See infra Section V.A. 
 144. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 1 (2014) [hereinafter SBA FAQ], available at 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf (stating 
that small businesses account for “48.5 percent of private-sector employment” and 
“46 percent of private-sector output”). 
 145. Id. (stating that small firms created “14.3 million of the 22.9 million net 
new jobs,” or 63% of such jobs, between 1993 and 2013); see also OFFICE OF 
ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT 26 (2010) [hereinafter SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY REPORT], 
available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sb_econ2010.pdf (stating that 
small firms “accounted for 64 percent of the net new jobs created between 1993 and 
2008”). 
 146. SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY REPORT, supra note 145, at 27-28 (citing 
studies); see also John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, Who Creates 
Jobs? Small Versus Large Versus Young, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 347, 360-61 
(2013). 
 147. REBEL A. COLE, HOW DID THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL 
BUSINESS LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES? 1 & n.1 (2012), available at 
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the community banking sector has consistently served as a dedicated 
and essential source of credit to small firms.148 Community banks 
currently provide about half of all bank credit extended to small 
businesses, even though community banks hold less than one-fifth of 
the banking industry’s assets.149  
Community banks pursue a “relationship lending” strategy that 
gives them significant advantages in providing credit to small 
firms.150 Community banks are relationship lenders because they 
specialize in gathering and evaluating “soft” information about the 
reputation and creditworthiness of local entrepreneurs.151 Community 
banks have a superior ability to assess and monitor local firms 
because their managers and loan officers generally have long tenures 
in their positions and are deeply involved in the life of their 
communities.152 Indeed, locally owned banks and their directors, 
                                                                                                       
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf (stating that “about 60 
percent of all small firms use some form of bank credit”); Charles Ou & Victoria 
Williams, Lending to Small Businesses by Financial Institutions in the United 
States, in OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, SMALL BUS. ADMIN, SMALL BUSINESS IN FOCUS: 
FINANCE 9, 9-10, 11 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/ 
files/advocacy/09finfocus_0.pdf (stating that commercial banks “accounted for 58 
percent of total debt owed by . . . small firms to external lenders” in the early 
2000s); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 258 (“Banks provide more than 
three-fifths of the credit extended to small businesses by persons other than owners 
and trade creditors, and banks have maintained this dominant market share despite 
the significant changes that have occurred in the financial services industry [since 
1980].”). 
 148. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at I, 1-1 
(“Community banks have always been inextricably connected to 
entrepreneurship. . . . They obtain most of their core deposits locally and make many 
of their loans to local businesses.”).  
 149. Id. at I, 5-1 (reporting that in 2011 community banks, as defined by the 
FDIC, “held 14 percent of banking industry assets, but 46 percent of the industry’s 
small loans to farms and businesses”); Jeffrey W. Gunther & Kelly Klemme, A 
Lender for Tough Times, in DALLAS FED. 2012 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, 25 
(stating that banks with assets under $10 billion “held 17 percent of industrywide 
banking assets as of June 2012—but they accounted for more than half of the 
amount lent to small businesses”). 
 150. Scott E. Hein, Timothy W. Koch & S. Scott MacDonald, On the 
Uniqueness of Community Banks, 90 ECON. REV. 15, 18-20 (2005); see also FDIC 
COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 1, at 1-1 (“The relationship lending 
approach used by community banks is often the only avenue small [borrowers] have 
to obtain loans and access other financial services.”). 
 151. Hein, Koch & MacDonald, supra note 150, at 18. 
 152. Allen N. Berger et al., Does Function Follow Organizational Form? 
Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 
237, 239-45, 265-67 (2005); Rebel A. Cole, Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. 
White, Cookie Cutter vs. Character: The Micro Structure of Small Business Lending 
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officers, and staff members typically provide generous financial 
support to, and fill key leadership positions for, local charitable and 
civic organizations.153  
Community banks play a particularly important role in 
supporting local economies and civic groups in rural counties as well 
as a number of counties included in metropolitan areas where few 
other banks are present. In 2012, community banks were the only 
banks operating banking offices in 615 counties, and community 
banks also operated offices in 642 other counties where 
noncommunity banks collectively had only one or two offices. Thus, 
more than one-third of U.S. counties, with a total population of over 
16 million people, “would have very limited physical access to 
mainstream banking services without the presence of community 
banks.”154 
Community banks emphasize the importance of providing 
deposit and cash management services to small businesses because 
deposit accounts cement their relationships with local entrepreneurs. 
Deposit accounts enable community banks to monitor the economic 
performance of their businesses loan customers. In turn, small 
                                                                                                       
by Large and Small Banks, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 227, 228-30, 249 
(2004); Hein, Koch & MacDonald, supra note 150, at 18-20, 22; Wilmarth, 
Transformation, supra note 13, at 255-57, 262, 266.  
 153. For discussions of the importance of locally owned banks as sources of 
philanthropy and civic leadership for community-based charitable and social 
organizations, see Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring 
“Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149, 151-55, 214-20 
(2006); Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Interstate Bank Mergers: The 
Case for Concern, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1397, 1425 (1989); see also Josh Adams, Local 
Banks a Key Part of Community, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 9, 2012, at 1, available at 2012 
WLNR 2799130 (describing the importance of community banks and their managers 
and directors as supporters and leaders of local charities and community groups); 
Kalen Holliday, Building Communities: One Bank at a Time, SAVINGS & 
COMMUNITY BANKER, Oct. 1, 2004, at 52, available at 2004 WLNR 15911752 
(reporting results of a survey showing that “[n]early all community banks donate 
time, money, or both to their communities,” with most community banks supporting 
more than ten nonprofit or community organizations).  
 154. Backup, supra note 48, at 34 (providing data and noting that the United 
States has a total of 3,238 counties); see also FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, 
supra note 1, at 3-5 (explaining that, in 2011, more than 70% of the counties in 
which community banks either operated all banking offices, or all but one or two 
offices, were rural counties, while about 15% of those counties were included in 
metropolitan areas). 
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businesses frequently choose to establish deposit accounts at banks 
that have their main offices located nearby.155  
Community banks “target small businesses as their primary 
customers for business lending and related services, while large 
banks view midsized and larger corporations as their preferred 
customers for financial services.”156 Large banks prefer to make loans 
to bigger firms that can provide “hard” quantitative data, including 
audited financial statements.157 When large banks do provide credit to 
small businesses, they frequently do so in the form of business credit 
cards with “micro” lines of credit under $100,000.158 Large banks use 
business credit cards to make loans to small firms because they can 
originate those loans—based primarily on the business owner’s 
personal financial profile and credit history—by using the same 
quantitative and automated methods (including credit scoring and 
mass marketing) that they use for their consumer credit card 
programs.159  
A study by Allen Berger and Lamont Black confirms that large 
banks generally provide small business credit by using quantitative 
“hard” technologies, while community banks prefer to make small 
                                                 
 155. Cole, Goldberg & White, supra note 152, at 247 (finding that “small 
banks, but not large banks, favor an applicant with which it has a pre-existing 
deposit relationship”); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 262, 268 (“The 
ability of local banks to observe small business deposit accounts provides those 
banks with a significant monitoring advantage over large banks that are 
headquartered outside the community and, therefore, are less likely to attract 
deposits from small firms within the locality.”); see also infra note 163 and 
accompanying text (describing another study that found a strong link between 
deposit accounts maintained by small businesses and relationship lending by 
community banks). 
 156. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 263; see also Gunther & 
Klemme, supra note 149, at 1 (reporting that community banks “have about 13 
percent of [their] assets in small business loans, far above the 2 percent for the 
largest banks”).  
 157. Berger et al., supra note 152, at 240, 250, 252; Cole, Goldberg & 
White, supra note 152, at 236, 245. Large banks prefer to rely on “hard” information 
and to use standardized, “cookie cutter” criteria for approving loans because (1) it is 
difficult for loan officers at large banks to gather and transmit to senior executives 
“soft” information about small businesses, and (2) complex hierarchies within large 
banks create control problems that encourage senior executives to prescribe 
quantitative criteria that give very limited discretion to loan officers. Berger et al., 
supra note 152, at 239-40, 242-43; Cole, Goldberg & White, supra note 152, at 229-
30, 249; Hein, Koch & MacDonald, supra note 150, at 19-20, 22. 
 158. See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 264-65, 267. 
 159. Ou & Williams, supra note 147, at 9, 14-20; Wilmarth, Transformation, 
supra note 13, at 264-65, 267. 
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business loans through a relationship-based approach that 
incorporates “soft” information.160 Berger and Black found that large 
banks in the late 1990s were more likely to extend credit to the 
smallest size category of small businesses (presumably through 
business credit card loans).161 Large banks were also more likely to 
provide credit in the form of equipment leases because large banks 
could use “hard” technologies in approving those leases and did not 
have to rely on “soft” information.162 In contrast, community banks 
were more likely to provide credit to small businesses through 
commercial real estate loans (because community banks could 
evaluate “soft” information about local property values) or through 
lines of credit that were based on existing relationships between the 
borrowers and the lending banks. Community banks also preferred to 
provide lines of credit to small businesses that maintained checking 
accounts or had longer relationships with them.163 Berger and Black 
concluded that relationship factors were more important than the size 
of the borrower in determining whether small businesses obtained 
credit from community banks instead of large banks.164 
In keeping with their business strategy of building strong 
relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources 
of credit for small businesses during the last two banking crises, 
compared with larger banks.165 During the most recent crisis, larger 
banks cut back sharply on their small business lending. A study by 
Rebel Cole determined that banks receiving TARP capital 
assistance—which were primarily larger banks—reduced their small 
business lending by a significantly higher percentage between 2008 
and 2011, compared with banks (mainly smaller institutions) that did 
                                                 
 160. Allen N. Berger & Lamont K. Black, Bank Size, Lending Technologies, 
and Small Business Finance, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 724, 724-25, 727, 734-35 (2011) 
(presenting a study based on small business lending data from the late 1990s). 
 161. Id. at 734-35. 
 162. Id. at 724, 726-29, 732-34; see also supra note 158 (discussing business 
credit card loans made by large banks to small businesses). 
 163. Berger & Black, supra note 160, at 728-29, 733-34. 
 164. Id. at 733-34. 
 165. Gunther & Klemme, supra note 149, at 26 (stating that between mid-
2008 and mid-2010, “community bank loan volume held up relative to 2007 levels, 
while the biggest banks significantly reduced business lending”); Wilmarth, 
Transformation, supra note 13, at 262 (citing a study finding that “small business 
lending declined by a greater percentage at banks larger than $10 billion [during the 
banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s] compared to banks smaller than $1 
billion”). 
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not receive TARP assistance.166 Similarly, the Small Business 
Administration reported that large banks cut back substantially on 
the amount of credit they provided to small firms through business 
credit cards after 2008.167  
In contrast, community banks slightly increased their share of 
the small business lending market between mid-2008 and mid-2012, 
even though their share of total banking industry assets declined 
during that period.168 Moreover, small business lending grew at a 
significantly faster rate at community banks during 2013 and 2014, 
compared with the rest of the banking industry.169 The lending 
                                                 
 166. Cole, supra note 147, at 25-26, 31, 41, 43-44; see also Rebel A. Cole, 
How Did the Financial Crisis Affect Business Lending in the U.S.? 5 (Dec. 19, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899067 
(determining that, among sixteen of the largest bank holding companies receiving 
TARP assistance, “small-business lending declined by more than 20%” at eleven 
and “by more than 10%” at thirteen, while “all 16 reduced small-business lending”); 
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (explaining that most TARP capital 
assistance was given to the largest banks, while relatively little TARP assistance was 
provided to community banks); Bob Ivry, Small Business Can’t Get Loans from 
Bailed-Out Banks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 16, 2010, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-16/small-business-can-t-get-
loans-from-banks-bailed-out-by-taxpayers-in-u-s- (reporting on the experiences of 
small business owners who could not obtain loans from Bank of America, JPMorgan 
Chase, or Wells Fargo).  
 167. SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY REPORT, supra note 145, at 86-87, 94-95.  
 168. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS 
ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter 2012 SBA REPORT], http://www.sba.gov/ 
advocacy/small-business-economy (follow “2012 Section B Finance” hyperlink; 
then select “Table B.9” Tab for “Share of Business Loans and Total Assets by Size 
of All U.S. Depository Institutions”) (showing that, between June 2008 and June 
2012, the share of small business loans held by banks with assets under $10 billion 
increased from 51.73% to 51.79%, even though the share of total banking industry 
assets held by those banks declined from 23.46% to 22.19%). 
 169. FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile: Second Quarter 2014, 8 FDIC Q., no. 
3, 2014, at 14-15, available at https://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2014jun/qbp.pdf 
(reporting that small business loans made by community banks grew at a rate of 
3.1% from June 2013 to June 2014, compared with a growth rate of only 1.1% for 
the entire banking industry); FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2014, 
8 FDIC Q., no. 4, 2014, at 16-17, available at https://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/ 
2014sep/qbp.pdf (reporting that small business loans made by community banks 
grew at a rate of 3.6% from September 2013 to September 2014, compared with a 
growth rate of only 2% for the entire banking industry); FDIC Fourth Quarter 2014 
Report, supra note 106, at 3, 17 (reporting that (1) small business loans made by 
community banks increased at a rate of 1.1% during the fourth quarter of 2014, 
compared with a growth rate of only 0.4% for the entire banking industry, and (2) 
total lending by community banks increased by 8.6% during 2014, compared with a 
growth rate of only 5.3% for the entire banking industry); see also Chris Cumming, 
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performance of community banks during the recent crisis is 
particularly impressive when one considers that (1) the federal 
government did relatively little to help community banks during the 
crisis while providing enormous amounts of assistance to big banks, 
and (2) as a result of the favoritism shown by the federal government 
toward large banks, only nine banks larger than $10 billion failed 
while more than 450 smaller banks failed.170  
B. Recent Failures of Community Banks Have Inflicted Serious 
Harm on Small Businesses and Communities 
Notwithstanding the commendable performance of the more 
than 6,000 community banks that survived the financial crisis,171 the 
failures of hundreds of community banks seriously damaged the 
small business sector as well as local communities. As Mark Gertler 
observed, “[t]he demise of local lenders has inflicted a 
disproportionate blow on small enterprises.”172 Similarly, as Mark 
Zandi explained, “[s]mall bank failures matter a lot to the 
communities in which they operate, especially in non-urban areas. 
Small banks are key to small businesses.”173 A prominent Atlanta 
lawyer pointed out that the failures of many community banks in 
Georgia “sidelined the important mission of allocating capital to 
borrowers with legitimate needs [and] had a very damaging impact 
on the state.”174  
A recent study by John Kandrac determined that bank failures 
between 2008 and 2010 had significant adverse impacts on income, 
employment, compensation growth, and poverty in the counties 
                                                                                                       
Smaller Banks Generating Solid Loan Growth as Others Ease Up, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 11028680 (reporting that loans at banks 
with assets under $40 billion had grown by 12% since the first quarter of 2013, 
while loans at banks larger than $50 billion had grown by less than 2% during that 
period). 
 170. See supra Part I.  
 171. See Backup, supra note 48, at 29, 34-37 (reporting that 6,141 
community banks remained in operation at the end of 2012, and their performance 
improved during 2012); FDIC Fourth Quarter 2014 Report, supra note 106, at 16-
17 (reporting that 6,037 community banks remained in operation at the end of 2014, 
and their total net income increased by 9.1% in 2014). 
 172. Matthews, supra note 107 (quoting Professor Mark Gertler). 
 173. Id. (quoting Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, Inc.) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174. Id. (quoting Brian Olasov) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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where the failures occurred.175 Similarly, news reports indicate that 
many small businesses could not find any type of external funding—
or were forced to rely on much more expensive credit from nonbank 
lenders—when local banks failed or were unable to continue 
providing loans to their established small firm customers.176 
Financing for small businesses from angel investors, venture capital 
firms, and public stock offerings declined precipitously after 2008, 
and those sources of funding have recovered very slowly in the past 
few years.177 Similarly, total business lending by finance companies 
fell at a significantly faster rate between 2008 and 2012, compared 
with the decline in small business lending by banks.178  
In view of the close relationships that community banks build 
with entrepreneurs and the significant harm that the community 
banking sector suffered during the financial crisis, it is not surprising 
                                                 
 175. JOHN KANDRAC, BANK FAILURE, RELATIONSHIP LENDING, AND LOCAL 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3, 10-11, 19-20 (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201441/201441pap.pdf. Kandrac 
found that the effects of bank failures on local economies were less severe in cases 
where the FDIC entered into loss-sharing agreements with acquiring banks. Id. at 
11, 20. As Kandrac pointed out, those loss-sharing agreements obligated the 
acquiring banks to maintain relationships with the failed banks’ borrowers for a 
specified period of time. Id. at 12-15. The results of his study “support the view that 
bank failures can have important effects on local economies, and that the disruption 
of banking relationships is a likely channel through which these effects are 
transmitted.” Id. at 16; see also Adam B. Ashcraft, Are Banks Really Special? New 
Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 
1712, 1713, 1719 (2005) (examining fifty-six bank subsidiaries of two large Texas 
bank holding companies that failed in 1988 and 1992, after the FDIC triggered their 
cross-guarantee obligations, and finding that those bank failures led to sharp 
declines in bank lending and significant reductions in personal incomes in the 
counties where the failed banks were located).  
 176. Zeke Faux & Max Abelson, Trying to Be a Nice Guy in Small-Business, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-
10/steven-mandis-high-rate-small-business-lendings-nice-guy (reporting on 
Kalamata Capital, a nonbank lender that was charging annual interest rates to small 
firms ranging from 53% to 72%); Matthews, supra note 107 (describing the inability 
of small firms to find alternative financing after their local banks failed); see also 
Andrew Martin, The Places They Go When Banks Say No, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2010, at BU1, BU6 (describing Hartsko Financial Services, another nonbank lender 
that was charging annual interest rates of more than 40% to small and midsized 
firms).  
 177. SBA FAQ, supra note 144, at 2; SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY REPORT, 
supra note 145, at 98-103.  
 178. 2012 SBA REPORT, supra note 168, tbls.B.8, B.10 (showing that 
between 2008 and 2012, small business lending by banks declined from $711.5 
billion to $587.8 billion, a decrease of 17.4%, while total business lending by 
finance companies fell from $607.6 billion to $467.4 billion, a reduction of 23.1%).  
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that small businesses also experienced severe losses during and after 
the financial crisis. For example, almost 60% of the net job losses 
recorded by all U.S. employers occurred at small businesses during 
the first three quarters of 2009.179 The share of net U.S. job losses 
incurred by the smallest firms (those with fewer than fifty 
employees) “was nearly double their 30% share of total 
employment” between 2007 and 2012.180 During the same five-year 
period, rates for new business formation and small business 
expansion fell sharply below their established trend lines between 
1992 and 2006.181 An important reason for the financial crisis’ 
disproportionate impact on smaller firms was that small businesses 
have long relied on banks for external credit and had very few 
alternative sources for financing when bank lending declined.182  
Two Citigroup economists, Nathan Sheets and Robert A 
Sockin, documented the harm suffered by the small business sector 
as a consequence of the financial crisis and the resulting drop in bank 
credit.183 Sheets and Sockin found that bank credit to both large 
companies and small firms declined sharply between 2008 and 2010. 
However, bank loans to large companies increased after 2010 and 
“returned to their previous peak” by 2012, while bank loans to small 
firms remained “15 percent off their peak” in 2012.184  
Sheets and Sockin also calculated that bank lending to large 
companies increased by $400 billion, or 75%, between 2004 and 
2012, but bank lending did not show any substantial increase for 
small firms during the same period.185 As Sheets and Sockin 
observed, “[t]his is a remarkable shift in the distribution of credit 
over an eight-year period and may, if anything, understate the actual 
                                                 
 179. SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY REPORT, supra note 145, at 28-29. 
 180. Elizabeth Laderman, Small Businesses Hit Hard by Weak Job Gains, 
FRBSF ECON. LETTER, Sept. 9, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.frbsf.org/ 
economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2013/september/small-business-
job-growth-employment-rate/el2013-26.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 3-4; FRANÇOIS GOURIO, TODD MESSER & MICHAEL SIEMER, THE 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SLOWDOWN IN 
NEW BUSINESS FORMATION? 1-2 (2014), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/ 
digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2014/cflseptember2014_326.pdf. 
 182. Laderman, supra note 180, at 1-2; see also GOURIO, MESSER & SIEMER, 
supra note 181, at 1. 
 183. NATHAN SHEETS & ROBERT A SOCKIN, CITI, DOES SIZE REALLY 
MATTER?: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF SMALL FIRMS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (2012) (on 
file with author).  
 184. Id. at 13. 
 185. Id. 
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difference in credit allocation, given that large firms have greater 
access to corporate debt markets.”186 As they further pointed out, a 
Boston Fed staff study found that small firms with a high degree of 
dependence on external financing were “more likely to lay off 
workers” during the financial crisis because those small firms 
“absorbed a significant credit-supply shock.”187  
Beyond the curtailment of credit for small businesses, failures 
of community banks have inflicted broader injuries on local 
communities. As noted above, (1) community banks and their 
managers and staff play leading roles in supporting local charitable 
and civic groups through financial contributions and volunteer 
work,188 and (2) community banks are the only banks operating 
physical offices in many rural counties and some counties in 
metropolitan areas.189 Consequently, failures of community banks 
have caused significant funding and staffing challenges for many 
local charities and public service organizations.190 Large, out-of-town 
banks that acquire failed community banks are less likely to provide 
comparable support to local nonprofits because those banks tend to 
give most of their backing either to nonprofits located in their 
headquarters cities or to larger statewide and national 
organizations.191 Thus, community bank failures have ripple effects 
that reach far beyond the banks themselves. 
                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 15 (citing BURCU DUYGAN-BUMP, ALEXEY LEVKOV & JUDIT 
MONTORIOL-GARRIGA, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., FINANCING CONSTRAINTS AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE GREAT RECESSION 23 (2011), available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1006.pdf). The Boston Fed 
staff study determined that “reduction in bank lending to small and financially 
constrained firms during the Great Recession is associated with increased layoffs of 
workers.” DUYGAN-BUMP, LEVKOV & MONTORIOL-GARRIGA, supra, at 23.  
 188. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 190. GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra note 70, at 53 (describing views of 
state bank regulators and community banking associations); Tammy Joyner, Failed 
Bank Honored in Henry County, AJC.COM (May 4, 2012, 7:09 PM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/business/failed-bank-honored-in-henry-county/nQTYm/ 
(reporting on the extensive charitable contributions and community involvement of a 
failed community bank, and describing concerns among local citizens about the 
availability of future support for community organizations); see also Laura 
McVicker, Bank’s Collapse Puts Local Charities in Limbo: Thousands of Dollars 
Pledged for Various Efforts in Jeopardy, COLUMBIAN, Jan. 22, 2009, available at 
2009 WLNR 1359469 (same).  
 191. GAO BANK FAILURE REPORT, supra note 70, at 53; see also Brunell, 
supra note 153, at 151-55, 214-15 (discussing the tendency of larger, nonlocal banks 
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C. A Further Decline in the Significance of the Community Banking 
Sector Would Seriously Harm Small Businesses, Consumers, and 
Local Communities 
Domestic and international evidence confirms that small firms, 
consumers, and local communities suffer when community banks are 
unable to maintain a significant competitive presence in local 
markets. After reviewing the striking contrast between the rapid 
growth in bank credit for large firms between 1995 and 2012 and the 
much slower rate of growth in bank lending to small firms, Sheets 
and Sockin highlighted the impact of the shrinking presence of 
community banks.192 As they explained: 
Well-established results in the empirical literature have shown a special 
link between small firms and small banks. As such, this sustained and 
sizable decline in the role of small banks as providers of credit— 
reflecting the ongoing consolidation of the U.S. banking system—is very 
likely a factor contributing to the downtrend in the share of credit provided 
to small firms.193  
A study by Steven Craig and Pauline Hardee concluded that 
small businesses were less likely to obtain access to bank credit—
and also were likely to receive lower amounts of credit—in U.S. 
markets that were dominated by the largest banks.194 Craig and 
Hardee also determined that nonbank lenders offset some, but not all, 
of the reduction in availability of small business credit in markets 
dominated by big banks.195 Similarly, a study by Allen Berger and 
others found that small firms were more “credit constrained” and 
more likely to be late in paying off their trade credit if they borrowed 
from larger banks.196 Berger’s study concluded that larger banks “are 
                                                                                                       
to reduce contributions to local charities after acquiring local banks and to give 
greater support to nonlocal charities); Carstensen, supra note 153, at 1425. 
 192. SHEETS & SOCKIN, supra note 183, at 13-14 (noting that bank lending to 
large firms expanded from $350 billion in 1995 to $900 billion in 2012, an increase 
of more than 150%, while bank lending to small firms rose from $175 billion to 
$280 billion during the same period, a rise of only 60%). 
 193. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 15 (stating that “the ongoing 
consolidation of the U.S. banking system, particularly the declining role of small 
banks, also appears to have been an important factor weighing on the supply of 
credit to small firms in recent years”).  
 194. Steven G. Craig & Pauline Hardee, The Impact of Bank Consolidation 
on Small Business Credit Availability, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1237, 1239-40, 1248-
49, 1258-59 (2007). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Berger et al., supra note 152, at 241, 245-46, 260.  
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not as effective at alleviating credit constraints” for small businesses, 
and, consequently, “bank consolidation may raise meaningful 
concerns for small firms.”197  
Any further decline in the competitive presence of community 
banks would harm consumers and local communities as well as 
entrepreneurs. Numerous studies have concluded that large banks 
charge substantially higher fees for deposit account services, 
including automated teller machine (ATM) fees, account 
maintenance fees, overdraft fees, and non-sufficient funds (NSF) 
fees, compared with smaller banks.198 Surveys show that community 
banks earn much higher rates of customer satisfaction and a far 
higher level of citizen trust, compared with big banks.199 In addition, 
                                                 
 197. Id. at 266. 
 198. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT 
PROGRAMS: A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 52 (2013), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf 
(stating that, in 2012, the median NSF fee and median overdraft fee among thirty-
three large banks were both $34, while the median NSF fee and median overdraft 
fee among 800 smaller banks and credit unions were both $30); EDMUND 
MIERZWINSKI, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, BIG BANKS, BIGGER FEES 2012: A NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF FEES AND DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE 1-2, 9-11 (2012), available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/USPIRG_Big_Banks_Bigger_Fees_0.p
df (reporting results of survey showing that “small banks had lower average 
checking account fees, overdraft fees and foreign or off-us ATM fees, as well as 
lower balance requirements to avoid checking fees, than big banks”); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-281, BANK FEES: FEDERAL BANKING 
REGULATORS COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CONSUMERS HAVE REQUIRED 
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO OPENING CHECKING OR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 16 
(2008) (“Large institutions on average charged between $4.00 and $5.00 more for 
insufficient funds and overdraft fees than smaller institutions.”); Wilmarth, 
Transformation, supra note 13, at 295 (citing earlier studies finding that “large, 
multistate banks charge fees on deposit accounts that are significantly higher than 
the fees assessed by small community banks”).  
 199. Kate Berry, Small Banks Still Rule in Customer Satisfaction: J.D. 
Power, AM. BANKER (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/178_74/small-banks-still-rule-in-customer-satisfaction-1058418-1.html; see 
also Tom Bengtson, Community Banks Have Edge in Small Business Lending, N.W. 
FIN. REV., Dec. 15, 2008, at 19, available at 2008 WLNR 24955810 (“Small banks 
have historically enjoyed the highest level of customer satisfaction, although 
medium-size banks are making gains, narrowing the gap with smaller banks. . . . 
[S]urveys show 72 percent of small business customers who bank at small banks are 
very satisfied with their banking relationship; 64 percent who bank at medium-size 
banks are very satisfied, and 51 percent of people who bank at large banks are very 
satisfied.”); Michael Ramlet & Raffy Maristela, Poll: Governmental and Financial 
Institutional Trust, MORNING CONSULT (June 24, 2014), 
http://themorningconsult.com/2014/06/morning-consult-finance-poll-institutional-
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as indicated above, many rural counties and some counties in 
metropolitan areas will be left without any banking offices (or with 
very few) if large numbers of community banks are forced to close.200 
Studies of foreign banking markets have similarly found that 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and consumers receive 
better service in markets where community banks maintain a 
significant presence. In contrast, SMEs and consumers fare worse in 
markets dominated by large banks. For example, a study of twenty-
one developed countries and twenty-eight developing nations found 
that countries with stronger community bank sectors (i.e., countries 
where community banks had a larger total market share and a higher 
average efficiency ranking) reaped significant benefits in the form of 
faster growth in GDP, higher employment by SMEs, and increased 
availability of bank credit.201  
Additionally, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and 
the U.K. Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) published recent 
studies indicating that the U.K.’s highly concentrated banking 
system provides inferior service to, and imposes high costs on, SMEs 
and consumers. The four largest U.K. banks hold over 80% of 
domestic “[b]usiness current accounts” (BCAs) maintained by 
SMEs, and those banks also provide 90% or more of business loans 
to SMEs.202 A joint study by the FCA and CMA determined that (1) 
only 13% of SMEs in the U.K. “trust their bank to act in their best 
interests”; (2) only 25% of SMEs in the U.K. “consider that their 
bank supports their business”; and (3) “more SMEs would be 
unwilling to recommend their bank to a friend than would be willing 
to do so.”203 The joint study also found that BCAs offered by smaller 
U.K. banks were less expensive than those provided by the four 
biggest banks, and that “satisfaction levels of SME customers at the 
smaller banks tend to be higher than those at the largest banks.”204 
                                                                                                       
trust/ (reporting that almost 80% of citizens trusted community banks, while less 
than 45% trusted investment banks and less than 40% trusted Wall Street). 
 200. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 201. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan & Leora F. Klapper, Further Evidence 
on the Link Between Finance and Growth: An International Analysis of Community 
Banking and Economic Performance, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 169, 186-92, 197-98 
(2004). 
 202. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. & COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., BANKING 
SERVICES TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: A CMA AND FCA MARKET 
STUDY 4, 44-51 (2014), available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/53eb6b73ed915d188800000c/SME-report_final.pdf. 
 203. Id. at 153, 168 (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. at 161, 168. 
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The joint study concluded that “competition is less effective in 
delivering good outcomes for SMEs . . . than would be the case in a 
market where banks are under more competitive pressure. . . . 
[O]verall we believe . . . the evidence indicates that [U.K.] banks are 
underperforming in satisfying SME customers.”205  
A separate study by the CMA reached similar results with 
regard to “personal current accounts” (PCAs) that U.K. banks 
provide to consumers. The four biggest U.K. banks control more 
than three-quarters of the consumer PCA market.206 The CMA’s 
study found that “larger [banks] have lower customer satisfaction 
scores and attract more complaints” and also “pay lower interest on 
credit balances,” compared with smaller banks.207 In addition, banks 
“with the lowest customer satisfaction rating have the highest market 
shares, while [smaller banks] with high customer satisfaction 
struggle to expand as market shares remain stable. This [evidence] 
suggests that there are limited competitive incentives to improve 
customer service.”208 
Much like the U.S. government, the U.K. government 
responded to the financial crisis by encouraging mergers among 
troubled institutions and by propping up TBTF megabanks, thereby 
promoting even greater consolidation within the U.K. banking 
system. For example, the U.K. government arranged for Lloyds TSB 
to make an emergency takeover of HBOS, and the government 
subsequently bailed out the resulting Lloyds Banking Group as well 
as RBS to prevent both megabanks from failing.209 As Chancellor of 
the Exchequer George Osborne observed, “‘One of the prices we’re 
paying for the financial crisis is that our banking sector is now 
dominated by a few big banks.’”210 The Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards pointed out that the TBTF status of the largest 
                                                 
 205. Id. at 5, 172. 
 206. COMPETITION & MKTS AUTH., PERSONAL CURRENT ACCOUNTS: MARKET 
STUDY UPDATE 9, 26 fig.2.2 (2014), available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/53c834c640f0b610aa000009/140717_-
_PCA_Review_Full_Report.pdf. 
 207. Id. at 36. 
 208. Id. at 119. 
 209. HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON 
BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD: FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 
2013–14, at 233-34, 247-48, 270-71 (2013) [hereinafter U.K. PCBS REPORT], 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-
final-report-vol-ii.pdf. 
 210. Id. at 233 (quoting the Right Honorable George Osborne, Member of 
Parliament for Tatton, Cheshire (Feb. 4, 2013)). 
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U.K. banks gives them “access to cheaper credit than would 
otherwise be available” and thereby “distorts competition and raises 
barriers to entry. Success does not depend simply on being prudently 
run or on serving customers effectively, but on the implicit [TBTF] 
guarantee.”211 
In view of the U.K.’s experience, the United States should take 
immediate steps to preserve the vitality of its community banking 
sector and to eliminate perverse incentives created by the TBTF 
status of megabanks. A similar warning flag appears when one 
considers the plainly inadequate services that SMEs receive from big 
banks in the highly concentrated Canadian banking system. During 
the past decade, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business 
(CFIB) has issued a series of survey reports showing that Canadian 
SMEs are deeply dissatisfied with the performance of the five largest 
Canadian banks. The “Big Five” banks control more than 70% of the 
SME lending market in Canada, and there is no meaningful 
community bank sector in Canada.212  
In the absence of community banks, Canadian credit unions 
have consistently outperformed the “Big Five” banks since 2000 in 
terms of satisfying SME customers.213 As the CFIB observed in 2003, 
the superior performance of Canadian credit unions “provides further 
evidence that these locally based and managed institutions have an 
edge servicing their small business clientele.”214 In contrast, when 
evaluating the performance of the big Canadian banks, the CFIB 
declared that “there is not a single Big Five bank that seems to be 
                                                 
 211. Id. at 113. 
 212. DOUG BRUCE & QUEENIE WONG, CANADIAN FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., 
BATTLE OF THE BANKS: HOW SMES RATE THEIR BANKS 9, 29 tbl.C1 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2012 CFIB REPORT], available at http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/cfib-
documents/rr3292.pdf (providing market shares of the “Big Five” Canadian banks 
for loans to SMEs between 2000 and 2012); Renee Haltom, Why Was Canada 
Exempt from the Financial Crisis?, 17 ECON FOCUS, no. 4, 2013, at 22, 22, available 
at https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2013/q4/pdf/full_ 
issue.pdf (stating that “Canada has just 80 banks, six of which hold 93 percent of the 
market share”). 
 213. 2012 CFIB REPORT, supra note 212, at 3 (“In 2012, credit unions 
dominated among all the banks in serving the SME market, similar to findings in 
2009.” (citation omitted)); see also DOUG BRUCE, CANADIAN FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., 
BANKING ON COMPETITION: RESULTS OF CFIB BANKING SURVEY 2 (2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 CFIB REPORT], available at http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/cfib-
documents/Banking.pdf (reporting that “[c]redit unions rank first in terms of overall 
satisfaction among business clients” in 2003, and noting that “credit unions ranked 
first in CFIB’s 2000 survey”). 
 214. 2003 CFIB REPORT, supra note 213, at 2. 
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taking a leadership role in serving the SME sector. . . . Efforts must 
be made to encourage the development of competitive alternatives to 
the major chartered banks.”215 Thus, studies, surveys, and other 
evidence from the highly consolidated U.K. and Canadian banking 
systems strongly indicate that markets dominated by big banks do 
not provide either good service or adequate credit to SMEs.216 U.S. 
policymakers and regulators should therefore take all possible 
measures to preserve a vibrant community bank sector in this 
country. 
IV. DODD–FRANK HAS NOT ENDED TBTF TREATMENT FOR 
MEGABANKS  
Two of Dodd–Frank’s stated purposes are “to end ‘too big to 
fail’” and “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”217 
When President Obama signed Dodd–Frank into law, he declared, 
“Because of this law, the American people will never again be asked 
to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes. . . . There will be no more 
taxpayer-funded bailouts. Period.”218 
Unfortunately, as shown below, there is a very high probability 
that Dodd–Frank will not prevent bailouts and will not end TBTF 
treatment for creditors of systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). Dodd–Frank creates a special resolution regime 
for dealing with failed SIFIs, but that regime allows the FDIC to give 
                                                 
 215. Id. at 3, 18. 
 216. See Haltom, supra note 212, at 25 (“Critics claim that Canada’s tightly 
regulated [banking] system is slower to innovate and fund entrepreneurs.”); Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of 
Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1054-55 (1992) (explaining that national 
surveys of bank lending to SMEs in 1987 showed that “the decentralized U.S. 
banking system [was] more competitive and responsive than the highly concentrated 
British and Canadian systems in providing credit to small businesses,” apparently 
because “most British and Canadian small businesses [were] served by large 
nationwide banks, while small firms in the United States [were] served primarily by 
local independent banks”). 
 217. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
 218. Stacy Kaper, Obama Signs Historic Regulatory Reform Bill into Law, 
AM. BANKER (July 21, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/obama-1022698-1.html (quoting Barack Obama, U.S. President, statement 
upon signing the Dodd–Frank legislation at the Ronald Reagan Building, D.C. (July 
21, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Portions of the analysis in this Part IV 
have been adapted from Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, Part V. 
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special protection to favored classes of creditors with close 
connections to Wall Street. Dodd–Frank also permits the Fed and 
other federal agencies to provide emergency liquidity assistance to 
troubled SIFIs. Moreover, Dodd–Frank will not stop Congress from 
adopting emergency bailout measures to keep SIFIs from failing 
during future financial crises. Finally, Dodd–Frank does not prevent 
SIFI-owned banks from transferring safety-net subsidies to their 
nonbank affiliates engaged in risky capital markets activities. In sum, 
Dodd–Frank fails to address the principal causes of TBTF bailouts 
because it does not mandate fundamental changes in the structure 
and operations of megabanks and nonbank SIFIs.  
A. Dodd–Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions but Allows the 
FDIC and Other Agencies to Protect Creditors of Those 
Institutions 
1.  Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Allows the 
FDIC to Provide Full Protection for Favored Creditors of 
SIFIs and Their Operating Subsidiaries 
Dodd–Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(OLA), which seeks to provide a “viable alternative to the 
undesirable choice” between the disorderly bankruptcy of a SIFI and 
a “bailout . . . that would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine 
market discipline.”219 Dodd–Frank’s OLA for SIFIs is similar in 
many respects to the FDIC’s existing resolution regime for failed 
depository institutions.220 However, contrary to Dodd–Frank’s stated 
goals,221 the OLA does not preclude future bailouts for favored 
creditors of TBTF institutions.  
Dodd–Frank authorizes the Fed to impose enhanced prudential 
requirements on bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion 
or more and also on nonbank financial companies that have been 
                                                 
 219. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010). 
 220. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 485-523 
(describing the FDIC’s resolution regime for failed banks); see also Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 
Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] 
(noting that “[p]arties who are familiar with the liquidation of insured depository 
institutions . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in Title II” of Dodd–Frank).  
 221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (quoting the purposes stated 
in Dodd–Frank’s preamble).  
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designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as 
potential “threat[s] to the financial stability of the United States.”222 
Dodd–Frank does not use the term “SIFI” to describe such 
institutions. However, I will follow general practice by using the 
term “SIFI” to refer to systemically important financial 
institutions.223 I will also describe large bank holding companies as 
“bank SIFIs” and FSOC-designated nonbank financial companies as 
“nonbank SIFIs.” 
In order to invoke the OLA for a “financial company” whose 
failure could pose a serious risk to the financial system (i.e., a SIFI), 
the Treasury Secretary must issue a systemic risk determination 
(SRD).224 The Treasury Secretary’s SRD must be based on the 
recommendation of the Fed, acting together with either the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) (if the SIFI’s largest subsidiary is 
a securities broker or dealer) or the Federal Insurance Office (if the 
SIFI’s largest subsidiary is an insurance company) or the FDIC (for 
any other SIFI, including one whose largest subsidiary is a bank).225 
The Treasury Secretary’s SRD must find that (1) the SIFI’s failure 
and resolution under the federal Bankruptcy Code or another 
applicable insolvency law would have “serious adverse effects on 
financial stability in the United States”; (2) application of the OLA 
would “avoid or mitigate such adverse effects”; and (3) “no viable 
private sector alternative is available to prevent” the company’s 
failure.226  
Dodd–Frank requires the FDIC to ensure that equity owners of 
a failed SIFI do not receive any payment until all creditor claims are 
paid, and it also mandates that executives responsible for the SIFI’s 
                                                 
 222. Dodd–Frank § 113(a)(1) (authorizing FSOC to designate nonbank 
financial companies as SIFIs if FSOC determines that such companies “could pose a 
threat to the financial stability of the United States”); id. §§ 115(a), 165(a) 
(effectively treating bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion or more as 
bank SIFIs); id. § 111 (establishing FSOC). 
 223. See FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS TOWARDS ENDING 
“TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” (TBTF): REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO THE G-
20, at 2 (2013) [hereinafter FSB 2013 TBTF REPORT], available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130902.pdf?page_moved=1 (explaining that “SIFIs are 
institutions of such size, market importance and interconnectedness that their 
distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the financial system and 
adverse economic consequences”). 
 224. Dodd–Frank § 203(b). 
 225. Id. § 203(a). 
 226. Id. § 203(b). 
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failure must be removed.227 Dodd–Frank further directs the FDIC to 
impose losses on unsecured creditors if a failed SIFI’s assets are 
insufficient to pay all secured and unsecured debts.228 However, as 
shown below, Dodd–Frank provides the FDIC with substantial 
leeway to provide full protection for favored classes of unsecured 
creditors of failed SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries.  
In its capacity as receiver for a failed SIFI, the FDIC may 
provide funding to transfer or pay off creditors’ claims in at least two 
ways. First, the FDIC can provide funding directly to the SIFI’s 
receivership estate by making loans, purchasing or guaranteeing 
assets, or assuming or guaranteeing liabilities.229 Second, the FDIC 
can provide funding to establish a “bridge financial company” 
(BFC), and the FDIC may then transfer designated assets and 
liabilities from the failed SIFI to the BFC.230 In either case, the FDIC 
(1) may adopt measures designed to reduce “the potential for serious 
adverse effects to the financial system,”231 and (2) may provide 
preferential treatment to certain creditors if the FDIC determines that 
such treatment is necessary to “maximize” the value of a failed 
SIFI’s assets or to preserve “essential” operations of the SIFI or a 
successor BFC.232 The FDIC can give preferential treatment to 
favored creditors under the foregoing conditions as long as every 
creditor receives at least the amount it would have recovered in a 
liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy 
Code.233 
In 2011, the FDIC implemented its OLA authority by issuing 
an interim final rule,234 followed by a final rule.235 The OLA rule 
                                                 
 227. Id. §§ 204(a)(1)-(2), 206(2)-(4). 
 228. Id. §§ 204(a)(1), 206(3). 
 229. Id. § 204(d). 
 230. Id. § 210(h)(1), (3), (5). 
 231. Id. § 210(a)(9)(E)(iii); see also id. § 206(1) (requiring the FDIC to 
determine that its acts as receiver are “necessary for purposes of the financial 
stability of the United States, and not for the purpose of preserving the [failed 
SIFI]”). 
 232. Id. § 210(b)(4), (h)(5)(E). 
 233. Id.; see also FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 220, at 64,175, 
64,177 (explaining Dodd–Frank’s minimum guarantee for creditors of a failed SIFI).  
 234. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Interim Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207-
11 (proposed Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter FDIC Interim OLA Rule]. 
 235. Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions Under Title II of the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 
(July 15, 2011) [hereinafter FDIC Final OLA Rule] (adopting regulations to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
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permits the FDIC to provide preferential treatment to certain 
creditors in an OLA proceeding if such treatment would help “to 
continue key operations, services, and transactions that will 
maximize the value of the [failed SIFI’s] assets and avoid a 
disorderly collapse in the market place.”236 In contrast, the OLA rule 
bars holders of subordinated debt or unsecured senior debt with a 
term of more than 360 days from receiving any preferential 
treatment.237 Hence, the FDIC can pay 100% of the claims submitted 
by short-term, unsecured creditors of a failed SIFI whenever the 
FDIC determines that such payments are “essential for [the SIFI’s] 
continued operation and orderly liquidation.”238  
Under the OLA rule, the FDIC is very likely to provide full 
protection for short-term liabilities of SIFIs that are funded by the 
capital markets, including commercial paper and securities 
repurchase agreements. Those types of short-term wholesale 
liabilities proved to be highly volatile and prone to creditor “runs” 
during the financial crisis.239 By declaring that the FDIC can give 
preferential treatment to short-term creditors of failed SIFIs, but will 
never provide such treatment to holders of long-term debt or 
subordinated debt, the OLA rule has at least two perverse effects. 
First, the OLA rule creates an implicit subsidy for short-term 
creditors of SIFIs, and it undermines market discipline by 
encouraging short-term creditors in the capital markets to continue 
providing funds to troubled SIFIs. Second, the OLA rule encourages 
SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term funding 
strategies that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis.240  
Dodd–Frank generally requires the FDIC to recover 
preferential payments made to creditors in an OLA proceeding if the 
proceeds of liquidating a failed SIFI are insufficient to repay the full 
amount that the FDIC has borrowed from the Treasury to finance the 
                                                 
 236. FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 220, at 64,175; FDIC Interim 
OLA Rule, supra note 234, at 4211. 
 237. FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra note 234, at 4211; FDIC Final OLA 
Rule, supra note 235, at 41,634. 
 238. FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 220, at 64,177-78; FDIC Interim 
OLA Rule, supra note 234, at 4211; see also FDIC Final OLA Rule, supra note 235, 
at 41,634 (reaffirming the position set forth in the interim OLA rule). 
 239. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW 
BANKING 2-6, 46-59 (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr458.pdf. 
 240. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 998-99. 
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liquidation.241 However, Dodd–Frank allows the FDIC to exercise its 
powers under the OLA for the purpose of preserving “the financial 
stability of the United States” and preventing “serious adverse effects 
to the financial system.”242 Accordingly, the FDIC potentially could 
waive its right of “claw-back” against favored short-term creditors 
and could reaffirm its decision to give them full protection if the 
FDIC determines that such treatment is necessary to maintain 
financial stability.243 
Since 2012, the FDIC has advocated a “single point of entry” 
(SPOE) strategy as its preferred approach for resolving failed SIFIs 
under the OLA.244 In December 2013, the FDIC formally presented 
its proposed SPOE strategy in a public call for comments.245 Under 
the SPOE approach, the FDIC would place only the SIFI’s top-tier 
holding company in receivership, and the FDIC would transfer the 
holding company’s most desirable assets—including its operating 
subsidiaries—to a BFC.246 The FDIC would then wipe out the equity 
interests of the shareholders of the SIFI’s top-tier holding company, 
                                                 
 241. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 210(o)(1)(B), (D), 124 Stat. 1376, 1509 (2010) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(B), (D) (2012)). 
 242. Id. §§ 206(1), 210(a)(9)(E)(iii).  
 243. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1000 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING 
THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 142-45, 147-48 
(2011) (describing the FDIC’s right to recover preferential payments from creditors, 
but concluding that Dodd–Frank gives the FDIC discretion to “bail out the most 
important creditors while giving little or nothing to other, theoretically comparable 
claims”). 
 244. See Joe Adler, Likely Battle Ahead for FDIC’s ‘Single Point’ Resolution 
Plan, AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 30941803 (stating that 
“FDIC officials have promoted the [SPOE] methodology . . . for well over a year as 
it seeks to carry out Dodd[–]Frank Act powers to clean up failed behemoths”); see 
also Michael Bologna, FDIC Unveils Resolution Strategies in the Face of Large 
Bank Failures, 98 BNA’s BANKING REP. 839 (2012) (reporting on a speech given by 
FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg on May 10, 2012, in which Mr. Gruenberg 
proposed an OLA resolution plan “that places bank holding companies in 
receivership and allows for smooth continued operation by potentially hundreds of 
domestic and foreign subsidiary organizations” under the control of a new BFC). 
 245. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single 
Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter 
FDIC SPOE Proposal]. 
 246. Id. at 76,616 (“To implement the SPOE strategy the FDIC would be 
appointed receiver only of the top-tier U.S. holding company . . . . The FDIC would 
organize a bridge financial company, into which it would transfer assets from the 
receivership estate, primarily the [parent] financial company’s investments in and 
loans to subsidiaries.”). 
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and the FDIC would convert the claims of the holding company’s 
bondholders into equity interests in the BFC.247 Most importantly, the 
failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries (including banks, securities 
broker-dealers, and insurance companies) would continue to operate 
without interruption, and the rights of their creditors would remain 
unimpaired.248 In addition, the holding company’s obligations to 
short-term creditors and service providers that are deemed 
“essential” to the BFC’s operations “would be assumed by the [BFC] 
in order to keep day-to-day operations running smoothly.”249  
As a practical matter, the SPOE strategy would accomplish a 
“reorganization” of the failed SIFI, in sharp contrast to the 
“liquidation” mandated by Title II of Dodd–Frank.250 Indeed, the 
FDIC intends to use claims procedures and accounting principles that 
are typically used in Chapter 11 reorganizations under the 
Bankruptcy Code when the FDIC carries out SPOE resolutions.251 
FDIC Board Member Jeremiah Norton has acknowledged that the 
SPOE strategy is “not contemplated in Dodd–Frank.”252  
As bankruptcy scholars have pointed out, the FDIC’s SPOE 
strategy strongly resembles the controversial “Section 363” 
transactions that the federal government used to restructure Chrysler 
                                                 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. (“The [holding] company’s subsidiaries would remain open and 
operating, allowing them to continue critical operations for the financial system and 
avoid the disruption that would otherwise accompany their closings . . . .”). 
 249. Id. at 76,618. 
 250. See, e.g., Fisher June 2013 Testimony, supra note 31, at 9, 19 
(describing the “single point of entry method” as a “simulated restructuring, as 
would occur in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy” rather than the “liquidation” mandated by 
Dodd–Frank); Who Is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act 
Enshrine Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 6, 7 (2013) 
[hereinafter Skeel Testimony] (statement of David A. Skeel, S. Samuel Arsht 
Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (“[A]lthough 
Title II explicitly requires that its provisions be used for liquidation, [SPOE] is 
essentially a reorganization. It thus stands in tension with the explicit requirements 
of Title II.”). 
 251. FDIC SPOE Proposal, supra note 245, at 76,618 (stating that, to the 
extent permitted by Dodd–Frank, “the FDIC intends to adapt certain claims forms 
and practices applicable to a Chapter 11 proceeding”); see also id. at 76,619 (stating 
that the FDIC plans to follow a “‘fresh start’ model [for] accounting treatment,” 
which is “the accounting framework generally applied to companies emerging from 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11”).  
 252. JEREMIAH O. NORTON, FDIC, DISCUSSION ON THE CURRENT STATE OF 
RESOLUTION PLANNING 6 (2013) [hereinafter NORTON SPEECH], available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2013/spoct2113.pdf. 
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and General Motors (GM) in the context of expedited Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings.253 In the Chrysler case—on which the 
subsequent GM deal was modeled—the federal government (1) 
created a shell company; (2) provided massive funding to finance the 
shell company’s purchase of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets; 
and (3) arranged for the new shell company to assume selected 
Chrysler liabilities on terms that gave highly preferential treatment to 
favored classes of creditor claims (including retiree pension claims, 
employee health care obligations, and debts owed to trade creditors) 
while giving much worse treatment to disfavored creditors (including 
secured bondholders and customers with products-liability claims).254 
Mark Roe and David Skeel argued that the Chrysler transaction 
represented a “deviant reorganization” that did not comply with 
Chapter 11 requirements, and they also pointed out that “[t]he 
unevenness of compensation to prior creditors raised considerable 
concerns in the capital markets.”255  
Like the Chrysler transaction, the FDIC’s SPOE proposal 
would disfavor long-term bondholders of the SIFI’s top-tier holding 
company while offering 100% protection to the holding company’s 
short-term creditors as well as all creditors of the SIFI’s operating 
subsidiaries, including uninsured depositors, derivatives 
counterparties, lenders under repurchase agreements, holders of 
commercial paper, and other wholesale creditors.256 The SPOE 
proposal thus contemplates “a stealth bailout of subsidiary creditors” 
by allowing the FDIC to provide funding to ensure 100% protection 
                                                 
 253. David A. Skeel, Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy 
Alternative, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 311, 321-23, 329 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014); Stephen J. 
Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN 
UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13, 13 (Mike Konczal & 
Marcus Stanley eds., 2013), available at http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/ 
files/Unfinished_Mission_2013.pdf; see also Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing 
the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 727 (2010) (describing the 
Chrysler bankruptcy).  
 254. Skeel, supra note 253, at 329; Roe & Skeel, supra note 253, at 729-34, 
765; Adam Levitin, Single-Point-of-Entry: No Bank Left Behind, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Aug. 31, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/08/single-
point-of-entry-no-bank-left-behind.html. 
 255. Roe & Skeel, supra note 253, at 729-31, 761, 765, 770-71; see also 
SKEEL, supra note 243, at 33-39 (presenting a similar critique of the Chrysler and 
GM bankruptcies). 
 256. Skeel, supra note 253, at 312-13, 321-23, 329; Levitin, supra note 254. 
 A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed 311 
for all of those creditors.257 By protecting derivatives counterparties 
and other wholesale creditors of operating subsidiaries, the SPOE 
plan would encourage SIFIs to rely “even more on the derivatives 
and other complex financial contracts that caused so much trouble” 
during the financial crisis.258  
Given the blanket protection that the SPOE strategy would 
provide to Wall Street creditors of SIFIs and their operating 
subsidiaries, it is not surprising that leading Wall Street trade 
associations have enthusiastically supported the SPOE concept.259 As 
Adam Levitin has pointed out, SPOE “ensures that Wall Street 
[creditors] will be rescued if a SIFI goes down. The result is to 
eliminate all credit risk for Wall Street [creditors] when dealing with 
SIFIs.”260 As a result, SPOE “ensures that SIFIs will stay too-big-to-
fail and . . . there will not be market discipline.”261  
In sum, the FDIC’s OLA rule and its SPOE strategy provide 
the FDIC with broad discretion to arrange bailouts for favored 
creditors of failed SIFIs, especially those with Wall Street 
connections. Dodd–Frank also provides a funding source for such 
bailouts. Section 210(n) of Dodd–Frank establishes an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF) to finance liquidations of SIFIs.262 As 
                                                 
 257. Lubben, supra note 253, at 16 (pointing out that “the FDIC will need to 
meet any and all funding requirements of the [operating] subsidiaries if single point 
of entry is to work as advertised”). 
 258. Skeel Testimony, supra note 250, at 7; see also Skeel, supra note 253, at 
326 (“By committing to fully protect derivatives [SPOE] diminishes the monitoring 
incentives of derivatives counterparties . . . and it strengthens incentives [of SIFIs] to 
use derivatives and other short-term financing.”). 
 259. In February 2014, five trade associations representing major U.S. and 
foreign financial institutions submitted a comment letter to the FDIC that eagerly 
endorsed the FDIC’s SPOE strategy. Comment letter from John Court, Managing 
Dir. & Senior Assoc., Gen. Counsel, The Clearing House, to Robert E. Feldman, 
Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 1-2 (Feb. 18, 2014), available at 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/Files/Association%20Documents/201402
18%20Single%20Point%20of%20Entry%20Comment%20Letter.pdf. Previously, in 
January 2013, The Clearing House issued a report advocating the SPOE strategy. 
THE CLEARING HOUSE, ENDING “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL”: TITLE II OF THE DODD–FRANK 
ACT AND THE APPROACH OF “SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY” PRIVATE SECTOR 
RECAPITALIZATION OF A FAILED FINANCIAL COMPANY 37-38 (2013) [hereinafter 
TCH SPOE REPORT], available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/714f0b24-
8047-4d79-825f-55f5d1e80bdc/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f7462820-
7d03-4ed2-8b75-96b917418d8f/White_Paper_Ending_Too-Big-to-Fail.pdf. 
 260. Levitin, supra note 254. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 210(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 1509 (2010). 
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discussed below, Dodd–Frank does not establish a prefunding 
mechanism for the OLF.263 However, the FDIC may obtain 
immediate funding for the OLF by borrowing from the Treasury 
amounts up to (1) 10% of a failed SIFI’s assets within thirty days 
after the FDIC’s appointment as receiver, plus (2) 90% of the “fair 
value” of the SIFI’s assets that are “available for repayment” 
thereafter.264  
The FDIC’s ability to borrow from the Treasury provides 
“huge amounts of funding” to protect creditors of SIFIs and their 
operating subsidiaries.265 The “fair value” standard gives the FDIC 
considerable leeway in calculating how much it can borrow from the 
Treasury since the “fair value” standard does not require the FDIC to 
rely on current market prices in determining the values of a failed 
SIFI’s assets.266 In addition, as David Skeel has observed, Treasury 
loans for OLA resolutions will likely have “generous” terms because 
(1) Treasury will charge interest based on “the average interest 
rate[s] for a basket of corporate bonds” of comparable maturity, and 
(2) that rate “will almost certainly be less than the penalty rate of 
interest called for in traditional lender-of-last resort lending.”267  
The FDIC must normally repay any OLF borrowings from the 
Treasury within five years.268 If the proceeds from resolving a failed 
SIFI are insufficient to repay the full amount that the FDIC borrowed 
from the Treasury, the FDIC must impose retroactive assessments on 
large financial companies to make up the difference.269 However, the 
                                                 
 263. See infra notes 473-478 and accompanying text (discussing the OLF’s 
lack of a prefunding mechanism and its reliance on ex post assessments against large 
financial companies). 
 264. Dodd–Frank § 210(n)(5)-(6). In order to borrow funds from the 
Treasury to finance an orderly liquidation, the FDIC must enter into a repayment 
agreement with the Treasury after consulting with the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial 
Services. Id. § 210(n)(9).  
 265. Skeel, supra note 253, at 327-28, 331; see also SKEEL, supra note 243, 
at 144-45 (describing the FDIC’s ability to borrow from the Treasury as a “massive 
honey pot” that “invites interventions that are essentially bailouts”). 
 266. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 999.  
 267. Skeel, supra note 253, at 327-28 & n.39 (discussing Dodd–Frank § 
210(n)(5)(C)); see also Fisher June 2013 Testimony, supra note 31, at 81-82 
(contending that the FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury will provide 
“taxpayer funding at far-below-market rates”). 
 268. Dodd–Frank § 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B). 
 269. See infra notes 474-478 and accompanying text (discussing the FDIC’s 
authority to impose retroactive assessments on large financial companies to repay 
borrowings used to resolve a failed SIFI). 
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Treasury may extend the FDIC’s repayment period in order “to avoid 
a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United 
States.”270 During a future systemic crisis, it is likely that the FDIC 
would request, and the Treasury would approve, a prolonged 
extension of the FDIC’s repayment obligations in order to postpone 
the FDIC’s duty to impose assessments on surviving SIFIs. During a 
future crisis—as was certainly true in 2008—many SIFIs would not 
be strong enough to bear the additional burdens of paying large 
assessments because they would be exposed to many of the same 
risks that caused the failure of their peers. Accordingly, Treasury 
loans for OLA resolutions would likely be extended far beyond their 
presumptive five-year terms and would represent lengthy, taxpayer-
funded bridge loans for the benefit of protected SIFI creditors. 
FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig has expressed deep 
misgivings about the significant cost of funding advantage that the 
SPOE strategy and FDIC funding will provide to SIFIs and their 
operating subsidiaries during future crises: 
In times of financial stress, the knowledge that operating units [of failed 
SIFIs] will be provided funding to meet liquidity demands could serve to 
encourage corporate treasurers and others to place their funds with SIFIs’ 
operating subsidiaries over other financial firms for whom such assurances 
are unavailable. Therefore, this assumption and access to funding provides 
SIFIs a significant competitive advantage . . . .271  
Similarly, FDIC Board Member Jeremiah Norton has warned that the 
SPOE strategy and FDIC funding could cause “the market 
equilibrium [to] shift in favor of LCFI subsidiaries” because 
“creditors of these subsidiaries could perceive that they would not 
take a loss upon distress at an LCFI and therefore would require a 
lower return on transactions or investments.”272  
Defenders of the SPOE approach contend that the FDIC will 
not have to borrow large sums from the Treasury if regulators require 
top-tier holding companies of SIFIs to hold large amounts of “bail-
                                                 
 270. Dodd–Frank § 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B)-(C). 
 271. Adler, supra note 244 (quoting Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, 
open meeting of FDIC board members (Dec. 10, 2013)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 272. NORTON SPEECH, supra note 252, at 9; accord Simon Johnson, Sadly, 
Too Big to Fail Is Not Over, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/sadly-too-big-to-fail-is-not-
over/?_r=0. 
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in” debt.273 SPOE proponents argue that, if a SIFI fails, the holding 
company’s bail-in debt could be converted into common stock of the 
BFC in order provide much of the necessary new equity for the 
BFC.274 However, converting bail-in debt into equity would not 
provide any new funding for the BFC. In addition, a new regulation 
requiring top-tier holding companies of SIFIs to issue large volumes 
of bail-in debt would create the immediate problem of identifying 
appropriate buyers for that debt. It is widely agreed that SIFIs should 
not sell bail-in debt to other large financial institutions because 
cross-holdings of such debt among SIFIs would greatly increase the 
risks of contagious failures during a financial crisis.275  
SIFIs could potentially sell their bail-in debt to hedge funds and 
private equity funds. However, those funds would presumably insist 
on very high interest rates before they bought such risky debt. In 
addition, many hedge funds and private equity funds borrow 
significant amounts from SIFIs. Consequently, it could be very 
dangerous to impose large losses from bail-in debt on those funds 
                                                 
 273. TCH SPOE REPORT, supra note 259, at 8-9, 34-38; see also CHARLES 
GOODHART & EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, PAPER NO. 
10065, A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BAIL-INS AS BANK RECAPITALISATION 




2FiYW5rcmVjYXBpLnBkZiZhbGw9MQ%3D%3D (describing the “bail-in” debt 
concept advocated by supporters of the SPOE strategy). 
 274. See, e.g., MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, FDIC, WALL STREET REFORM: 
ASSESSING AND ENHANCING THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 8 (2014), 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep0914.pdf; TCH SPOE 
REPORT, supra note 259, at 8-9, 31-38; DANIEL K. TARULLO, STATEMENT BEFORE 
THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 9-10 (2014), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20140909a.pdf. 
 275. Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor Fin. Stability, Speech at INSOL 
International World Congress: Resolution and Future of Finance 9 (May 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/ 
2013/speech658.pdf; see also Ben Moshinsky & Jim Brunsden, Banks Face Pass-
the-Parcel Debt Limit in Writedown Rule, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 25, 2014, 7:01 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-25/banks-face-pass-the-
parcel-debt-limit-in-writedown-rule (reporting that the Financial Stability Board 
adopted a proposed requirement for bail-in debt that would not allow large global 
banks to satisfy the requirement by selling such debt to other large banks).  
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during a crisis, thereby impairing their ability to repay their SIFI 
loans.276  
Regulators might therefore be inclined to encourage SIFIs to 
sell their bail-in debt to mutual funds, pension funds, and other asset 
managers that oversee investments by ordinary individuals and other 
“non-systemic” investors. However, “pushing pensioners [and 
individual investors in mutual funds] under the bus” to save creditors 
of SIFIs should be no more palatable than taxpayer-financed 
bailouts.277 Regulators and SIFIs should not be allowed to use bail-in 
debt to impose the costs of future bailouts on ordinary investors. 
Individual investors (including those owning shares in mutual funds 
and pension funds) are in no better position than taxpayers to 
evaluate the potential risks of SIFIs or to bear the financial burden of 
bailing out SIFI creditors.278  
2.  Dodd–Frank Does Not Prevent Federal Regulators from 
Using Other Sources of Funding to Protect Creditors of 
SIFIs 
As shown in the previous section, the FDIC has substantial 
leeway to provide full protection to favored classes of SIFI creditors 
in OLA resolutions. The FDIC and other federal agencies also have 
additional tools for protecting SIFI creditors. The “systemic risk 
exception” (SRE) in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) 
provides a significant source of funding to bail out creditors of failed 
SIFIs.279 Under the SRE, the Treasury Secretary can authorize the 
FDIC to use deposit insurance funds to provide full protection to 
uninsured creditors of a bank if such action is deemed necessary to 
                                                 
 276. Avinash Persaud, Bail-Ins Are No Better than Fool’s Gold, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 21, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/686dfa94-27a7-11e3-8feb-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3TtaOvub4. 
 277. Id.; accord GOODHART & AVGOULEAS, supra note 273, at 13.  
 278. GOODHART & AVGOULEAS, supra note 273, at 13; see also id. at 5-12, 
18-19 (raising additional concerns about the feasibility of the SPOE strategy and 
bail-in debt, particularly in the context of cross-border resolutions of global SIFIs).  
 279. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: 
GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10-11, 
29-32 (2010) [hereinafter FCIC TBTF STAFF REPORT], available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-Governmental-Rescues 
.pdf (describing the SRE under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), as originally enacted in 
1991 and as invoked by federal regulators during the financial crisis). I was the 
principal drafter of the foregoing staff report while I worked as a consultant to the 
FCIC during the summer of 2010. 
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avoid or mitigate “serious . . . effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability.”280 Section 1106 of Dodd–Frank narrowed the 
scope of the SRE by requiring that a bank must be placed in 
receivership before the bank’s creditors can receive extraordinary 
protection under the SRE.281 Accordingly, if a failing SIFI owns a 
bank that is placed in receivership, the SRE would permit the 
FDIC—with the Fed’s concurrence and the Treasury Secretary’s 
approval—to provide full protection to that bank’s creditors in order 
to avoid or mitigate systemic risk. “By protecting a SIFI-owned 
bank’s creditors[—]which could include the SIFI itself” as well as 
creditors who have claims against both the bank and the SIFI—”the 
FDIC could use the SRE” to support either the SIFI or its creditors.282  
Two other provisions of Dodd–Frank limit, but do not 
eliminate, the ability of the Fed and the FDIC to provide financial 
support to failing SIFIs or their subsidiaries outside the OLA or the 
SRE. Under § 1101 of Dodd–Frank, the Fed may continue to provide 
emergency loans under § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act283 if the 
firms receiving such loans are “not insolvent” and are “participant[s] 
in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility” approved by 
the Treasury Secretary.284 Under § 1105 of Dodd–Frank, the FDIC 
may continue to guarantee debt obligations of depository institutions 
or their holding companies or other affiliates if the FDIC establishes 
a “widely available program” for “solvent” institutions that is 
approved by the Treasury Secretary and endorsed by a joint 
resolution of Congress.285  
                                                 
 280. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I) (2012). In order to invoke the SRE, the 
Treasury Secretary must receive a favorable recommendation from the FDIC and the 
Fed and consult with the President. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i).  
 281. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1106(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2125 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 
1823(c)(4)(G)). 
 282. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1001. 
 283. 12 U.S.C. § 343; see FCIC TBTF STAFF REPORT, supra note 279, at 19, 
21-26 (referring to § 13(3) as amended in 1991 and as applied by the Fed to provide 
emergency credit to particular firms and segments of the financial markets during 
the financial crisis).  
 284. Dodd–Frank § 1101(a) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 
1101(a)(6) prohibits the Fed from providing loans under § 13(3) to a company that is 
the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding, an OLA resolution, “or any other Federal or 
State insolvency proceeding.” Id. § 1101(a)(6); see S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 6, 182-
83 (2010) (discussing Dodd–Frank’s restrictions on the Fed’s lending authority 
under § 13(3)). 
 285. Dodd–Frank § 1105. Section 1106(a) of Dodd–Frank bars the FDIC 
from “establish[ing] any widely available debt guarantee program” based on the 
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Thus, the FDIC cannot guarantee the debt of financial 
institutions under § 1105 without congressional approval. However, 
§ 1101 allows the Fed—with only the Treasury Secretary’s 
approval—to create a “broad-based” program similar to the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) for the purpose of providing 
emergency liquidity assistance to a selected group of SIFIs that the 
Fed deems to be “not insolvent.”286 As shown by the events of 2008, 
“it is [very] difficult for outsiders (including members of Congress) 
to second-guess a regulator’s determination of solvency [in] the 
midst of a systemic crisis.”287 “Moreover, regulators are strongly 
inclined during a crisis to make generous assessments of solvency in 
order to justify their decision to provide emergency assistance to 
troubled [SIFIs].”288 Thus, during a future financial crisis the Fed 
could use its remaining authority under § 13(3) to provide 
emergency loans to a targeted group of troubled SIFIs that have not 
yet been placed in OLA resolutions or other bankruptcy or 
insolvency proceedings.289 
“Moreover, Dodd–Frank does not [affect the ability of 
individual SIFIs] to receive liquidity support from the [Fed’s] 
discount window or from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs).”290 
“The [Fed’s] discount window (often referred to as the [Fed’s] 
‘lender of last resort’ facility) provides short-term loans to depository 
                                                                                                       
SRE under the FDI Act. Id. § 1106(a); see S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 6-7, 183-84 
(2010) (discussing Dodd–Frank’s limitations on the FDIC’s authority to guarantee 
debt obligations of depository institutions and their holding companies).  
 286. Dodd–Frank § 1101(a)(6) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The [Fed] established the PDCF in March 2008 (at the time of its rescue of 
Bear) and expanded that facility in September 2008 (at the time of 
Lehman’s failure). The PDCF allowed the nineteen primary dealers in 
government securities to make secured borrowings from the [Fed] on 
[terms] similar to [those governing secured advances to banks from the 
Fed’s discount window]. The nineteen primary dealers eligible for 
participation in the PDCF were securities broker-dealers; . . . all but four 
of those dealers were affiliated with banks.  
Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1002-03 n.214.  
 287. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1003. 
 288. Id. at 1003; Johnson, supra note 272; SKEEL, supra note 243, at 132-40. 
 289. See supra notes 283-284 and accompanying text; see also SKEEL, supra 
note 243, at 11, 139-40 (observing that the Fed can “maneuver around the 
restrictions [on its § 13(3) lending authority] by creating an across-the-board lending 
facility that is really a single firm bailout in disguise”). 
 290. See Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1003. 
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institutions secured by qualifying collateral.”291 “Similarly, FHLBs—
[sometimes] described . . . as ‘lender[s] of next-to-last resort’—
[provide] collateralized ‘advances’ to member institutions, including 
banks and insurance companies.”292  
During the last financial crisis, banks did not borrow significant 
amounts from the Fed’s discount window due to the perceived 
“stigma” of doing so, as well as the availability of alternative sources 
of credit through FHLBs and emergency liquidity facilities that the 
Fed established under § 13(3).293 Following the outbreak of the 
financial crisis, the FHLBs provided $235 billion of advances to 
member institutions during the second half of 2007, including almost 
$150 billion of advances to ten major LCFIs. “Six of those LCFIs 
incurred large losses during the crisis[] and . . . either failed, were 
acquired in emergency transactions, or received [extraordinary] 
‘assistance’ from the federal government.”294 Thus, “FHLB advances 
provided a significant source of support for troubled LCFIs, 
[particularly] during the early phase of the financial crisis.”295 During 
future crises, individual LCFIs would probably use the FRB’s 
discount window more frequently, along with FHLB advances, 
because § 1101 of Dodd–Frank makes it more difficult for the Fed to 
provide emergency credit to individual institutions under § 13(3).296 
“Discount window loans and FHLB advances cannot be made 
to banks [that are already] in receivership, but they do provide a 
potential source of funding” for banks owned by troubled SIFIs that 
have not yet been placed in receivership.297 Similarly, as shown 
                                                 
 291. See id. at 1003 & n.216 (quoting Adam Ashcraft, Morten L. Bech & W. 
Scott Frame, The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last 
Resort?, 42 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 551, 552 (2010)) (discussing the Fed’s 
authority to make discount window loans to individual banks under 12 U.S.C. § 
347b). 
 292. Id. at 1003-04 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ashcraft, Bech & Frame, 
supra note 291, at 554-62, 577-79). 
 293. Ashcraft, Bech & Frame, supra note 291, at 567-79 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve 
in the Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 64-72 (2009). 
 294. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1004 (quoting Ashcraft, Bech 
& Frame, supra note 292, at 553, 560, 579-80). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 347b(b) (2012)) (allowing the Fed to make 
discount window loans to “undercapitalized” banks subject to specified limitations); 
12 C.F.R. § 1266.4(b), (d) (2014) (allowing FHLBs to make advances to “capital 
deficient” banks, but requiring special regulatory approval for advances to insolvent 
banks). 
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above, the Fed can provide emergency credit to groups of troubled 
SIFIs under § 13(3) as long as they have not been declared 
insolvent.298 To the extent that the Fed or the FHLBs provide any of 
the foregoing types of loans, “at least some short-term creditors of 
troubled SIFIs or [their subsidiary] banks are likely to benefit by 
[receiving] full payment of their claims before any receivership is 
[established].”299 
3.  Dodd–Frank Does Not Prevent Congress from Authorizing 
Bailouts of SIFIs During Future Crises 
Notwithstanding Dodd–Frank’s explicit promise to end bailouts 
of SIFIs, the preceding Subsection shows that federal agencies still 
possess several tools for protecting SIFI creditors during future 
crises. A more fundamental problem is that Dodd–Frank’s “no 
bailout” pledge does not prevent a future Congress from allowing 
regulators to rescue SIFIs. When a future Congress confronts the 
next systemic financial crisis, that Congress may well decide to 
abandon the no-bailout promise either explicitly (by amending 
Dodd–Frank) or implicitly (by looking the other way while 
regulators expansively construe their authority to protect SIFI 
creditors).300  
In 1989, congressional leaders and President George H.W. 
Bush made “[n]ever again” pledges when Congress enacted 
legislation authorizing the use of taxpayer funds to rescue the thrift 
industry.301 Those pledges closely resembled President Obama’s 
                                                 
 298. See supra notes 286-289 and accompanying text. 
 299. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1004-05; see also 12 U.S.C. § 
347b(b) (allowing the FRB to make discount window loans to “undercapitalized” 
banks subject to specified limitations).  
 300. Marc Jarsulic & Simon Johnson, How a Big-Bank Failure Could 
Unfold, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/how-a-big-bank-failure-could-
unfold/; Simon Johnson, The Case for Megabanks Fails, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013, 
5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/the-case-for-megabanks-
fails/. 
 301. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1005 n.225 (quoting “[n]ever 
again” statements in the House committee report and in President Bush’s signing 
statement for the 1989 legislation (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 310 (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 106; Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, 
George Bush: Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 9, 1989), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17414)). 
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“never again” statement when he signed Dodd–Frank into law.302 
Similar assurances were made in 1991 when Congress enacted 
sweeping regulatory reform legislation to deal with the banking crisis 
of the 1980s and early 1990s.303 Congressional leaders assured the 
public in 1991 that the new reforms—including the “prompt 
corrective action” regime—would significantly reduce the likelihood 
of TBTF bailouts, even though the legislation included the SRE to 
deal with “extraordinary cases.”304  
Neither the 1989 pledges nor the 1991 assurances stopped 
Congress, President George W. Bush, and federal agencies from 
authorizing the use of hundreds of billions of dollars in “public funds 
to bail out major financial institutions in 2008.”305 In light of that 
history, Adam Levitin has justifiably concluded that  
[l]aw is an insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts 
altogether. It is impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset 
resolution process, irrespective of the results. The financial Ulysses cannot 
be bound to the mast. . . . Once the ship is foundering, we do not want 
Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest [we] go down with the ship and 
drown. Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free—too bail.306 
Levitin and other scholars predict that future Congresses will relax or 
remove Dodd–Frank’s constraints on TBTF bailouts, or will permit 
federal regulators to evade those limitations if such actions are 
deemed necessary to prevent future collapses of SIFIs that could 
destabilize our financial system.307 
Another major reason for questioning the credibility of Dodd–
Frank’s no-bailout promise is the absence of any unified 
                                                 
 302. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (quoting President Obama’s 
statement). 
 303. See S. REP. NO. 102-167, at 17-33 (1991) (describing the need for 
regulatory reforms to respond to the banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s). 
 304. Id. at 3-4, 44-46 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 137 CONG. 
REC. H11808 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Slattery) (declaring that 
the 1991 legislation would “have the effect of putting the brakes on the use of the 
too big to fail doctrine”); Carnell, supra note 62, at 326-30, 363, 367-68 (explaining 
that the 1991 legislation was designed to “curtail too-big-to-fail policies” by 
requiring regulators (1) to impose “prompt corrective action” sanctions on 
undercapitalized banks, and (2) to use a “least-cost” approach in resolving failed 
banks, subject to a “narrow systemic-risk exception” that would rarely be invoked). 
 305. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1005; see also FCIC TBTF 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 279, at 10, 21-34. 
 306. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011). 
 307. Id. at 489; accord SKEEL, supra note 243, at 12-15, 145; Cheryl D. 
Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 
224, 227 (2010); Jarsulic & Johnson, supra note 300; Johnson, supra note 300.  
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international framework for resolving SIFIs with cross-border 
operations. An OLA proceeding will not successfully resolve the 
failure of a global SIFI unless the foreign countries in which the SIFI 
operates agree to cooperate in carrying out the OLA plan (including 
the FDIC’s proposed SPOE strategy).308 At present, it is highly 
doubtful whether that kind of foreign cooperation would be 
forthcoming. In June 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
reported that “as yet, orderly resolution of systemic cross-border 
banks is not a feasible option.”309 Despite efforts by the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) to create an international resolution 
blueprint, the IMF concluded that “orderly cross-border resolution is 
still far from assured. Should a large cross-border bank fail today, it 
appears unlikely that the pitfalls and misaligned incentives that 
undermined [international] cooperation in the global financial crisis 
could be avoided.”310  
Similarly, the FSB reported in September 2014 that “most 
jurisdictions do not currently have statutory powers to recognise, 
enforce or give legal effect to foreign resolution measures.”311 The 
FSB also warned that “judicial recognition procedures” for enforcing 
foreign orders dealing with business resolutions are “typically 
designed for corporate insolvency proceedings and are largely 
untested for actions taken by foreign resolution authorities with 
respect to financial institutions.”312 The FSB further cautioned that 
“very few jurisdictions currently have [cross-border resolution] 
frameworks in place,”313 and “no jurisdiction has experience” in 
applying such a framework to accomplish “the resolution of a 
complex cross-border financial group.”314 
                                                 
 308. See, e.g., GOODHART & AVGOULEAS, supra note 273, at 18-19, 22-24; 
Jarsulic & Johnson, supra note 300. 
 309. INT’L MONETARY FUND, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2014) [hereinafter IMF BANK RESOLUTION REPORT] (emphasis 
omitted), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf. 
 310. Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted). 
 311. FIN. STABILITY BD., CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION 
ACTION 3 (2014) [hereinafter FSB CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION REPORT], available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/c_140929.pdf. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 11. 
 314. Id. at 6. In October 2014, eighteen major banks that are leading global 
derivatives dealers agreed on changes to their master swaps agreements overseen by 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Gregory Mott, Banks 
Back Swap Contracts That Could Help Unwind Too-Big-to-Fail, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
(Oct. 11, 2014, 5:00 PM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2014-10-11/banks-back-swap-contracts-that-could-help-unwind-too-big-to-fail. The 
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To date, relatively few nations have adopted SIFI resolution 
laws that are similar to Title II of Dodd–Frank.315 In addition, past 
experience suggests that foreign nations are likely to adopt “‘ring-
fencing’” policies and engage in “[u]nilateral responses” during 
future crises, including segregation and seizure of SIFI-owned assets 
subject to their jurisdiction.316 Accordingly, during a future crisis—
especially one involving threats to multiple SIFIs—U.S. regulators 
might well decide that they must arrange bailouts for SIFIs with 
cross-border operations instead of taking the risk that invoking OLA 
receiverships would trigger protracted disputes with foreign 
regulators as well as panicked runs by SIFI creditors.317  
                                                                                                       
changes would provide for temporary delays in the termination of derivatives 
contracts or the seizure of collateral following the insolvency of a derivatives dealer. 
Id. Trade associations representing big international banks proclaimed that the 
agreed changes to ISDA master contracts would “facilitate cross-border resolution 
efforts and reduce the risk of a disorderly wind-down.” Id. (quoting Scott O’Malia, 
ISDA Chief Exec. Officer, and a similar statement by TCH president Paul Saltzman) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, the FSB has warned that 
contractual solutions to cross-border enforceability . . . have limitations 
and therefore may not be considered a substitute for statutory regimes in 
the longer term. . . . [T]he enforceability of such contractual recognition 
provisions has yet to be tested in the courts and limitations on their 
enforceability (for example, on public policy grounds) may not always be 
clear. 
FSB CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION REPORT, supra note 311, at 11.  
 315. See, e.g., Paul L. Lee & Edite Ligere, Cross-Border Resolution of 
Banking Groups: International Initiatives and U.S. Perspectives – Part II, PRATT’S 
J. BANKR. L., Oct. 2013, at 583, 585-89, 599-609; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS: U.S. 
AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS 29-34 
(2014). 
 316. IMF BANK RESOLUTION REPORT, supra note 309, at 5-7 (stating that 
“[u]nilateral responses [by national authorities] were the norm” in dealing with 
troubled cross-border SIFIs during the recent financial crisis, “leading in some cases 
to the breakup of [SIFI] groups into national components”); id. at 25-29 (explaining 
that European authorities had great difficulty in agreeing on resolution strategies for 
Dexia and Fortis and ultimately decided to separate both cross-border SIFIs into 
separate, nationalized banks); Paul Taylor, European Bank Mergers Still Face 
Hurdles Post-Stress Tests, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2014, 3:16 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-ecb-banks-tests-insight-idUSKCN0I1 
05920141012 (describing the adoption of “ring-fencing” strategies by European 
banking authorities during the financial crisis, and quoting former Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King’s observation that “‘global banks are global in life but 
national in death’”).  
 317. See, e.g., Jarsulic & Johnson, supra note 300; Johnson, supra note 272.  
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B. The Dodd–Frank Act Does Not Prevent Financial Conglomerates 
from Using Their Safety-Net Subsidies to Support Risky Capital 
Markets Activities  
In enacting Dodd–Frank, Congress included two provisions—
the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment—that were intended 
to prevent the federal “safety net” for banks318 from being used to 
subsidize risky activities in the capital markets. As shown below, 
neither provision has proven to be effective. After aggressive 
lobbying by Wall Street, the House–Senate conference committee on 
Dodd–Frank inserted numerous exemptions into the Volcker Rule 
and the Lincoln Amendment. Following Dodd–Frank’s enactment, 
the financial industry vigorously lobbied to obstruct the 
implementation of both provisions, and the industry also promoted 
legislative efforts to amend or repeal both statutes. In December 
2014, Wall Street’s allies in Congress succeeded in repealing the 
Lincoln Amendment. 
The financial industry’s successful campaigns to undermine the 
Volcker Rule and repeal the Lincoln Amendment reveal fundamental 
problems with Dodd–Frank’s broader design. The statute does not 
challenge the business model and operating strategies of megabanks. 
Instead, Dodd–Frank relies on highly technical regulatory reforms 
that are not likely to stop megabanks from exploiting federal safety-
net subsidies and taking excessive risks. Dodd–Frank’s greatest 
weakness may be its heavy reliance on the same financial regulatory 
agencies that repeatedly failed to impose effective discipline on 
megabanks in the past.  
1. The Volcker Rule Does Not Impose Strong and Enforceable 
Constraints on Risk-Taking by Megabanks  
Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker originally proposed the 
Volcker Rule (§ 619 of Dodd–Frank) in order to stop banks from 
making speculative trades and investments in the capital markets.319 
                                                 
 318. “The federal ‘safety net’ for banks” provides significant subsidies in the 
form of “(1) federal deposit insurance,” (2) the SRE’s potential protection for 
“uninsured depositors and other uninsured creditors” of TBTF banks and “(3) 
discount window advances and other liquidity assistance provided by the FRB as 
lender of last resort.” Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1023 n.308. 
 319. Louis Uchitelle, Volcker Pushes for Reform, Regretting Past Silence, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at BU1 (describing Mr. Volcker’s determined advocacy 
for the Volcker Rule). 
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As approved by the Senate Banking Committee, the Volcker Rule 
would have barred banks from (1) sponsoring or investing in hedge 
funds or private equity funds, and (2) engaging in proprietary 
trading—i.e., buying and selling securities, derivatives, and other 
financial instruments for the purpose of generating trading profits.320 
As the Senate committee report explained, the Volcker Rule was 
designed to prevent banks “protected by the federal safety net, which 
have a lower cost of funds, from directing those funds to high-risk 
uses” involving speculative trading and investments.321  
Wall Street vehemently opposed the Volcker Rule.322 As a 
result of extensive lobbying by the financial industry, the House–
Senate conference committee on the Dodd–Frank Act agreed on a 
last-minute compromise that substantially weakened the Volcker 
Rule.323 The final compromise on the Volcker Rule included 
exemptions that permit banks to (1) invest up to 3% of their Tier 1 
capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as long as such 
investments do not exceed 3% of the total ownership interests in any 
single fund); (2) purchase and sell government securities; (3) engage 
in “[r]isk-mitigating hedging activities”; (4) purchase and sell 
securities, derivatives, and other financial instruments “in connection 
with underwriting or market-making-related activities”; (5) make 
investments through insurance company affiliates; and (6) make 
investments through small business investment companies.324 The 
                                                 
 320. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8-9, 90-92 (2010). 
 321. Id. at 8-9, 90 (explaining that the Volcker Rule was intended to 
“eliminate any economic subsidy to high-risk activities that is provided by access to 
lower-cost capital because of participation in the regulatory safety net”).  
 322. John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s Economic Adviser and His 
Battles over the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/07/26/the-volcker-rule; see also Eamon 
Javers & Victoria McGrane, Chris Dodd Proposal Hits Wall Street Hard, POLITICO 
(Mar. 16, 2010, 5:10 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/34463.html  
(reporting that the Volcker Rule was “hated on Wall Street”). 
 323. Cassidy, supra note 322 (reporting that the compromise disappointed 
Mr. Volcker); Bradley Keoun & Christine Harper, The Financial Reform Law: A 
‘Fig Leaf,’ BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 1, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
magazine/content/10_28/b4186042369207.htm (reporting on the final compromise 
that weakened the Volcker Rule).  
 324. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-27 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (enacting § 13(d) of the BHC Act). 
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final compromise also granted long phase-in periods for the Volcker 
Rule’s provisions.325  
A particularly troublesome aspect of the Volcker Rule is the 
statute’s attempt to distinguish between prohibited “proprietary 
trading” and permissible “market-making.”326 Both proprietary 
trading and market-making involve purchasing and selling securities 
as principal, and it is therefore “notoriously difficult” to draw a clear 
dividing line between the two activities.327 Similarly, it is very hard 
to articulate a workable distinction between prohibited proprietary 
trading and permitted “[r]isk-mitigating hedging activities.”328 As 
Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo observed, a “fundamental challenge” in 
separating the three closely related activities is “the fact that a 
specific trade may be either permissible or impermissible depending 
on the context and circumstances within which that trade is made.”329  
Congress left it to the three federal banking agencies, along 
with the CFTC and the SEC, to implement the Volcker Rule by 
adopting joint regulations.330 As a result of extensive lobbying by the 
financial industry and disagreements among the five regulators, final 
implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule were not issued until 
                                                 
 325. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1028 (explaining that § 13(c) 
of the BHC Act, as enacted by the Volcker Rule, gave banks (1) until July 2017 “to 
bring most of their equity-investing and proprietary-trading activities into 
compliance with the Volcker Rule,” and (2) until July 2022 “to bring their ‘illiquid’ 
investments that were . . . in existence on May 1, 2010, into compliance with the 
Rule”). 
 326. Dodd–Frank § 619 (internal quotation marks omitted) (enacting § 
13(d)(1)(B) and (h)(4) of the BHC Act). 
 327. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1029; see also CARNELL, 
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 619-21 (explaining that “market makers” must 
act “as principals, taking securities into their own inventories as owners” to ensure 
their ability to satisfy customer purchase or sell orders; as a result, “implementing 
[the market-making] exception has proven extremely difficult” for regulators in 
carrying out the Volcker Rule).  
 328. Dodd–Frank § 619 (internal quotation marks omitted) (enacting § 
13(d)(1)(C) and (h)(4) of the BHC Act); see also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, 
supra note 138, at 622 (“Another major obstacle in implementing the Volcker Rule 
in a coherent way is that it appears virtually impossible to reconcile the rule’s ban on 
proprietary trading with the need of banks to reduce risk by hedging.”).  
 329. Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed. Reserve Governor, Opening Statement (Dec. 
10, 2013) [hereinafter Tarullo Volcker Rule Statement], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131210a-tarullo-
statement.htm (publishing the statement issued by Govenor Tarullo in connection 
with the Fed’s approval of final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule). 
 330. Dodd–Frank § 619 (enacting § 13(b)(2) of the BHC Act). 
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December 2013.331 Wall Street responded to the final regulations 
with considerable relief because the regulations “leave market-
making operations intact” and also provide leeway for “aggregate 
hedges” as well as the retention of some funds managed by banks.332  
Former Wells Fargo chairman Richard Kovacevich described 
the final outcome as “‘reasonable and one that the industry can live 
with.’”333 Hence, Wall Street’s lobbying campaign appears to have 
been successful in softening the Volcker Rule’s impact.334  
The final regulations (including guidance) are lengthy and 
complex, covering 140 pages in the Federal Register.335 Fed 
Governor Tarullo acknowledged that while “[m]any of us—myself 
included—had hoped for a final rule substantially more streamlined 
than the 2011 proposal,” the final regulations are “only modestly 
simplified.”336 Given the ambiguity of key definitions, the complexity 
                                                 
 331. Chris Bruce & K. Claire Compton, Bumpy Phase-In Seen for Volcker 
Rule Despite Extended Compliance Deadlines, 101 BNA’s BANKING REP. 965, 965-
66 (2013); see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1302-04 (describing the 
financial industry’s aggressive lobbying efforts that delayed adoption of the 
implementing regulations). 
 332. Michael J. Moore, Dakin Campbell & Laura Marcinek, Wall Street 
Exhales as Volcker Rule Seen Sparing Market-Making, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 11, 
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-11/wall-street-
exhales-as-volcker-rule-seen-sparing-market-making; see also Silla Brush, 
Cheyenne Hopkins & Jesse Hamilton, Volcker Rule Ushers in Era of Increased 
Oversight of Trades, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 10, 2013, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-10/volcker-rule-eases-market-
making-while-hedges-face-new-scrutiny (reporting that “Wall Street’s lobbying 
efforts paid off in easing some provisions of the rule” as “[r]egulators granted a 
broader exemption for banks’ market-making desks”); Sheelah Kolhatkar, Is the 
Volcker Rule Too Soft on Wall Street?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-12-11/is-the-volcker-rule-too-soft-on-
wall-street (“[T]he consensus is that the final rule is far less dire than bankers 
feared.”); Sarah N. Lynch & Ross Kerber, U.S. Fund Industry Sees Modest Wins in 
Final Volcker Rule, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013, 2:57 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-financial-regulation-volcker-fund-idU 
SBRE9BA00K20131211 (reporting that “[r]egulators decided to exempt certain 
funds after Wall Street complained,” and the exempted funds include “many 
commodity pools, foreign registered mutual funds, securitized loans and corporate 
structures such as joint ventures”). 
 333. Moore, Campbell & Marcinek, supra note 332 (quoting Richard 
Kovacevich). 
 334. Brush, Hopkins & Hamilton, supra note 332; Kolhatkar, supra note 
332. 
 335. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Propriety Trading and Certain Interests 
in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 
5536-6075 (proposed Jan. 31, 2014). 
 336. Tarullo Volcker Rule Statement, supra note 329. 
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of the final regulations, and the agencies’ decision to rely heavily on 
internal compliance efforts by banks, the ability of regulators to 
enforce the Volcker Rule in any rigorous manner remains very 
doubtful.337  
As soon as the final regulations were issued, the financial 
industry sought further concessions. In January 2014, regulators 
approved an additional exemption for CDOs that held trust-preferred 
securities issued by community banks.338 The financial industry 
immediately pushed for another exemption covering collateralized 
loan obligations (CLOs).339 After members of Congress applied 
considerable pressure, the Fed granted a two-year extension for 
banks to bring their CLOs into compliance with the Volcker Rule.340  
Banks also lobbied for an extended delay of their obligation to 
bring their private equity and venture capital investments into 
compliance with the Volcker Rule.341 In addition, the financial 
industry provided massive support to Republican candidates in the 
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 339. Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, Bank Industry Pushes for More 
Revisions to Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-15/banks-push-for-further-
changes-to-volcker-rule-following-cdo-fix.  
 340. Cheyenne Hopkins, Banks Given Two More Years to Meet Volcker CLO 
Standards, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 7, 2014, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-07/federal-reserve-delays-
volcker-clo-conformance-by-two-years; see also Rob Tricchinelli, Facing Pressure, 
Federal Regulators Grant Two-Year Extension on CLOs, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
695, 695 (2014). 
 341. Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, Banks Push to Delay Rule on 
Investments, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2014, at C3; see also Yalman Onaran, SIFMA 
Says Fed Should Delay Parts of Volcker for Some Funds, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
2045, 2045 (2014).  
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2014 midterm elections, and that support helped Republicans to 
capture the Senate and retain control of the House.342 The incoming 
Republican leaders in the Senate and the House promptly announced 
that they would target several provisions of Dodd-Frank for repeal or 
modification, including the Volcker Rule.343  
Thus, there is a strong possibility that Congress will soon pass 
legislation to weaken the Volcker Rule.344 Meanwhile, effective 
implementation of the existing Rule will depend on coordination 
among five federal agencies that have found it very difficult to reach 
consensus in the past.345 Given those challenges and Wall Street’s 
abundant opportunities to “circumvent” the Rule’s complex 
provisions,346 it is highly doubtful whether the Rule will stop 
                                                 
 342. See Silla Brush, Cheyenne Hopkins & Jesse Hamilton, Emboldened by 
Swap Victory, Banks Eye Further Changes in 2015, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 12, 
2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-12/emboldened-
by-swap-victory-banks-eye-further-changes-in-2015 (“Wall Street firms . . . will be 
counting on Republican control of both houses of Congress to speed reversal of 
what they call the overreach of the [Dodd–Frank Act].”). The finance, insurance, 
and real estate (FIRE) sector was by far the largest source of political contributions 
among all industry sectors during the 2014 midterm elections. The FIRE sector 
contributed $464 million to political action groups, parties, and candidates, and the 
sector gave 62% of its political contributions to Republican candidates. Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
industries/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).  
 343. Rob Tricchinelli, As Republicans Control Both Chambers, Dodd–Frank 
Is Squarely in the Crosshairs, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 172, 172 (2015) (“Several 
aspects of the [Dodd–Frank Act] . . . are in Republicans’ crosshairs, including . . . 
the Volcker Rule.”); Simon Johnson, The Republican Strategy to Repeal Dodd–
Frank, BASELINE SCENARIO (Jan. 7, 2015), http://baselinescenario.com/2015/01/ 
07/the-republican-strategy-to-repeal-dodd-frank/ (stating that Republican leaders in 
the new Congress plan to “chip away” at various Dodd–Frank provisions, and their 
“initial target is the Volcker Rule”). 
 344. Tricchinelli, supra note 343, at 172; Johnson, supra note 343. 
 345. Chris Bruce, Banking Lawyers See Rocky Road for Implementation of 
Volcker Rule, 103 BNA’S BANKING REP. 542, 542 (2014); see also Nela Richardson, 
Volcker Rule’s Bite Depends on Enforcement: BGOV Insight, 101 BNA’S BANKING 
REP. 1001, 1001 (2013) (observing that “[t]he final rule is vague and leaves much 
discretion to the five regulators charged with enforcing it”); Peter Eavis & Ben 
Protess, Pressure Builds to Finish Volcker Rule on Wall St. Oversight, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/pressure-builds-
to-finish-volcker-rule-on-wall-st-oversight/?_r=0 (reporting on “tension” and 
“internal wrangling” among the five agencies that “stymied them for years” in their 
efforts to adopt joint regulations to implement the Volcker Rule).  
 346. Bruce, supra note 345, at 543 (paraphrasing the view of Professor M. 
Todd Henderson that the Volcker Rule “will be a futile effort in many respects 
[because] Wall Streeters will be able to circumvent its restrictions”). As one 
journalist observed: 
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megabanks from continuing to engage in speculative capital markets 
activities.347 
2. Wall Street Persuaded Congress to Repeal the Lincoln 
Amendment  
Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) originally sponsored the 
Lincoln Amendment (§ 716 of Dodd–Frank).348 As approved by the 
Senate Agriculture Committee (which Senator Lincoln chaired),       
§ 716 would have barred dealers in swaps and other over-the-counter 
derivatives from receiving any assistance from the FDIC’s deposit 
insurance fund or from the Fed’s discount window or other 
emergency lending facilities.349  
The Lincoln Amendment was intended to force banks to “spin 
off their derivatives operations” in order to shield taxpayers from 
being compelled to “bail out” a bank after its “derivatives deals 
failed.”350 Senator Lincoln also wanted to prevent banks from using 
“cheaper funding provided by deposits insured by the FDIC[,] to 
subsidize their trading activities.”351 “Thus, the purposes of the 
Lincoln Amendment—[insulating] banks from the risks of 
speculative activities and [preventing] the spread of safety net 
subsidies—were similar to the objectives of the Volcker Rule, but 
                                                                                                       
Wall Street’s phalanxes of lawyers will surely be able to breathe more 
ambiguity into the deep vagueness the text [of the final regulations] 
already seems to contain. . . . What’s more, if these rules will be enforced 
by regulators who may want to get hired into lucrative jobs by the banks 
they’re supervising, can we be confident the tough calls will be resolved in 
the public interest? 
Miller, supra note 337. 
 347. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1029-30; Jonathan Weil, 
Keep Your Expectations for the Volcker Rule Low, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Dec. 10, 
2013, 10:04 AM); see also Rodriguez Valladares, supra note 337 (concluding that 
“despite Volcker’s laudable goal, banks will not end up doing much to sufficiently 
reduce their risks and protect U.S. taxpayers”). 
 348. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1030. 
 349. Id. (discussing § 716 as approved by the Senate Agriculture 
Committee). 
 350. Richard Hill, Derivatives: Conferees Reach Compromise: Banks Could 
Continue to Trade Some Derivatives, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1234, 1234 (2010). 
 351. Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, Banks Would Be Forced to Push Out 
Derivative Trading Under Plan, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDgYbbi7GobY. 
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the Lincoln Amendment focused on dealing and trading in 
derivatives instead of all types of proprietary trading.”352  
Senator Lincoln’s amendment provoked “tremendous 
pushback . . . from Republicans, fellow Democrats, the White House, 
banking regulators, and Wall Street interests.”353 As was true with the 
Volcker Rule, the House–Senate conference committee agreed on a 
final compromise that significantly weakened the Lincoln 
Amendment.354 As enacted, § 716 allowed FDIC-insured banks to 
deal in (1) swaps used for “[h]edging and other similar risk 
mitigating activities directly related to the [bank’s] activities”; (2) 
swaps based on interest rates, currency rates, and other “reference 
assets that are permissible for investment by a national bank,” 
including gold and silver; and (3) credit default swaps that are 
cleared pursuant to Title VII of Dodd–Frank.355  
The final compromise on the Lincoln Amendment probably 
would have required major banks to transfer less than one-fifth of 
their pre-Dodd–Frank derivatives activities into separate affiliates.356 
Even so, the Lincoln Amendment would have forced the largest 
banks to spin off a significant amount of their existing swaps-trading 
operations. For example, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup conduct 
virtually all of their derivatives activities within their banks, and they 
                                                 
 352. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1031. 
 353. Hill, supra note 350; see also Stacy Kaper & Cheyenne Hopkins, Key 
Issues Unresolved as Reform Finishes Up; Fate of Derivatives, Volcker Rule Still in 
Limbo in Final Hours, AM. BANKER, June 25, 2010, at 1 (“[B]anks have vigorously 
opposed [the Lincoln Amendment], arguing it would cost them millions of dollars to 
spin off their derivatives units. Regulators, too, have argued against the provision, 
saying it would drive derivatives trades overseas or underground, where they would 
not be regulated.”). 
 354. Barrett Devlin & Damian Paletta, The Financial-Regulation Overhaul: 
A Fight to the Wire as Pro-Business Democrats Dig in on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., 
June 26, 2010, at A5; Edward Wyatt & David M. Herszenhorn, Accord Reached for 
an Overhaul of Finance Rules: Historic Deal Expands Federal Authority to Curb 
Risky Wall St. Practices, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A1, A12.  
 355. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 716(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010); see also Hill, supra note 350; 
Wyatt & Herszenhorn, supra note 354, at A12. 
 356. Keoun & Harper, supra note 323; Randall Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, 
The Financial-Regulation Overhaul: Biggest Banks Manage to Dodge Some Bullets, 
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at A5; see also Hill, supra note 350 (quoting the 
Consumer Federation of America’s view that the final compromise “‘significantly 
weakened’” the Lincoln Amendment). 
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would have been required to make significant changes in their 
derivatives operations.357  
To prevent the Lincoln Amendment from taking effect, the 
financial industry launched a vigorous lobbying campaign to repeal 
the statute. In 2013, the House overwhelmingly passed a bill to 
repeal the Lincoln Amendment—a bill that Wall Street crafted and 
eagerly supported.358 In response to Wall Street’s entreaties, the Fed 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) agreed in 
2013 to postpone the compliance date for the Lincoln Amendment 
until July 2015.359  
Before that extended compliance period expired, the financial 
industry and its congressional allies engineered a repeal of the 
Lincoln Amendment in December 2014.360 With support from most 
Republicans and some Democrats, Republican leaders successfully 
attached a repeal measure to “must-pass spending legislation,”361 and 
the Obama Administration accepted the repeal in order “to get the 
budget deal done.”362 Wall Street’s massive lobbying efforts for the 
                                                 
 357. See infra note 446 and accompanying text (stating that Chase and 
Citigroup each hold 99% of the notional value of their derivatives within their 
banks); see also Johnson, supra note 343 (explaining that the repeal of the Lincoln 
Amendment in December 2014 “primarily benefited Citigroup and JP Morgan 
Chase”). 
 358. Victoria Finkle, House Votes to Roll Back Dodd–Frank Swaps 
Provision, AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 2013 (reporting that the House passed a bill to 
repeal the Lincoln Amendment “by a bipartisan vote of 292-122, including 70 
Democrats”); Eric Lipton, House Votes to Repeal Dodd–Frank Provision, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at B3 (reporting that Citigroup drafted most of the repeal bill, 
and Wall Street banks engaged in “intense lobbying” to push the bill through the 
House). 
 359. In 2013, the Fed and OCC issued rules giving domestic and foreign 
banks until July 2015 to bring their swaps activities into compliance with the 
Lincoln Amendment. Jeff Kearns & Jesse Hamilton, Fed Releases Final Swaps 
Push-Out Rule for Foreign Banks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 24, 2013, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-24/fed-finalizes-dodd-frank-
swaps-push-out-rule-effective-jan-31; see also Jesse Hamilton, Deutsche Bank 
Among Lenders Given Two-Year U.S. Swaps Phase-Out, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 16, 
2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-15/fed-gives-
four-banks-two-year-phase-out-for-certain-swaps-trades.  
 360. Dave Clarke, Kate Davidson & Jon Prior, How Wall St. Got Its Way, 
POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/wall-
street-spending-bill-congress-113525.html. 
 361. Cheyenne Hopkins & Silla Brush, Wall Street’s Win on Swaps Rule 
Shows Washington Resurgence, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 12, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-12/wall-street-s-win-on-swaps-
rule-shows-resurgence-in-washington. 
 362. Clarke, Davidson & Prior, supra note 360. 
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repeal included personal telephone calls from JPMorgan Chase CEO 
Jamie Dimon to key members of Congress.363 As I observed at the 
time of the repeal, “‘Wall Street’s determined lobbying [to repeal] 
Section 716 provides compelling evidence that Wall Street’s 
business model depends on the ability of large financial 
conglomerates to keep exploiting the cheap funding provided by 
their ‘too big to fail’ subsidies.’”364 The repeal of the Lincoln 
Amendment raises grave doubts about Dodd–Frank’s ability to 
impose any lasting restraints on speculative risk-taking and the 
exploitation of safety-net subsidies by megabanks.365  
3. Dodd–Frank Does Not Change the High-Risk Business 
Model of Universal Banks, and the Statute Instead Relies 
on Regulators Who Are Vulnerable to Industry Capture 
As shown above, Dodd–Frank does not solve the TBTF 
problem, and it will not stop megabanks from continuing to engage 
in speculative risk-taking. During the financial crisis, the federal 
government made the TBTF problem even worse by adopting 
extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of big financial 
institutions. The government’s “fail safe” program for megabanks 
enabled those institutions to become even larger and more powerful 
than they had been before the crisis.366  
Dodd–Frank has not changed that outcome. Four years after 
Dodd–Frank’s enactment, FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig 
observed that “[c]ompared to 2008, the largest financial firms today 
are in most instances larger, more complicated, and more 
interconnected.”367 He also pointed out that Dodd–Frank has not 
                                                 
 363. Id.; Hopkins & Brush, supra note 361. 
 364. Rob Blackwell, Why Citi May Soon Regret Its Big Victory on Capitol 
Hill, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2014 (quoting my remarks). 
 365. Johnson, supra note 343 (stating that “the repeal of Section 716” shows 
the determination of Republican leaders “to strip away all meaningful restrictions 
imposed on Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and other megabanks—and to roll-back 
Dodd–Frank as far as possible, until it becomes meaningless or they are finally able 
to repeal it completely”). 
 366. See supra Part I; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 180, 191 
(pointing out that the federal government’s response to the financial crisis produced 
“much larger market shares for the fewer but bigger megabanks,” thereby 
contributing to “the enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions and the 
corresponding increase in their economic and political power”).  
 367. Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Address at the Boston 
Economic Club: Can We End Financial Bailouts?, (May 7, 2014) [hereinafter 
Hoenig May 7, 2014 Address]; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text 
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forced megabanks to change their high-risk business strategies. 
Megabanks continue to exploit “the safety net subsidy to support 
their expansion across the globe,” and they also continue to (1) 
combine “commercial, investment banking, and broker-dealer 
activities,” and (2) rely on “wholesale funding markets” that “are 
major sources of volatility in times of financial stress.”368 
Notwithstanding efforts by banking agencies to strengthen capital 
requirements, the largest U.S. banks still “remain excessively 
leveraged with ratios, on average, of nearly 22 to 1,” while the 
“remainder of the industry averages below 12 to 1.”369  
Thus, as I have previously argued, it is very unlikely that 
Dodd–Frank will compel “large financial conglomerates to change 
their business model or to reduce their appetite for risk-taking.”370 I 
have also contended that “the universal banking model is deeply 
flawed by its excessive organizational complexity, its vulnerability to 
culture clashes and conflicts of interest, and its tendency to permit 
excessive risk-taking within far-flung, semi-autonomous units that 
lack adequate oversight from either senior management or regulatory 
                                                                                                       
(stating that the four largest U.S. banks increased their share of total U.S. banking 
assets from 32% in 2005 to 47.7% in 2013). 
 368. Hoenig May 7, 2014 Address, supra note 367. 
 369. Id.; see also id. at n.6 (citing FDIC, GLOBAL CAPITAL INDEX: 
CAPITALIZATION RATIOS FOR GLOBAL SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (2013), 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/capitalizationratios 
4q13.pdf) (providing a weblink to a “Global Capital Index,” showing that the 
average leverage capital ratio was 4.62% during the fourth quarter of 2013 for the 
eight major U.S. banks designated as “Global Systemically Important Banks” by the 
FSB); Quarterly Banking Profile: Fourth Quarter 2013, 8 FDIC Q., no. 1, 2014, at 
2, 5 tbl.I-A (showing that the average leverage capital ratio for all FDIC-insured 
institutions was 9.41% during the fourth quarter of 2013). For a comprehensive 
analysis demonstrating that regulators should require banks (especially the largest 
banks) to hold significantly higher levels of equity capital and to operate with much 
less leverage, see generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW 
CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013). 
 370. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1437; see also Martin Wolf, 
Financial Reform: Call to Arms, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:41 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/152ccd58-3294-11e4-93c6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 
3SP7gA3aA (stating that “cynics” might reasonably conclude that the “manic 
rulemaking [in the United States and elsewhere] is designed to disguise the fact that 
the thrust of it all has been to preserve the system that existed before the crisis: . . . it 
will continue to rely on the interaction of vast financial institutions with 
freewheeling financial markets; it will continue to be highly leveraged; and it will 
continue to rely for profitability on successfully managing huge maturity and risk 
mismatches,” and also contending that the “financial system remains fragile” and 
vulnerable to the risk of “further crises”). 
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agencies.”371 The pervasive managerial and regulatory failures that 
contributed to Citigroup’s near-collapse in 2007 and 2008 indicate 
that today’s megabanks are “not only [TBTF], but also too big and 
too complex to manage or regulate effectively.”372 The “London 
Whale” debacle at JPMorgan Chase—which resulted in more than $6 
billion of losses from speculative trading in derivatives—revealed 
similar failures in risk management and oversight by Chase’s senior 
executives, the New York Fed, and the OCC.373 
Failures by the New York Fed and the OCC to stop disastrous 
risk-taking by Citigroup and Chase are unfortunately consistent with 
a much longer series of supervisory lapses with respect to large 
financial institutions. During the 1970s and 1980s, regulators did not 
prevent major banks from pursuing hazardous (and in many cases 
fatal) strategies, including rapid growth with heavy concentrations in 
high-risk assets and excessive reliance on volatile, short-term 
liabilities.374 Regulators were unwilling or unable to stop risky 
behavior during that period as long as banks continued to report 
profits.375  
Similarly, federal banking and securities regulators failed to 
restrain excessive risk-taking by large banks and securities firms 
                                                 
 371. Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 136. 
 372. Id. at 72, 90-132 (describing the managerial and regulatory failures that 
contributed to Citigroup’s near-collapse and bailouts). 
 373. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1430-37 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (describing failures by Chase’s executives and by the OCC that 
contributed to the “London Whale” trading losses); Tom Braithwaite & Gina Chon, 
Fed Did Not Act on JPMorgan “Whale” Fears, FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 21, 2014, 5:11 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7177f1e4-592e-11e4-9546-00144feab7de.html 
#axzz3SP7gA3aA (discussing a report by the Fed’s Office of Inspector General, 
which cited failures by the New York Fed to share information with the OCC or to 
conduct further examinations after becoming aware of Chase’s risky derivatives 
trades); Craig Torres, Fed Watchdog Criticizes Scrutiny of JPMorgan London 
Whale, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 21, 2014, 9:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-10-21/fed-watchdog-criticizes-scrutiny-of-jpmorgan-london-
whale (same); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OIG-
14-035, AUDIT REPORT: OCC NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN SUPERVISION OF TRADING 
ACTIVITIES IN LIGHT OF THE JPMORGAN CHASE LOSSES 1 (2014) (“OCC had many 
opportunities to address weaknesses in [Chase’s] risk management of trading 
activities, but did not act strongly or timely enough to address those weaknesses. In 
some cases, OCC failed to act at all.”). 
 374. FCIC TBTF STAFF REPORT, supra note 279, at 5-10; Wilmarth, 
Transformation, supra note 13, at 313-16. 
 375. George Hanc et al., An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s 
and Early 1990s, in 1 FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
39-46, 245-47, 373-78 (1997). 
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during the two decades that preceded the financial crisis of 2007–
2009.376 Scholars have uncovered strong evidence of “regulatory 
capture” by large financial institutions during that period, resulting 
from factors such as (1) large-scale political contributions and 
lobbying expenditures by the financial industry; (2) an intellectual 
and policy environment that strongly favored deregulation and a 
“light touch” approach to supervision; and (3) a “revolving door” 
that facilitated a continuous interchange of senior personnel between 
the top echelons of Wall Street and the financial regulatory 
agencies.377 Leading financial institutions also engaged in global 
regulatory arbitrage by threatening to move significant parts of their 
operations from the United States to London or other foreign 
financial centers if U.S. regulators did not make regulatory 
concessions.378  
As reflected in the highly ambiguous terms of the Volcker 
Rule,379 Dodd–Frank does not prescribe, except in very general 
terms, the standards that federal regulators must incorporate into 
their implementing rules. The creation of a robust regulatory regime 
therefore depends upon the agencies’ ability and willingness to 
establish and enforce rigorous standards.380 Unfortunately, as Simon 
Johnson and James Kwak have pointed out, “solutions that depend 
on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective action ignore 
the political constraints on regulation and the political power of the 
                                                 
 376. See, e.g., JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR. & ROSS LEVINE, 
GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US 4-7, 85-115 (2012); 
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 157-223 (2011); JOHNSON & 
KWAK, supra note 90, at 6-10, 120-50; Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1328-
45; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent 
Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk 24 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. 
Studies, Working Paper No. 380, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1675015 (stating that “[a]greement is virtually universal that lax regulation 
by all the financial regulators played a significant role in the 2008 financial crisis”). 
 377. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 82-109, 118-21, 133-50; Wilmarth, 
Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1328-45, 1359-69, 1390-428; Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra 
& Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis 4-5 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/287, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520.  
 378. Coffee, supra note 376, at 18-21, 25-26; Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd–Frank’s Dangers and the 
Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 178-79 
(2011); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1393-97. 
 379. See supra Subsection IV.B.1. 
 380. SKEEL, supra note 243, at 80-92; Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 
15, at 1012. 
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large banks.”381 As a result of Wall Street’s aggressive lobbying and 
litigation efforts, federal regulators completed only about half of 
Dodd–Frank’s required regulations by the statute’s fourth 
anniversary in July 2014, and regulators did not even issue proposals 
for half of the unfinished rules.382  
The battles over the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment 
provide vivid examples of the financial industry’s ability to block or 
delay reforms and extract concessions from regulators.383 For 
additional evidence of the financial industry’s clout, consider first 
the successful campaign by mutual fund companies to defeat efforts 
by former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro and FSOC to require retail 
money market mutual funds (MMMFs) to operate with floating net 
asset values (NAVs) instead of a misleading “fixed” NAV of $1 per 
share.384 Then consider the ability of banks to persuade regulators to 
accept no-down-payment mortgages as “qualified residential 
mortgages” (QRMs) that are exempt from Dodd–Frank’s risk 
retention requirement for mortgages securitized by banks.385 Wall 
                                                 
 381. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 207. 
 382. Ben Weyl, Dodd–Frank Birthday Means Rhetoric, Not New Laws, CQ 
NEWS, July 18, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 20146118 (reporting that agencies 
completed only 52% of the 398 required regulations by July 2014, and agencies 
failed to issue even proposed rules for 24% of the mandated regulations); see also 
Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1296-322 (describing the financial industry’s 
campaign to obstruct the implementation of Dodd–Frank).  
 383. See supra Subsections IV.B.1-2. 
 384. Christopher Rowland, Fidelity Fought Washington over Money Market 
Funds—and Won, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
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 385. Peter Eavis, U.S. Regulators Approve Eased Mortgage Lending Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, at B3 (reporting that “after a firestorm of criticism from 
bankers and consumer advocates,” federal regulators issued rules providing that 
QRMs would not need any down payments in order to be exempt from the 
requirement that banks securitizing mortgages must retain 5% of the risks); Stephen 
Hall, Weakening Reforms in the Securitization Market to Protect Mortgage 
Financing from an Uncertain Threat Is a Bad Trade, BETTER MARKETS BLOG (Oct. 
23, 2014, 10:19 AM), https://www.bettermarkets.com/blogs/weakening-reforms-
securitization-market-protect-mortgage-financing-uncertain-threat-bad-trade#.VEmb 
p_nF-WU (stating that the QRM rules “will not require the lender/packager [of no-
down-payment mortgages] to retain meaningful risk,” with the result that 
securitizing banks “will have no skin in the game just as before the [financial] crisis, 
effectively defeating a core purpose of the rule”). 
 A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed 337 
Street’s continued success in undermining Dodd–Frank’s reforms 
“raises profound questions about the concentrated economic and 
political power wielded by a small group of megabanks.”386  
Any hope that today’s megabanks can be effectively managed 
or regulated is further undermined by the continuing series of major 
scandals that have implicated most of the top global banks.387 For 
example, leading global banks have paid very large penalties for (1) 
fraudulent sales of hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime 
mortgages and MBS;388 (2) fraudulent sales of CDOs and other 
securities law violations;389 (3) far-reaching violations of anti-money 
laundering laws involving transfers of funds to drug gangs and rogue 
“nations linked with terrorists (including Iran, Burma, Cuba, North 
Korea and Sudan)”;390 (4) aiding and abetting widespread tax evasion 
by U.S. citizens;391 and (5) systematic collusion in manipulating 
Libor and other international interest and currency rates.392  
                                                 
 386. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1444. 
 387. See Neha Dimri & Avik Das, FACTBOX – Bank Settlements Top $50 
Bln This Year as US Cracks Down, REUTERS NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/banks-settlement 
idUKL4N0PP48Z20140716 (listing penalties for serious misconduct that officials 
have imposed on fifteen leading global banks since 2008).  
 388. See id. (listing more than $50 billion in penalties and costs imposed by 
government authorities on BofA, Citigroup, Chase, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, 
Barclays Bank, and Wells Fargo for fraudulent sales of subprime mortgages and 
MBS); see supra note 104 (describing the mortgage fraud committed by BofA and 
Citigroup).  
 389. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1344-45, 1380-82 (describing 
SEC orders requiring BofA, Chase, Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs to pay more than 
$1.2 billion to resolve alleged securities law violations, but noting criticisms of the 
SEC’s actions as being too lenient). 
 390. Id. at 1324-25, 1374-75 (describing the money laundering violations 
committed by HSBC and Standard Chartered); Dimri & Das, supra note 387 (listing 
over $11 billion of penalties assessed by government authorities against BNP 
Paribas, HSBC, and Standard Chartered for money laundering).  
 391. Dimri & Das, supra note 387 (listing nearly $3.3 billion of penalties 
imposed on Credit Suisse and UBS for promoting tax evasion by U.S. citizens); 
Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1376-77 n.445 (describing the tax evasion 
violations committed by UBS). 
 392. See Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1323-25, 1375-77 
(describing nearly $2 billion in penalties assessed by U.S. and international officials 
against Barclays and UBS for manipulating Libor); Jenny Anderson, Banking Fines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, at B7 (reporting on over $100 million in fines imposed 
by EU officials on Chase, RBS, UBS, and Credit Suisse for “cartel behavior” in 
rigging Swiss franc benchmark interest rates); Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor, 
Bank of Eng., Making Markets Fair and Effective (Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter 
Shafik Oct. 27, 2014 Speech], available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
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In a closed-door meeting with Wall Street executives in 
October 2014, New York Fed President William Dudley cited the 
“long list of . . . fines and penalties” imposed on large financial 
institutions for “serious professional misbehavior, ethical lapses and 
compliance failures.”393 He noted that “[t]he pattern of bad behavior 
did not end with the financial crisis, but continued despite the 
considerable public sector intervention that was necessary to 
stabilize the financial system.”394 He declared that the financial 
industry had a serious “culture problem” and had “largely lost the 
public trust.”395 
In Mr. Dudley’s view, the pervasive “cultural failures” of 
megabanks raised the “important question [of] whether the sheer 
size, complexity and global scope of large financial firms today have 
left them ‘too big to manage.’”396 He also highlighted “the shift in the 
prevailing business model” of megabanks toward “trading” and 
“transaction-oriented activities,” in which “[c]lients became 
counterparties—the other side of a trade—rather than partners in a 
                                                                                                       
publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech771.pdf (citing “a series of appalling 
cases of misconduct in Fixed Income, Currency, Commodity and other markets”). 
 393. William C. Dudley, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services 
Industry (Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 Speech], available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html; see also 
Matthew Boesler, Dudley Warns Banks Must Improve Culture or Be Broken Up, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-10-20/dudley-warns-banks-must-improve-culture-or-be-broken-up 
(reporting that Mr. Dudley presented his remarks “at a closed-doors workshop 
attended by senior bankers at the New York Fed on reforming Wall Street culture 
and behavior”). 
 394. Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 Speech, supra note 393. Fed Governor Daniel 
Tarullo, who also spoke at the same closed-door meeting, stated that “headlines 
describing misconduct in financial firms have appeared with disturbing regularity” 
with respect to post-crisis as well as pre-crisis behavior. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Good Compliance, Not Mere 
Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Tarullo Oct. 20, 2014 Speech], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020a.pdf. Mr. 
Tarullo warned that “if banks do not take more effective steps to control the 
behavior of those who work for them, there will be both increased pressure and 
propensity on the part of regulators and law enforcers to impose more requirements, 
constraints, and punishments.” Id. 
 395. Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 Speech, supra note 393. Similarly, Bank of 
England Deputy Governor Minouche Shafik referred in a recent speech to “a series 
of appalling cases of misconduct” by large financial institutions that “proved [to be] 
surprisingly prevalent and persistent” and “further eroded the trust of the general 
public in financial markets.” Shafik Oct. 27, 2014 Speech, supra note 392. 
 396. Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 Speech, supra note 393. 
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long-term business relationship.”397 He warned that if “bad behavior” 
by large financial institutions continued, “the inevitable conclusion 
will be reached that your firms are too big and complex to manage 
effectively,” and “financial stability concerns would dictate that your 
firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified.”398 One 
news report indicated that senior bankers were “unnerved” by Mr. 
Dudley’s suggestion that large banks might be broken up if their 
behavior did not improve.399 
It is unfortunate that Mr. Dudley chose to deliver his sharp 
warning to Wall Street’s leaders in a private meeting that was closed 
to the media.400 As one commentator noted, a public meeting would 
have provided an opportunity for “probably the most important 
public policy discussion since the financial crisis.”401 The closed-
door setting of Mr. Dudley’s speech was not well chosen if his goal 
was to promote greater public confidence either in Wall Street or in a 
regulatory agency that is widely viewed as having a “cozy 
relationship” with Wall Street.402  
However, Mr. Dudley’s speech did appear to recognize that the 
status quo on Wall Street is neither healthy nor sustainable. Unless 
much stronger measures are taken to prevent megabanks from 
exploiting safety-net subsidies and pursuing speculative risks in the 
capital markets, they will have abundant opportunities and incentives 
to do so. In addition, unless community banks are given substantial 
relief from Dodd–Frank’s compliance burdens, their position in our 
                                                 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Peter Eavis, Regulator Tells Banks to Clean Up Bad Behavior or Face 
Downsizing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014, 8:03 PM), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/regulator-tells-banks-to-clean-up-bad-
behavior-or-face-downsizing/. 
 400. David Weidner, Opinion: Why You Weren’t Invited to the Fed’s 
“Ethics” Talk with Wall Street, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 21, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-you-werent-invited-to-the-
feds-ethics-talk-with-wall-street-2014-10-21. In contrast, a week after Mr. Dudley’s 
speech, Bank of England Deputy Governor Minouche Shafik chose to present a 
similarly hard-edged critique of scandals involving large U.K. banks in a public 
address that was covered by the media. Shafik Oct. 27, 2014 Speech, supra note 
392; Sam Fleming & Chris Giles, City Facing More than “A Few Bad Apples,” FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014, 3:52 PM) (describing Deputy Governor Shafik’s “blistering 
speech” presented to “an audience at the London School of Economics”). 
 401. Weidner, supra note 400. 
 402. Id.; see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1401-03, 1418-19 
(describing strong concerns about Wall Street’s ability to exercise undue influence 
over the New York Fed); Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 14, at 124-30 (same). 
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financial system will continue to decline, and the quality of financial 
services offered to consumers and small businesses will further 
erode. Part V of this Article proposes a new regulatory regime that 
could successfully address these important concerns.  
V. A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM OF REGULATION IS NEEDED TO 
MAINTAIN A HEALTHY COMMUNITY BANKING SECTOR AND 
ELIMINATE THE TBTF SUBSIDY FOR MEGABANKS  
A. Congress and Federal Regulators Should Reduce Compliance 
Burdens for Community Banks and Should Encourage the 
Formation of De Novo Community Banks 
As shown above, Dodd–Frank imposes a number of costly new 
compliance burdens on community banks. The CFPB’s new 
mortgage lending rules and the federal banking agencies’ new capital 
regulation create difficult challenges that impair the ability of 
community banks to provide customized home mortgage loans to 
entrepreneurs and farmers.403 Unless those compliance burdens are 
significantly reduced, many community banks are likely to abandon 
the residential mortgage business.404  
Accordingly, the CFPB should expand the small creditor 
exception in its QM regulation as well as the small servicer 
exception in its mortgage servicing regulation so that both exceptions 
apply to all banks with assets under $10 billion. Expanding those 
exceptions would not threaten the interests of customers who obtain 
mortgages from community banks. Both exceptions require 
qualifying smaller banks to satisfy a series of safeguards to ensure 
that mortgage borrowers will be treated fairly by smaller mortgage 
originators and servicers.405  
The federal banking agencies should also revise their new 
capital regulation to provide less punitive treatment for MSAs 
retained by banks with assets under $10 billion.406 Community banks 
have established a record of sound home mortgage lending that is far 
superior to the performance of big banks.407 There is no good reason 
to require community banks to deal with the same regulatory burdens 
that Congress imposed on megabanks after determining that those 
                                                 
 403. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 404. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 128-130, 134-135 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text. 
 407. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
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banks were primarily responsible for the reckless lending and 
securitization practices that created the subprime lending bubble.408 
While Dodd–Frank does not go nearly far enough, it does 
reflect a growing recognition by policymakers that compliance 
burdens should be reduced across the board for community banks.409 
In recent congressional testimony, Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo 
supported a number of steps to reduce examination, reporting, and 
other regulatory costs for community banks. He also recommended 
that Congress exclude community banks “from the scope of the 
Volcker rule and from the incentive compensation requirements of 
section 956 of the Dodd–Frank Act” because those provisions are 
directed at concerns that primarily relate to the largest financial 
institutions.410  
Congress and federal regulators should promptly undertake a 
comprehensive review of federal banking statutes and regulations for 
the purpose of identifying compliance requirements that can be 
eliminated, simplified, or made more flexible for community banks. 
Of course, regulatory relief for community banks should be granted 
in a way that does not endanger the safety and soundness of our 
banking system or create substantial concerns about consumer 
protection. In addition, Congress should index to inflation the $10 
billion statutory ceiling for community bank status. An inflation-
adjusted maximum will help to ensure that the statutory ceiling 
continues to provide a reliable standard for identifying community 
banks that qualify for a simplified and more flexible compliance 
regime. 
Another pressing need is for the FDIC to liberalize its current 
policy governing approvals of applications by de novo community 
banks for deposit insurance. The FDIC has approved deposit 
insurance for only one de novo community bank since the end of 
2010.411 In contrast, the FDIC approved an average of 159 de novo 
                                                 
 408. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4-6, 11-17 (2010). 
 409. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text. 
 410. Wall Street Reform: Assessing and Enhancing the Financial Regulatory 
System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 16 (2014) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System). 
 411. Jeff Bater, Community Banks: Bank Groups Ask Regulator to Review 
Procedures on De Novo Bank Applications, 101 BNA’S BANKING REP. 929, 929 
2013); Ryan Tracy, Tally of U.S. Banks Sinks to Record Low, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2013, 7:33 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230457940457923 
2343313671258 (reporting that Bank of Bird-in-Hand in Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania, received FDIC approval for deposit insurance and thereby became 
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bank applications each year between 1984 and 2008.412 The FDIC’s 
current policy for approving deposit insurance for newly chartered 
banks frequently compels de novo banks to raise $20 million or more 
in capital investments in order to open for business. That amount of 
capital is extremely difficult to raise in rural areas or small towns.413  
The FDIC should liberalize its application procedures to 
provide a more reasonable opportunity for de novo community banks 
to be established, particularly in rural areas and small towns where 
very few other banks are located.414 The FDIC should reduce the 
required amount of initial capital for de novo banks to a level that is 
appropriate for the risks inherent in each bank’s business plan. To 
provide appropriate protection for the deposit insurance fund, the 
FDIC could require more frequent examinations of de novo banks 
during their early years of operation and could also impose tighter 
restrictions on their ability to rely on brokered deposits.415 In view of 
the vital role played by community banks in providing credit and 
customized services to small business and consumers, as well as their 
crucial support for the civic life of local communities, the FDIC 
should encourage the formation of new community banks on sound 
and reasonable terms. 
B. A Two-Tiered Regulatory System Would Encourage the 
Relationship-Based Business Model of Community Banks and 
Reduce the Speculative Risks Created by Megabanks 
In order to preserve the viability of community banks and 
reduce the risks of megabanks, we must establish a two-tiered 
regulatory system. The first tier should encourage and support the 
deposit-taking and lending activities of community banks and other 
                                                                                                       
“the first new bank startup in the U.S. since December 2010”); see also Andy Peters, 
Blast from the Past: De Novo Drought May End in Amish Country, AM. BANKER, 
Jan. 22, 2013, at 1 (reporting on Bank of Bird-in-Hand’s application and stating that 
a Connecticut bank that “opened in December 2010, was the nation’s last de novo”). 
 412. Letter from David Baris, Exec. Dir., Am. Ass’n of Bank Dirs. & 
Camden R. Fine, President & CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. to Martin 
Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC 1 n.1 (Dec. 2, 2013) [hereinafter ICBA De Novo Bank 
Letter], available at http://icba.files.cms-plus.com/ICBASites/PDFs/Gruenberg% 
20letter%20on%20de%20novo%20banks%2012%2002%2013%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 413. See id. at 2; Tracy, supra note 411 (noting that the Bank of Bird-in-
Hand raised $17 million of capital in order to secure the FDIC’s approval). 
 414. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that community 
banks operate the only banking facilities in many rural counties and small towns). 
 415. ICBA De Novo Bank Letter, supra note 412, at 2-3. 
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banking organizations that adopt a relationship-based business 
model. The second tier should squarely address the TBTF problem 
that Dodd–Frank has failed to solve. To remove the TBTF subsidy 
exploited by universal banks, we must change their structure so that 
(1) they cannot transfer their federal safety-net subsidies to their 
nonbank affiliates engaged in risky capital markets activities, and (2) 
it would be much easier for regulators to separate banks from their 
nonbank affiliates when any segments of their holding companies are 
threatened with failure. We must also require SIFIs to internalize the 
systemic risks they create by paying risk-based premiums to prefund 
the Orderly Liquidation Fund.  
My proposal for a two-tiered system of financial regulation 
builds on similar recommendations that I have presented 
previously.416 As explained below, the first tier of relationship-based 
banking organizations would be permitted to offer a relatively broad 
range of banking-related services. However, those organizations and 
their affiliates would not be allowed to engage as principal in capital 
markets activities, including securities underwriting and dealing, 
insurance underwriting, and derivatives dealing.  
In contrast, the second tier of “narrow banks” could affiliate 
with “nontraditional” financial conglomerates engaged in capital 
markets operations (except for commodities trading, merchant 
banking, and private equity investments). Narrow banks would be 
prohibited from making any extensions of credit or other transfers of 
funds to their nonbank affiliates, except for lawful dividends paid to 
their parent holding companies. The narrow bank concept provides 
the most politically feasible approach for ensuring that megabanks 
cannot transfer their safety-net subsidies to affiliated companies 
engaged in speculative transactions in the capital markets.417 To 
further reduce the systemic risk of large financial conglomerates, 
those institutions should be required to (1) pay risk-based premiums 
to prefund the Orderly Liquidation Fund in order to reduce the 
likelihood of taxpayer-funded rescues of SIFIs, and (2) structure 
their compensation plans for executives and other key employees so 
                                                 
 416. For a previous description of my two-tiered proposal, which serves as a 
basis for this Part V, see Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1034-52. 
 417. For discussions of similar “narrow bank” proposals, see ROBERT E. 
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 164-89 (1987); Ronnie J. Phillips & Alessandro 
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that at least half of their compensation is paid in the form of long-
term contingent convertible bonds. 
1. The First Tier of Banking Organizations Would Engage in 
Relationship-Based Intermediation 
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated banking firms 
would be relationship-based banking organizations that limit their 
activities (including the activities of their holding company affiliates) 
to lines of business that are “closely related to banking” under          
§ 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).418 To 
provide a reasonable degree of flexibility to first-tier banking 
organizations, Congress should amend § 4(c)(8) to allow the Fed to 
expand the list of “closely related” activities that are currently 
permissible for holding company affiliates of traditional banks.419  
The first tier of relationship banks could take deposits, make 
loans, offer fiduciary services, and act as agents in selling securities, 
mutual funds, and insurance products that are underwritten by non-
affiliated firms. Additionally, relationship banks could underwrite 
and deal in “bank-eligible” securities that national banks are 
permitted to underwrite and deal in directly.420 First-tier banking 
organizations could also purchase, as end-users, derivatives 
transactions that (1) hedge against their own firm-specific risks, and 
(2) qualify for hedging treatment under Financial Accounting 
Standard (FAS) Statement No. 133.421 However, first-tier banks 
would not be allowed to engage, either directly or through affiliates, 
                                                 
 418. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2012); CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra 
note 138, at 416-18 (describing activities that are “closely related to banking” and 
are permissible for nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs under § 4(c)(8)).  
 419. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) prohibits the Fed from 
approving any “closely related” activities for bank holding companies under § 
4(c)(8) of the BHC Act in addition to those that were permitted on November 11, 
1999. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 417-18. Congress should 
amend § 4(c)(8) to authorize the Fed to approve a limited range of new activities 
that are “‘closely related’” to the traditional banking functions of accepting deposits, 
extending credit, discounting negotiable instruments, and providing fiduciary 
services. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1036-37 n.375. 
 420. See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 225-26 n.30 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (discussing “bank-eligible” securities that national banks 
are authorized to underwrite or purchase or sell for their own account); CARNELL, 
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 132-34 (same). 
 421. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1036 (explaining the 
importance of limiting derivatives for first-tier “traditional” banking organizations to 
those that qualify for hedging treatment under FAS 133). 
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in underwriting or dealing in “bank-ineligible” securities,422 
insurance underwriting, derivatives dealing, commodities trading, 
merchant banking, or private equity investing.  
First-tier banking firms would include community banks as 
well as midsized regional banks that choose to follow a relationship-
based business model. In the past, those types of banks have not 
engaged to any substantial extent in capital markets activities, and it 
therefore should not be difficult for first-tier banks to comply with 
the prohibition against any affiliation with capital markets 
businesses. My proposal would encourage first-tier banks to maintain 
and strengthen their current focus on attracting core deposits; 
providing customized, relationship-based loans to consumers and 
small businesses; and offering wealth management and other 
fiduciary services to local customers.423 First-tier banks and their 
holding companies would continue to operate under their current 
supervisory arrangements, and their deposits (up to the current 
statutory maximum of $250,000 per qualifying account) would be 
covered by deposit insurance. 
2. The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking Organizations 
Would Be Barred from Exploiting Federal Safety-Net 
Subsidies 
Unlike first-tier banking firms, the second tier of 
“nontraditional” banking organizations—which would probably 
include all of today’s megabanks—would be authorized to engage in 
a broader range of “financial in nature” activities through nonbank 
affiliates.424 The permissible activities for nonbank affiliates of 
second-tier banks would include underwriting and dealing in bank-
ineligible securities, underwriting all types of insurance, and dealing 
and trading in derivatives.425 Second-tier banking organizations 
                                                 
 422. See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 219-20, 225-26 n.30, 
318-20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the distinction between (1) 
“bank-eligible” securities, which banks may underwrite and deal in directly, and (2) 
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 423. See supra Sections II.B, III.A (discussing the relationship-based 
business model followed by community banks); see also Wilmarth, Transformation, 
supra note 13, at 262-70 (same). 
 424. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 420-23 (discussing 
“financial in nature” activities that are permitted for financial holding companies 
under GLBA). 
 425. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1037. 
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would include (1) financial holding companies (FHCs) registered 
under §§ 4(k) and 4(l) of the BHC Act;426 (2) holding companies 
owning grandfathered “nonbank banks”; and (3) grandfathered 
“unitary thrift” holding companies.427 In addition, firms controlling 
industrial banks should be required either to register as FHCs or to 
divest their ownership of such banks if they do not wish to comply 
with the BHC Act’s prohibition against commercial activities.428 
Second-tier holding companies would thus encompass banking 
organizations that engage in capital markets activities as well as 
other financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository 
institutions. 
Under my proposal, FDIC-insured banks that are subsidiaries 
of second-tier holding companies would be required to operate as 
“narrow banks.” The purpose of the narrow bank structure would be 
to prevent “nontraditional,” second-tier holding companies from 
causing their subsidiary banks to transfer their federal safety-net 
subsidies to nonbank affiliates. Narrow banks could offer FDIC-
insured deposit accounts, including checking and savings accounts 
                                                 
 426. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)-(l) (2012); see CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra 
note 138, at 420-21, 467-70 (describing the requirements for FHC status under the 
BHC Act, as amended by GLBA).  
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 428. Industrial banks are exempted from treatment as “banks” under the 
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Frank, supra note 15, at 1037 n.379. Section 603 of Dodd–Frank imposed a “three-
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expired in July 2013. Philip van Doorn, WalMart May Still Get Its Bank: Street 
Whispers, THE STREET (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
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2013”). I have previously argued that Congress should prohibit commercial firms 
from owning industrial banks because such ownership (1) undermines the long-
established U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce; (2) threatens to spread 
federal safety-net subsidies to the commercial sector of the U.S. economy; (3) 
threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund; (4) creates competitive 
inequities between commercial firms that own industrial banks and other 
commercial firms; and (5) increases the likelihood of federal bailouts of commercial 
companies. Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 427, at 1543-44, 1554-620.  
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and certificates of deposit. Narrow banks would be required to hold 
all of their assets in the form of cash and marketable, short-term debt 
obligations, including qualifying government securities, high-quality 
commercial paper, and other liquid, short-term debt instruments that 
are eligible for investment by MMMFs under the SEC’s rules.429  
Narrow banks could not make any other types of loans or 
investments, nor could they accept any uninsured deposits. Narrow 
banks would present a very small risk to the FDIC’s Deposit 
Insurance Fund (DIF) because (1) each narrow bank’s non-cash 
assets would consist solely of marketable, short-term debt securities 
that could be “marked to market” on a daily basis, and the FDIC 
could therefore readily determine whether a narrow bank was 
threatened with insolvency, and “(2) the FDIC could promptly 
convert a narrow bank’s assets into cash if the FDIC decided to 
liquidate the bank and pay off the claims of its insured depositors.”430 
Thus, my proposed limitations on narrow bank investments would 
protect the DIF from any significant loss if a narrow bank failed.  
Restricting the permissible investments of second-tier narrow 
banks should not have a significant impact on bank lending to small 
businesses. As shown above, megabanks—unlike community 
banks—generally do not make relationship loans to small firms. 
Instead, big banks provide credit to small businesses primarily 
through standardized, “cookie cutter” loan programs, including 
business credit cards and equipment leases, which (1) rely on imper-
sonal credit-scoring techniques and other automated technologies 
and (2) enable many of the resulting loans to be securitized.431 
Similarly, major banks typically provide loans to large businesses 
through a syndication process that is closely tied to the capital 
markets and is very similar to an underwriting of debt securities. 
Indeed, lead banks in loan syndications typically sell most of the 
resulting loans to institutional investors.432  
                                                 
 429. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1038. 
 430. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit 
Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 BUS. LAW. 907, 921-22, 
928-29 (1989). 
 431. See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text (describing how big 
banks provide credit to SMEs primarily through impersonal, highly automated 
loans); see also Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 262-67 (same). 
 432. Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 13, at 980-84, 1039-42 (describing the 
loan syndication process employed by big banks and the selling of the resulting 
loans to institutional investors, including insurance companies, pension funds, 
mutual funds, and collateralized loan obligations); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra 
note 13, at 378-80 (same); see also Lisa Abramowicz, Dirty Secret of $1 Trillion 
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Under my proposal, second-tier holding companies would be 
allowed to conduct their current business lending programs through 
nonbank subsidiaries that are funded by the capital markets through 
securitization and loan sales. The main difference from current 
practice—and an important one—is that second-tier holding 
companies would not be permitted to use low-cost, FDIC-insured 
deposits to fund their lending activities. Because megabanks use a 
lending strategy tied to the capital markets, those banks should not 
be allowed to rely on subsidized deposits (rather than capital markets 
funding) to conduct their lending activities.433 
Three additional rules are essential to prevent second-tier 
holding companies from exploiting the federal safety-net subsidies 
provided to their FDIC-insured narrow banks. First, narrow banks 
should be absolutely prohibited—without any possibility of a 
regulatory waiver—from making extensions of credit or other 
transfers of funds to their affiliates, except for the payment of lawful 
dividends out of profits to their parent holding companies. Currently, 
transactions between FDIC-insured banks and their affiliates are 
restricted by §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. However, 
the Fed repeatedly waived those restrictions during recent financial 
crises. The Fed’s waivers allowed bank subsidiaries of FHCs to 
provide extensive financial support to affiliated securities broker-
dealers and MMMFs.434 By granting those waivers, the Fed enabled 
FHC-owned banks to transfer the safety-net subsidies embedded 
within their low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits to their nonbank 
affiliates.435  
                                                                                                       
Loans Is When You Get Your Money Back, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-17/dirty-secret-of-1-trillion-
loans-is-when-do-you-get-money-back (describing sales by big banks of syndicated 
leveraged corporate loans to institutional investors). 
 433. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1049 (noting that Congress, if 
it wished, could allow narrow banks that are subsidiaries of second-tier holding 
companies to make a limited amount of relationship loans to bank-dependent firms, 
up to a specified maximum percentage (e.g., 10%) of their assets, as long as such 
loans were retained on the banks’ balance sheets and were not securitized). 
 434. Id. at 1041; see Scott, supra note 430, at 929; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 
371c, 371c-1 (2012). 
 435. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1041-42. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the Fed’s repeated waivers of § 23A during the most 
recent financial crisis, see Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm–Leach–Bliley to Dodd–
Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1683, 1729-63 (2011).  
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Dodd–Frank limits, but does not remove, the Fed’s authority to 
grant future waivers or exemptions under §§ 23A and 23B. Dodd–
Frank requires the Fed to obtain the concurrence of either the OCC 
(with respect to waivers granted by orders for national banks) or the 
FDIC (with respect to waivers granted by orders for state banks or 
general exemptions granted by regulation).436 However, it is very 
unlikely that the OCC or the FDIC would refuse to concur if the Fed 
sought a future waiver to deal with a perceived threat to one or more 
megabanks. Accordingly, Dodd–Frank does not guarantee that the 
Fed will adhere to § 23A’s and § 23B’s restrictions on affiliate 
transactions in the future.437  
“For example, the [Fed] . . . permitted BofA [in 2011] to evade 
the restrictions of § 23A by transferring an undisclosed amount of 
derivatives contracts from its Merrill broker-dealer subsidiary to its 
subsidiary bank.”438 That transaction increased the potential risk that 
the DIF and taxpayers might ultimately be compelled to cover losses 
incurred by BofA on the transferred derivatives. The derivatives 
transfer reportedly allowed BofA—which was then struggling with a 
host of problems—to avoid contractual requirements to post $3.3 
billion of additional collateral with its derivatives counterparties. 
BofA’s ability to avoid posting additional collateral was due to the 
fact that BofA’s subsidiary bank was explicitly protected by the 
federal safety net and therefore held a significantly higher credit 
rating than Merrill.439 One commentator noted that “the Fed’s 
                                                 
 436. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 608(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1609-10 (2010) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 
371c(f)); id. § 608(b)(6) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(e)(2)). 
 437. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1042. 
 438. Enhanced Supervision: A New Regime for Regulating Large, Complex 
Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer 
Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 57 (2011) 
(statement of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School). 
 439. For discussions of the Fed’s approval of BofA’s transfer of derivatives, 
see Kate Davidson, Democrats Raise Red Flag on B of A Derivatives Transfer, 
NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/2010_464/red-flag-boa-
derivatives-transfer-1027181-1.html; Simon Johnson, Bank of America Is Too Much 
of a Behemoth to Fail: Simon Johnson, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 23, 2011, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-23/bank-of-america-too-much-
of-behemoth-to-fail-commentary-by-simon-johnson; Jonathan Weil, Bank of 
America Bosses Find Friend in the Fed: Jonathan Weil, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 19, 
2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-20/bank-of-
america-bosses-find-friend-in-the-fed-jonathan-weil.  
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priorities seem to lie with protecting [BofA] from losses at Merrill, 
even if that means greater risks for the FDIC’s insurance fund.”440  
My proposal for second-tier narrow banks would replace        
§§ 23A and 23B with an ironclad rule. That rule would absolutely 
prohibit all extensions of credit or other transfers of funds by second-
tier narrow banks to their nonbank affiliates, except for lawful 
dividends paid to parent holding companies. My proposal would bar 
federal regulators from approving any transfers of safety-net 
subsidies from narrow banks to their affiliates. An absolute bar on 
affiliate transactions is necessary to prevent narrow banks (and the 
DIF) from being used as sources of bailout funding for nonbank 
affiliates of second-tier financial conglomerates. 
Second, narrow banks should be barred both from acting as 
dealers in derivatives and from purchasing derivatives as end-users, 
except in transactions that qualify for position-specific hedging 
treatment under FAS 133. My proposal would require second-tier 
financial conglomerates to conduct all of their derivatives dealing 
and trading activities through separate nonbank subsidiaries. My 
approach would be consistent with GLBA’s requirement that FHCs 
must conduct all of their underwriting and dealing activities for 
bank-ineligible securities and insurance products through nonbank 
subsidiaries.441 Many derivatives function as “synthetic” substitutes 
for securities or insurance.442 Accordingly, those derivatives should 
be foreclosed to banks for the same reasons that banks cannot engage 
directly in underwriting or dealing in bank-ineligible securities or 
insurance.443 Prohibiting second-tier narrow banks from dealing or 
trading in derivatives is urgently needed to stop financial 
conglomerates from using federal safety-net subsidies to support 
                                                 
 440. Weil, supra note 439. 
 441. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 25-26, 130-33, 
154-55, 420-23, 429-30 (explaining that under GLBA, all underwriting and dealing 
by FHCs in bank-ineligible securities and insurance products must be conducted 
through nonbank holding company subsidiaries or (in the case of securities) through 
nonbank financial subsidiaries of banks); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, 
at 219-20, 225-26 n.30, 318-20. 
 442. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1044 & n.405; Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Regulation 
of Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Jun. 22, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/2009/ts062209mls.htm. 
 443. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1044 & n.405. 
 A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed 351 
speculative trading activities within their FDIC-insured bank 
subsidiaries.444 
The OCC has pointed out that FHCs generate higher profits 
when they conduct derivatives activities within their subsidiary 
banks, in part because the “favorable [funding] rate enjoyed by the 
banks” is lower than the “borrowing rate of their holding 
companies.”445 Not surprisingly, the three largest U.S. banking 
organizations—JPMorgan Chase, BofA, and Citigroup—conduct 
“the vast majority” of their derivatives transactions within their 
FDIC-insured subsidiary banks.446 Indeed, Chase’s “London Whale” 
trading debacle occurred within the “Chief Investment Office” 
established by Chase’s subsidiary bank, which used “excess 
deposits” to invest in high-risk synthetic credit derivatives.447  
Allowing FHC-owned subsidiary banks to trade in derivatives 
may be favorable to FHCs, but it is certainly not beneficial for the 
DIF and taxpayers. The DIF and taxpayers are exposed to a 
significantly higher risk of losses when derivatives dealing and 
                                                 
 444. See supra Subsection IV.B.2 (explaining that the financial industry 
persuaded Congress to repeal the Lincoln Amendment because that provision 
threatened to force megabanks to transfer significant portions of their risky 
derivatives activities into nonbank affiliates that would not be protected by the 
FDIC). 
 445. Letter from John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to James 
A. Leach, Chairman, Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs. 3 (Sept. 13, 2000), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/sep00/int892.pdf; see 
also Simon Nixon, Barclays Capped by Regulatory Risk, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2010, 
at C10 (stating that Barclays Capital (Barcap), a large securities firm, “gets cheaper 
funding than it could access as a stand-alone” because Barclays Bank PLC uses its 
“retail deposits to provide cheap funding to Barcap”).  
 446. Jesse Hamilton & Silla Brush, Regulators Weigh Delay for Separating 
Banks’ Swaps Units, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://origin-
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=MS:US&sid=aKZvvWQ6
BflQ; see also Silla Brush, JPMorgan to BofA Get Delay on Rule Isolating 
Derivatives, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 4, 2013, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-03/jpmorgan-and-bofa-get-two-
year-delay-in-dodd-frank-swaps-pushout (reporting that “JPMorgan [Chase] had 99 
percent of its $72 trillion in notional swaps trades in its commercial bank in the third 
quarter of 2012 . . . [while] Bank of America had 68 percent of its $64 trillion [of 
derivatives] in its commercial bank”); Campbell, supra note 33 (reporting that 
“[m]ore than 99 percent of the notional value of Citigroup’s derivatives were at its 
bank subsidiary” in March 2014); Nixon, supra note 445 (stating that “[m]ost of 
Barcap’s positions, including derivatives exposures, lie on Barclays Bank PLC’s 
balance sheet,” and noting that Barcap’s reliance on “cheap funding” from Barclays 
Bank “exposes depositors to investment-banking risk”). 
 447. Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 1430-31 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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trading activities are conducted directly within banks. Chase’s 
“London Whale” scandal inflicted losses of $6.2 billion on Chase’s 
subsidiary bank,448 and those losses would have been a matter of 
great concern to the FDIC and taxpayers if the bank had failed. My 
proposal would stop megabanks from exploiting safety-net subsidies 
in their derivatives activities and would force second-tier banking 
organizations to conduct such activities within nonbank affiliates.449 
Third, Congress should repeal the “systemic risk exception” 
(SRE), which is still incorporated in the FDI Act.450 By repealing the 
SRE, Congress would require the FDIC to follow the least costly 
resolution procedure for every failed bank, and the FDIC could no 
longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting 
uninsured creditors of a failed megabank or its nonbank affiliates. 
Repealing the SRE would make clear to the financial markets that 
the DIF protects only bank depositors. “Uninsured creditors of 
[megabanks] and their nonbank [affiliates] would therefore have 
stronger incentives to monitor the financial operations and condition 
of such entities.”451  
A repeal of the SRE would also help to protect smaller banks 
from being forced to share the potential cost of protecting uninsured 
creditors of megabanks. Under current law, all FDIC-insured banks 
must pay a special assessment (allocated in proportion to their total 
assets) to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of invoking the SRE to 
protect uninsured creditors of a TBTF bank.452 A 2000 FDIC report 
noted the unfairness of expecting smaller banks to help pay for 
“systemic risk” bailouts when “it is virtually inconceivable that they 
would receive similar treatment if distressed.”453 The FDIC report 
suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to remove the 
[SRE],”454 as my proposal would do.  
                                                 
 448. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 449. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1044-45. 
 450. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text (discussing the SRE). 
 451. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1042-43. 
 452. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii) (2012). 
 453. FDIC, OPTIONS PAPER 33 (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
deposit/insurance/initiative/Options_080700m.pdf. 
 454. Id. 
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3. Two Supplemental Rules Would Prevent Second-Tier 
Banking Organizations from Engaging in Speculative 
Activities in the Commercial Sector 
Congress should enact two supplemental rules to prevent 
second-tier banking companies from extending their speculative 
operations into the commercial sector. First, Congress should 
prohibit second-tier banks and their holding company affiliates from 
engaging in “merchant banking,” which is generally understood to 
include the business of making private equity investments.455 To 
accomplish this reform, Congress should repeal §§ 4(k)(4)(H) and (I) 
of the BHC Act,456 which currently allow FHCs to acquire and hold 
long-term, controlling stakes in commercial firms if they comply 
with regulations governing merchant banking and insurance 
company portfolio investments.457 In addition, Congress should 
repeal the exemption in the Volcker Rule that allows banking 
organizations and nonbank SIFIs to make limited investments in 
private equity funds.458  
Private equity investments involve a high degree of risk and 
have inflicted significant losses on FHCs in the past.459 In addition, 
such investments threaten to “weaken the separation [of] banking 
and commerce” by allowing FHCs “to maintain long-term control 
over entities that conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) 
businesses.”460 Large-scale combinations between banks and 
commercial firms are likely to create serious financial risks and 
economic distortions, including (1) potential threats to the safety and 
                                                 
 455. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 425-26. 
 456. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)-(I). 
 457. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 425-26 (explaining 
that GLBA’s grant of merchant banking authority allows FHCs to “own and control 
nonfinancial firms” with “remarkably little constraint,” while the implementing 
regulations adopted by the Fed and the Treasury provide “some constraint” but still 
permit “significant nonfinancial affiliations”).  
 458. See supra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing limited private 
equity investments permitted by the Volcker Rule). 
 459. Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 13, at 330-32, 375-78 (discussing 
losses incurred by financial conglomerates on risky equity investments during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s); see also Donal Griffin, Pandit Pay Climbs as Citigroup 
Revenue Slumps, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-12/pandit-compensation-climbs-
toward-53-million-as-citigroup-revenue-slumps (reporting that Citigroup recorded 
an investment loss of $200 million after it acquired a large hedge fund, Old Lane 
Partners, in 2007 and later decided to shut down the fund). 
 460. Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 427, at 1581. 
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soundness of banks that affiliate with commercial firms; (2) conflicts 
of interest resulting in biased lending decisions by such banks; (3) 
unfair competitive advantages for commercial firms that affiliate 
with banks and thereby secure access to safety-net subsidies; (4) a 
greater probability of TBTF bailouts that will spread from the 
financial industry to the commercial sector; and (5) unhealthy 
concentrations of financial, economic, and political power.461  
Second, Congress should bar second-tier narrow banks and 
their holding company affiliates from owning or trading in physical 
commodities (including energy). Under § 4(k) of the BHC Act, the 
Fed has allowed a dozen FHCs to engage in certain physical 
commodities businesses after determining that those businesses were 
“complement[ary]” to permissible “financial activities.”462 Some 
FHCs also bought physical commodities firms purportedly as 
merchant banking investments under § 4(k)(4)(H) of the BHC Act.463 
In addition, JPMorgan Chase and BofA acquired significant 
commodities-related businesses as a result of their emergency 
                                                 
 461. Id. at 1588. For further discussion of this argument, see id. at 1588-613, 
1619-21. In 2009, the federal government arranged a very costly rescue of GMAC, 
an FDIC-insured industrial bank with $172 billion of assets that was controlled by 
General Motors (GM). See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
THE UNIQUE TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER THE TARP 1, 4 (2010), available at 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402042135/http://cop.senate.gov/do
cuments/cop-031110-report.pdf. The federal government’s rescue of GMAC and its 
simultaneous bailout of GM provide a vivid illustration of why banking-commercial 
conglomerates are likely to become potential candidates for TBTF bailouts. See id. 
at 1-32, 54-56, 115-21 (describing how the federal government provided $17.2 
billion of TARP capital infusions and other financial assistance to prevent the failure 
of GMAC, and also discussing the subsidy-related issues created by the close 
connection between the GMAC rescue and the federal government’s bailout of 
GM); id. at 122-28 (providing additional views of J. Mark McWatters and Paul S. 
Atkins, discussing same matters). 
 462. Regulating Financial Holding Companies and Physical Commodities: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) [hereinafter Gibson 
Testimony] (statement of Michael S. Gibson, Director, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System’s Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the Fed’s approval of certain commodities-related 
businesses as permissible complementary activities, see Saule T. Omarova, The 
Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
265, 285-89, 299-310 (2013). 
 463. Gibson Testimony, supra note 462, at 4 (stating that § 4(k)(4)(H) allows 
FHCs “to make merchant banking investments” in commodities-related businesses 
“without prior [Fed] approval”); see also Omarova, supra note 462, at 281-85, 336-
37 (discussing the apparent ability of FHCs to make merchant banking investments 
in commodities-related businesses with a substantial amount of flexibility).  
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takeovers of Bear and Merrill during the financial crisis.464 Finally, 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley established very large physical 
commodities operations by claiming broad “grandfathered” authority 
to engage in such activities under § 4(o) of the BHC Act.465  
The involvement of leading banks in physical commodities 
operations has triggered allegations of unlawful manipulation of 
prices for electricity and metals as well as other anticompetitive 
conduct.466 Members of Congress have repeatedly called on the Fed 
to stop banking organizations from owning or trading in physical 
commodities, but the largest banks have vigorously resisted attempts 
                                                 
 464. Gibson Testimony, supra note 462, at 5 (stating that “the range of 
permissible physical commodities activities [of Chase after acquiring Bear Stearns 
and of BofA after acquiring Merrill Lynch] is limited because they are not 
grandfathered under section 4(o)”); see also Omarova, supra note 462, at 324-33 
(describing the commodities businesses established by Chase after acquiring Bear 
and RBS Sempra during the financial crisis, as well as Chase’s reliance on a Fed-
approved “grace period” to continue those activities). 
 465. Gibson Testimony, supra note 462, at 4-5 (stating that Goldman and 
Morgan Stanley “claim the right to conduct commodities activities under the 
grandfather provision found in section 4(o)” of the BHC Act, which permits 
companies that were not previously bank holding companies and became FHCs after 
November 12, 1999, to continue engaging in commodities operations that those 
companies conducted in the United States prior to October 1, 1997); see also 
Omarova, supra note 462, at 289-93, 310-24, 333-36 (describing the extensive 
commodities activities conducted by Goldman and Morgan Stanley in alleged 
reliance on § 4(o) of the BHC Act).  
 466. See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 462, at 266-67, 321-24, 331-32, 347-49 
(discussing commodities-related controversies involving Chase and Goldman); see 
also Lynn Garner, FERC Approves Settlement with J.P. Morgan for $410 Million in 
Penalties, Disgorgement, 101 BNA’S BANKING REP. 227, 227 (2013) (reporting that 
Chase agreed to “pay $410 million in civil penalties and disgorgement of profits to 
settle a market manipulation investigation [by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC)] involving the California and Midwest electricity markets”); 
Carolyn Whetzel, FERC Fines Barclays, Four Traders $488M, Cites Manipulation 
of Western Energy Market, 101 BNA’S BANKING REP. 153, 153 (2013) (“Barclays 
Bank PLC and four of its former traders must pay $487.9 million for allegedly 
manipulating wholesale electricity markets in California and other western markets, 
under a final [FERC] order . . . .”); David Kocieniewski, A Shuffle of Aluminum, but 
to Banks, Pure Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, at A1 (describing allegations that 
Goldman manipulated aluminum supplies and prices); Gretchen Morgenson, Off 
Limits, but Blessed by the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013, at BU1 (“Maneuvering 
in markets for electricity, metals, oil and more added billions to the bottom line at 
banks like JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in recent years. . . . 
Industrial users of aluminum and other metals contend that questionable activities by 
major banks have increased their costs.”).  
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to limit their authority to engage in those activities.467 The Fed has 
requested public comment and conducted a protracted review of 
physical commodities activities by FHCs, but it has not taken any 
public measures to restrict physical commodities operations by 
FHCs.468 
Congress must prohibit second-tier banking organizations from 
owning or trading in physical commodities for the same reasons that 
it must prohibit those organizations from making private equity 
investments. The involvement of leading banks in physical 
commodities operations, as with other inherently commercial 
activities, creates a broad range of unacceptable risks. As indicated 
above, those risks include threats to the safety and soundness of 
systemically important banks; conflicts of interest resulting in biased 
lending decisions; bank transfers of safety-net subsidies to bank-
affiliated commodities firms; and unhealthy concentrations of 
                                                 
 467. Jeff Bater, Industry, Democrats Square Off as Fed Looks at Banks in 
Commodity Businesses, 102 BNA’S BANKING REP. 707, 707 (2014); Ryan Tracy, 
Senators Push Fed on Commodities, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2014, at C3; Cheyenne 
Hopkins & Jesse Hamilton, Banks Tell Fed Commodity Business Benefits Outweigh 
Risks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-17/banks-tell-fed-commodity-
business-benefits-outweigh-risks; Douwe Miedema & David Sheppard, At Senate, 
Wall St. and Fed Feel Heat over Commodity Trade, REUTERS (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/23/us-commodities-banks-senate-
idUSBRE96M03O20130723; Michael J. Moore & Jesse Hamilton, Fed Criticized 
on Oversight of Bank-Owned Commodity Units, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 23, 2013, 
7:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-23/congress-must-
rein-in-bank-commodities-units-rosner-says; Joseph Richter & Lynn Doan, Warren 
Says Banks Using Enron Commodity Model Face Risk, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 23, 
2013, 1:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-23/warren-says-
banks-using-enron-commodity-model-face-risk. 
 468. Anna Louie Sussman, PROFILE-Oregon Lawmaker Will Not Let Fed 
Forget to Tackle Commodities, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/08/17/commodities-usa-senate-idUSL2N0QC28K20140817 (reporting 
that Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) criticized the Fed for not acting to restrict 
commodities activities by banks after the Fed solicited public comments and 
reviewed the matter); see also Cheyenne Hopkins, Fed Weighs Further Restrictions 
on Banks’ Commodities Units, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 14, 2014, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-14/fed-weighs-further-
restrictions-on-banks-commodities-units (reporting on the Fed’s request for “public 
input on whether to put restrictions on banks’ trading and warehousing of physical 
commodities,” and explaining that the Fed had previously said in July 2013 that it 
was “reconsidering” a 2003 decision that allowed banks to expand into physical 
commodities activities).  
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financial, economic, and political power.469 Moreover, as shown by 
the recent financial crisis, the lamentable performance of managers 
and regulators of many FHCs raises fundamental doubts about the 
ability of executives and regulators to manage or regulate even more 
complex conglomerates that encompass both financial and 
commercial operations.470 
In combination, the supplemental rules described above would 
prevent second-tier banking organizations from using their federal 
safety-net subsidies to finance risky activities in the commercial 
sector and thereby undermine the traditional separation between 
banking and commerce. Restricting the scope of the TBTF subsidy 
and other safety-net subsidies is of utmost importance in restoring a 
more level playing field between small and large banks and also 
between banking and commercial firms.471 The unchecked expansion 
of safety-net subsidies has increasingly distorted our regulatory and 
economic policies over the past three decades.472 My proposal would 
                                                 
 469. See supra note 461 and accompanying text; see also Omarova, supra 
note 462, at 342-51; John Kemp, COLUMN-Reasons to Be Wary About Banks’ 
Commodity Trading: Kemp, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/10/21/banks-commodity-trading-idUSL5N0IB20E20131021. 
 470. Omarova, supra note 462, at 351-54; Kemp, supra note 469.  
 471. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 101-32 (2014). A detailed 
analysis of the magnitude of the TBTF subsidy for large banks is beyond the scope 
of this Article. However, most studies have concluded that big financial institutions 
benefited from a very large TBTF subsidy during the period leading up to the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009, and especially during the crisis itself. Id. Some studies 
have found that the TBTF subsidy declined after 2009 in the United States but 
remained significant in the EU due to the EU’s continuing sovereign debt problems. 
For recent surveys of past studies and results of new studies, see id.; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-621, LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: 
EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 46-54 (2014) [hereinafter GAO TBTF 
SUBSIDY STUDY], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf; THOMAS 
HOENIG, TBTF SUBSIDY FOR LARGE BANKS—LITERATURE REVIEW (2014), available 
at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/literature-review.pdf. Thus, most 
studies have concluded that the TBTF subsidy for major banks becomes very large 
during financial crises, when the federal government essentially provides 
catastrophe insurance for those institutions. For example, the GAO determined that 
major U.S. banks would have benefited from a TBTF subsidy in 2013—in the form 
of significantly lower bond funding costs, compared with smaller banks—if the 
highly stressed credit conditions in 2008 had still been present in 2013. GAO TBTF 
SUBSIDY STUDY, supra, at 54.  
 472. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 204-05 (“TBTF banks are bad 
for competition and therefore bad for the economy. Bond investors realize that 
megabanks have an implicit government guarantee, and therefore they are willing to 
lend them money at lower rates than their smaller competitors. . . . This subsidy 
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stop megabanks from using safety-net subsidies to expand their 
operations into commercial fields.  
4. Second-Tier Banking Organizations and Other SIFIs Should 
Pay Risk-Based Premiums to Prefund the OLF 
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank establishes an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF) to provide financing for the FDIC’s 
liquidation of failed SIFIs. However, Dodd–Frank does not require 
SIFIs to pay any assessments to prefund the OLF. During the 
legislative debates over Dodd–Frank, the financial industry and its 
Republican allies were successful (with behind-the-scenes support 
from the Obama Administration) in defeating several attempts by 
House and Senate Democrats to establish a prefunded OLF.473 As a 
result of the financial industry’s victories, taxpayers face a clear risk 
that they will be expected to finance future resolutions of failed 
SIFIs.  
In the absence of a prefunded OLF, the FDIC will be obliged to 
borrow the necessary funds from the Treasury in order to finance an 
OLA proceeding after a SIFI is placed in receivership.474 Dodd–
Frank generally requires the FDIC to repay its borrowings from the 
Treasury within five years by making retroactive assessments on (1) 
creditors who received preferential payments (to the extent of such 
payments); (2) nonbank SIFIs supervised by the Fed under Dodd–
Frank; (3) BHCs with assets of $50 billion or more; and (4) other 
financial companies with assets of $50 billion or more.475 As noted 
above, however, Dodd–Frank allows the FDIC and the Treasury to 
avoid assessments on favored creditors and to extend the five-year 
                                                                                                       
makes it harder for smaller banks to compete.”); Wolf, supra note 370 (“The 
business model of contemporary banking has been this: employ as much implicitly 
or explicitly guaranteed debt as possible; employ as little equity as one can . . . . This 
was a wonderful model for banks. For everybody else, it was a disaster.”). 
 473. See Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1015-19 (describing how 
the financial industry and its political allies defeated (1) a House Democratic 
proposal that would have prefunded the OLF by collecting $150 billion in risk-based 
assessments from nonbank SIFIs and large banks; (2) a Senate Democratic proposal 
that would have prefunded the OLF with $50 billion of such assessments; and (3) a 
proposal by Democratic members of the House–Senate conference committee to 
impose a $19 billion tax on large banks and large hedge funds).  
 474. See supra notes 263-267 and accompanying text (describing the FDIC’s 
borrowing authority). 
 475. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1) (2012).  
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repayment period if such actions are deemed necessary to avoid a 
serious threat to financial stability.476  
Thus, Dodd–Frank relies on an ex post funding system for 
financing liquidations of SIFIs, and it also allows the Treasury to 
make long-term OLF bridge loans that ultimately will be funded by 
taxpayers.477 It is contrary to customary insurance principles to rely 
on an empty OLF that can be funded only after a SIFI fails and must 
be liquidated.478 When commentators have considered analogous 
insurance issues related to the DIF, they have recognized that the 
FDIC should reduce moral hazard problems by requiring banks to 
pay risk-based premiums that compel “[e]ach bank [to] bear the cost 
of its own risk-taking.”479 No one advocates a post-funded DIF today; 
indeed, analysts have generally argued that the DIF needs a higher 
level of prefunding in order to respond adequately to systemic 
banking crises.480  
Because the OLF is not prefunded, SIFIs receive an implicit, 
unpriced subsidy in the form of lower funding costs, which they 
enjoy by reason of the protection their creditors expect to receive 
from the Treasury-backed OLF. SIFIs will pay nothing for that 
subsidy until the first SIFI fails.481 When the Dodd–Frank conference 
committee rejected proposals for a prefunded OLF, large financial 
institutions viewed that outcome as a significant “victory” because it 
relieved them of the burden of paying an “upfront fee” to cover the 
potential costs of their implicit subsidy.482 
                                                 
 476. See supra notes 263-270 and accompanying text (discussing the leeway 
afforded to the FDIC and Treasury under Dodd–Frank’s provisions governing the 
OLA and OLF). 
 477. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 999-1000, 1015-22. 
 478. Id. at 1017 & n.280 (observing that insurers typically collect premiums 
in advance from their policyholders, pool and invest those claims, and rely on the 
resulting pool of funds to pay claims made by policyholders).  
 479. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 282-83. 
 480. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, João A. C. Santos & Tanju Yorulmazer, 
Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Aug. 
2010, at 89, 89 (2010). 
 481. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1017.  
 482. Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Democrats Set to Begin Final Push 
to Enact Dodd–Frank Financial Overhaul, 94 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1277, 1277 
(2010) (reporting that the conference committee’s decision to forgo a prefunded 
OLF was “seen as a victory for large financial institutions,” and quoting analyst 
Jaret Seiberg’s comment that “‘[t]he key for [the financial services] industry was to 
avoid the upfront fee’”). 
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A prefunded OLF is essential to shrink the TBTF subsidy for 
LCFIs.483 The FDIC should be authorized to assess risk-based 
premiums over a period of several years to establish a prefunded 
OLF with sufficient financial resources to provide reasonable 
protection to taxpayers against the potential cost of resolving failures 
of SIFIs during a future systemic financial crisis. As noted above, 
federal regulators provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the 
nineteen largest BHCs—each with assets of more than $100 
billion—and to AIG during the financial crisis. Accordingly, $300 
billion (appropriately adjusted for inflation) should be the minimum 
acceptable size for a prefunded OLF. The FDIC should impose risk-
based OLF premiums on all BHCs with assets of more than $100 
billion (also adjusted for inflation) and on all designated nonbank 
SIFIs. The FDIC should also impose additional assessments on SIFIs 
to replenish the OLF after the OLF incurs any loss due to the failure 
of a SIFI.484 
There are five additional reasons why Congress must amend 
Dodd–Frank to establish a prefunded OLF. First, it is unlikely that 
most SIFIs would have adequate financial resources to pay large 
OLF assessments after one or more of their peers fail during a future 
financial crisis. SIFIs are frequently exposed to highly correlated risk 
exposures during a serious financial disruption because they 
typically follow similar high-risk business strategies (herding) during 
credit booms that lead to financial crises. Many SIFIs are therefore 
                                                 
 483. See supra note 471 (citing studies confirming the existence of a large 
TBTF subsidy for megabanks during the financial crisis). 
 484. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing support provided 
by the federal government to the nineteen largest banks and AIG during the financial 
crisis); see also Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1019-20 (discussing the 
need to impose risk-based assessments on SIFIs to prefund the OLF or replenish the 
OLF after a SIFI fails). Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller have proposed a 
similar “Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund” with a prefunded base of $250 
billion, which would be financed by risk-adjusted assessments paid by large 
financial firms. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 378, at 204-06. They would also 
provide their proposed fund with a supplemental borrowing authority of up to $750 
billion from the Treasury. Id.; see also Xin Huang, Hao Zhou & Haibin Zhu, A 
Framework for Assessing the Systemic Risk of Major Financial Institutions, 33 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 2036, 2036 (2009) (proposing a methodology for calculating an 
insurance premium sufficient to create a hypothetical fund that could cover losses of 
more than 15% of the total liabilities of twelve major U.S. banks during the period 
2001–2008, and concluding that the hypothetical aggregate insurance premium for 
that fund would have had an “upper bound” of $250 billion in July 2008).  
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likely to face a substantial risk of failure during a major disturbance 
in the financial markets.485  
Accordingly, during a future financial crisis, the FDIC 
probably will not be able in the short term to collect enough 
premiums from surviving SIFIs to cover the costs of resolving one or 
more failed SIFIs. As a result, the FDIC will have to borrow large 
sums from the Treasury to cover short-term resolution costs. Even if 
the FDIC ultimately repays the borrowed funds by imposing 
retroactive assessments on surviving SIFIs, the public and the 
financial markets will rightly conclude that the federal government 
(and ultimately the taxpayers) provided bridge loans to pay the 
creditors of failed SIFIs.486  
“Second, under Dodd–Frank’s post-funded OLF, the most 
reckless SIFIs will effectively shift the potential costs of their risk-
taking” to more conservatively managed SIFIs, as “the latter will be 
more likely to survive and bear the [retroactive] costs of resolving 
their failed peers.”487 Thus, our post-funded OLF creates “a terrible 
free-rider problem” by encouraging aggressive SIFIs to pursue high-
risk strategies without paying for the likely costs of their hazardous 
ventures.488 
Third, a prefunded OLF would encourage each SIFI to monitor 
other SIFIs and to alert regulators to excessive risk-taking by those 
institutions. Every SIFI would know that the failure of another SIFI 
would deplete the OLF and would also trigger future assessments 
that it and other surviving SIFIs must pay. “Thus, each SIFI would 
have good reason[s] to complain to regulators if it became aware of 
unsound practices or conditions at another SIFI.”489 
Fourth, requiring SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to prefund 
the OLF would shrink the TBTF subsidy “by forcing [SIFIs] to 
                                                 
 485. For evidence of “herding” by large financial institutions prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 and earlier crises, see Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra 
note 15, at 1020 & n.293 (citing several studies). 
 486. See supra notes 263-270, 473-482 and accompanying text. 
 487. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1021. 
 488. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Taxing Systemic Risk, in REGULATING 
WALL STREET: THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 121, 134 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). 
 489. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1021; see also Gordon & 
Muller, supra note 378, at 210 (contending that a prefunded OLF that has authority 
to impose additional assessments to offset the costs of resolving failed SIFIs would 
create a desirable “mutualization of risk [among SIFIs] that should encourage more 
cautious firms to press regulators to rein in firms and practices that pose systemic 
risks”). 
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internalize more of the ‘negative externality’ (i.e., the potential 
public bailout cost) of their activities.”490 Risk-based premiums to 
prefund the OLF would be analogous to a “systemic risk tax,” which 
a number of commentators have advocated for the purpose of 
compelling SIFIs to “internalize the systemic risk costs imposed on 
the rest of the financial sector and external real economy.”491 In 
addition to requiring SIFIs to pay for the potential external costs of 
their operations, a prefunded OLF would provide a much-needed 
reserve fund that would shield governments and taxpayers from 
having to incur the expense of underwriting future resolutions of 
failed SIFIs.492  
Fifth, as Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller have noted, a 
prefunded OLF would also reduce the TBTF subsidy by making 
Dodd–Frank’s “liquidation threat more credible.”493 They correctly 
point out that a prefunded OLF would encourage regulators to 
invoke the OLA receivership process for a failing SIFI because a 
prefunded OLF would give regulators the necessary financial 
resources to cover shortfalls in the SIFI’s assets.494 In contrast, 
Dodd–Frank’s post-funded OLF creates strong incentives for 
regulators to grant forbearance in order to postpone (and hopefully 
avoid) an OLA receivership that would force regulators to take the 
politically unpopular step of borrowing from the Treasury to finance 
the resolution of a failing SIFI.495 
To further shrink the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, the OLF should 
be strictly separated from the DIF, which insures bank deposits. As 
discussed above, the SRE in the FDI Act provides a potential source 
of bailout funds for SIFI-owned banks and their uninsured 
creditors.496 Congress should repeal the SRE and should designate the 
                                                 
 490. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1021-22. 
 491. Acharya et al., supra note 488, at 124, 138 (citing “other papers that 
also call for Pigouvian-type taxes” on systemic risks created by SIFIs); see also id. 
at 124-31 (setting forth a proposed formula and procedure for calculating and 
implementing a systemic risk tax). 
 492. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1021-22. 
 493. Gordon & Muller, supra note 378, at 208. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. at 193. 
 496. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text (discussing the SRE as 
a potential bailout source for SIFIs). For example, the FDIC relied on the SRE when 
it agreed with the Treasury and the Fed to provide more than $400 billion of asset 
guarantees to Citigroup and BofA during the financial crisis. Wilmarth, Dodd–
Frank, supra note 15, at 1022-23 & n.304 (pointing out that the Treasury Secretary 
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OLF as the exclusive source of future funding for all resolutions of 
failed SIFIs. By repealing the SRE, Congress would make clear that 
(1) the FDIC must apply the FDI Act’s least-cost test in resolving all 
future bank failures; (2) the DIF must be used solely to pay the 
claims of bank depositors; and (3) non-deposit creditors of SIFIs 
could no longer view the DIF as a potential source of financial 
support. By making all of the foregoing changes, Congress would 
significantly reduce the implicit TBTF subsidy currently exploited 
by SIFIs.497 
5. Top Executives and Key Employees of Second-Tier Banking 
Organizations Should Receive at Least Half of Their Total 
Compensation in the Form of Contingent Convertible Debt 
There is wide agreement that compensation packages for senior 
managers and other key employees of major banks encouraged the 
pursuit of reckless and destructive business strategies during the 
period leading up to the financial crisis.498 Leading banks adopted 
bonus and stock option plans that provided very large rewards to 
managers and key employees (including traders) if they met short-
term revenue and profit targets. Bonuses and equity-based incentives 
caused executives and key employees to focus primarily on boosting 
short-term returns for shareholders while paying little or no attention 
to the interests of long-term creditors (including the deposit 
insurance fund and taxpayers).499 The resulting emphasis on short-
                                                                                                       
ultimately did not invoke the SRE for BofA because the terms of BofA’s asset 
guarantee were agreed to in principle but not finalized). 
 497. See Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1023.  
 498. See, e.g., BARTH, CAPRIO, JR. & LEVINE, supra note 376, at 57-76; 
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 58-61, 115-16; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger 
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249-74 (2010); John 
McCormack, Morgan Stanley & Judy Weiker, Rethinking “Strength of Incentives” 
for Executives of Financial Institutions, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65, 66-69 (2010); 
Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation 
for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1216-23 (2011); FCIC REPORT, supra 
note 18, at xix, 61-64; Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 103; Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 
Speech, supra note 393; Tarullo Oct. 20, 2014 Speech, supra note 394, at 8-10. 
 499. See authorities cited infra note 501; see also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian 
Bolton, Misaligned Bank Executive Incentive Compensation 1-6, 13-14, 17-33 (June 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277917 (analyzing executive compensation plans at 
fourteen of the largest U.S. financial institutions between 2000 and 2008 and 
concluding that (1) those fourteen institutions provided much larger amounts of 
equity-based pay to their chief executive officers, compared with thirty-seven 
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term shareholder returns was particularly dangerous in the financial 
industry due to the highly leveraged condition of many large 
financial institutions and the explicit and implicit subsidies provided 
to those institutions by the federal safety net.500 
Recent studies have shown that financial institutions were more 
likely to default or perform poorly during the financial crisis if their 
compensation packages for senior executives were more heavily 
weighted toward equity-based pay.501 In addition, after Congress 
authorized banks to expand on a nationwide basis in 1994 and to 
affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies in 1999, the 
largest banks responded by increasing their equity-based 
incentives.502 Big bank executives responded to those enhanced 
incentives by adopting a variety of high-risk measures, including 
aggressive acquisitions, rapid expansion of nontraditional, fee-based 
businesses (including investment banking), and large investments in 
subprime MBS.503  
In contrast, banks whose top executives had larger amounts of 
“inside debt” performed significantly better during the financial 
crisis and had a substantially lower risk of default.504 “Inside debt” 
                                                                                                       
smaller banks that did not receive TARP assistance; and (2) the same fourteen 
institutions incurred much greater risks and performed much worse during the 
financial crisis, compared with the same group of smaller banks); Wilmarth, 
Citigroup, supra note 14, at 99, 104-05, 115-17 (describing how bonuses based on 
short-term revenue and profit targets encouraged reckless behavior by Citigroup’s 
senior executives, traders, and other key employees).  
 500. Rosalind L. Bennett, Levent Güntay & Haluk Unal, Inside Debt, Bank 
Default Risk and Performance During the Crisis 2-3 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, 
Working Paper No. 2012-03, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122619; 
McCormack, Stanley & Weiker, supra note 498, at 66; Tung, supra note 498, at 
1210-16; Sjoerd Van Bekkum, Inside Debt and Bank Risk 3-4 (Mar. 14, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682139. 
 501. Robert DeYoung, Emma Y. Peng & Meng Yan, Executive 
Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165, 166-68, 193-95 (2013); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René 
M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12-13, 
24-25 (2011); see Bennett, Güntay & Unal, supra note 500, at 1-6, 19-24, 36-37.  
 502. See DeYoung, Peng & Yan, supra note 501, at 165-66, 180-82; Tung, 
supra note 498, at 1216-23. 
 503. See DeYoung, Peng & Yan, supra note 501, at 166-68, 175, 177, 180-
83, 189, 192-95; Jens Hagendorff & Francesco Vallascas, CEO Pay Incentives and 
Risk-Taking: Evidence from Bank Acquisitions, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1078, 1079-80, 
1084-86, 1091-94 (2011). 
 504. See Bennett, Güntay & Unal, supra note 500, at 3-6, 19-24, 34-37; 
Bekkum, supra note 500 (manuscript at 4-7, 17-26, 30-31); Frederick Tung & Xue 
Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3-5, 
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includes executive rights to pensions and deferred compensation, 
which are “typically unfunded and unsecured” and therefore “face 
default risk just as outside creditors do.”505 Studies have found that 
executives holding a higher proportion of inside debt in relation to 
their equity interests had incentives that were more aligned with 
creditors and therefore followed lower-risk business strategies.506  
In view of the risk-reducing influence of inside debt, analysts 
and regulators have proposed that senior managers and key 
employees of large banks should receive a substantial portion of their 
total compensation in the form of long-term debt rather than equity. 
Giving long-term debt a greater role in compensation would 
encourage managers and traders to choose operating plans that 
promote the long-term survival of the bank, an outcome that would 
serve the interests of the deposit insurance fund and taxpayers.507  
In a previous article, I argued that SIFIs should be required to 
pay a significant percentage of the compensation received by senior 
managers and other key employees in the form of contingent 
convertible bonds (CoCos).508 CoCos held by executives and key 
employees should be converted automatically into common stock 
upon the occurrence of a designated event of financial stress, 
including (1) a decline in capital below a specified level that would 
“trigger” automatic conversion or (2) the initiation of an OLA 
proceeding or a receivership, conservatorship, or insolvency 
proceeding for a SIFI or one of its principal subsidiaries. The 
primary regulator of a SIFI should have the power to mandate the 
activation of the pre-insolvency “trigger” for financial distress. 
                                                                                                       
22-29 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161. 
 505. See Tung & Wang, supra note 504, at 1, 6-7 (noting that “pensions and 
deferred compensation . . . give managers fixed claims against the firm that like 
conventional debt, depend on the firm’s solvency for full payment”). 
 506. See supra note 504. 
 507. See McCormack, Stanley & Weiker, supra note 498, at 70-71; Tung, 
supra note 498, at 1226-41, 1245-51; Dudley Oct. 20, 2014 Speech, supra note 393; 
see also Caroline Salas Gage & Craig Torres, Fed Citing Wall Street Lapses Leads 
Drive on Bonds as Pay, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 30, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-30/fed-citing-wall-street-lapses-
leads-drive-on-bonds-as-pay (quoting comments supporting debt-based executive 
compensation from Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry, New York Fed 
President William Dudley, and former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair). 
 508. See Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1008-09. For a helpful 
survey of the terms and characteristics of CoCos, see Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia 
Kartasheva & Bilyana Bogdanova, CoCos: A Primer, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2013, at 
43, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309f.pdf. 
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As noted above, domestic and foreign regulators are actively 
considering resolution plans that would require SIFIs to sell large 
amounts of “bail-in” debt (including CoCos) to outside investors.509 
A significant potential risk of the bail-in debt strategy is that pulling 
the mandatory conversion “trigger” at one SIFI could precipitate a 
generalized “creditor flight” from debt issued by all other financial 
institutions with similar risk exposures.510 That risk would not arise 
with the issuance of CoCos to senior managers and key employees 
because they are “captive investors” who could be required, as a 
condition of their employment, to accept and retain CoCos during 
their term of service and also during a lengthy post-employment 
period.511  
Senior managers and key employees should not be allowed to 
make voluntary conversions of their CoCos into common stock until 
the expiration of a lengthy period (e.g., three to five years) after the 
end of their employment. In addition, managers and key employees 
should be required to spread any sales of common stock received 
upon voluntary conversion of their CoCos over an additional period 
of similar length. Managers and key employees should also be 
prohibited from purchasing any derivatives or other financial 
instruments (e.g., credit default swaps or put options on stock) for 
the purpose of hedging their exposure to CoCos or the common stock 
issuable upon conversion of CoCos (either mandatory or voluntary). 
A lengthy post-employment holding period for CoCos and a further 
holding period for stock issued upon conversion “would discourage 
managers and key employees from taking excessive risks to boost 
the value of [their voluntary] conversion” option during their term of 
employment.512 At the same time, as explained above, CoCos “should 
be subject to mandatory conversion into common stock upon the 
occurrence of a designated ‘triggering’ event of financial distress.”513 
It is likely that any common stock received upon mandatory 
conversion would soon become worthless.514 
                                                 
 509. See supra text accompanying notes 273-278; see also GOODHART & 
AVGOULEAS, supra note 273, at 1-4, 7-10. 
 510. See GOODHART & AVGOULEAS, supra note 273, at 11-12, 17-18, 20-21. 
 511. See Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1008-09 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 512. Id. at 1009. 
 513. Id. 
 514. For similar proposals that advocate the use of CoCos to change the 
incentives of senior managers and key employees of SIFIs, see Wulf A. Kaal, 
Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 
1854-72 (2012); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
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Requiring senior executives and key employees to receive at 
least half of their total compensation in the form of CoCos and to 
hold those CoCos (and any resulting common stock) for several 
years after their employment would give those insiders a powerful 
incentive to follow prudent business policies that serve the interests 
of longer-term shareholders and creditors (including the deposit 
insurance fund and taxpayers). Insiders would face the risk of 
automatically losing the value of their CoCos if their company 
became distressed, without the need for any affirmative clawback by 
senior management or regulators. Thus, my proposal “would cause 
managers and key employees to realize that (1) they will not be able 
to ‘cash out’ a significant percentage of their accrued compensation 
unless their organization achieves long-term success and viability, 
and (2) they will lose a significant portion of their accrued 
compensation if their institution” encounters severe financial 
distress.515  
Section 956(b) of Dodd–Frank requires federal financial 
regulators to adopt joint rules prohibiting incentive-based 
compensation arrangements that encourage financial institutions to 
assume “inappropriate risks.”516 Regulators have not adopted final 
rules to implement § 956(b), even though Dodd–Frank established a 
deadline of April 2011 for that action.517 Regulators should promptly 
                                                                                                       
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 8-14 
(Columbia Law Sch. & European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
373, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633906. 
 515. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1009. 
 516. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 956(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010). 
 517. See id. (requiring federal financial regulators to adopt regulations 
implementing § 956(b) “[n]ot later than 9 months after” Dodd–Frank’s enactment in 
July 2010). Federal regulators issued proposed regulations in April 2011, but those 
regulations have not been finalized. See Incentive-Based Compensation 
Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1232) (publishing proposed rules to implement § 956). According to one 
published report, the proposed regulations became “bogged down in regulatory 
infighting” among the six federal agencies responsible for issuing final rules. Gina 
Chon, US Bank Bonus Curb Hit by Regulatory Squabble, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 
14, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4c322e4-23ba-11e4-8e29-00144feabdc0. 
html#axzz3ZILDNyc9. In January 2015, Fed Governor Jerome Powell stated that 
federal financial regulators were “preparing for . . . comment a proposed new rule on 
incentive compensation.” Governor Jerome H. Powell, Comments on the Fair and 
Effective Markets Review (Jan. 20, 2015), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20150120a.htm (emphasis 
added). Thus, it appears that federal regulators are far from achieving Dodd–Frank’s 
mandate for imposing effective limits on incentive-based compensation. 
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adopt rules that would carry out the intent of § 956(b) by including 
the CoCo compensation plan described above. 
CONCLUSION 
The regulatory framework established by Dodd–Frank is 
deeply flawed and threatens to inflict additional harm on our 
financial markets and our economy. The statute imposes onerous and 
unjustified compliance burdens on community banks. The statute 
also fails to solve the TBTF problem and leaves the door open for 
future bailouts of SIFIs and their creditors. Without significant 
changes, Dodd–Frank will further weaken the community bank 
sector, accelerate the ongoing consolidation of our banking industry, 
and enable megabanks to exercise even greater influence over our 
political and regulatory systems. 
In light of Dodd–Frank’s manifest shortcomings, we must 
adopt a two-tiered regulatory system that will promote the health of 
community banks and control the risks of megabanks. The first tier 
of regulation must encourage and preserve the proven business 
model of relationship-based intermediation that has long provided 
superior service to small businesses, local communities, and 
consumers. The second regulatory tier must compel large financial 
conglomerates to conduct their deposit-taking activities within 
narrow banks, which are strictly separated from capital markets 
activities and are also prohibited from transferring their safety-net 
subsidies to nonbank affiliates. We must adopt further regulatory 
reforms (including a prefunded Orderly Liquidation Fund) to shrink 
the TBTF subsidy. We must also require SIFIs to pay a large share of 
compensation for executives and key employees in the form of 
CoCos, so that the incentives of insiders will be better aligned with 
the interests of long-term creditors, the FDIC, and taxpayers.  
My proposal’s ultimate purpose is to force large financial 
conglomerates to prove that they can produce superior risk-related 
returns for investors without relying on explicit and implicit 
government subsidies. Most studies have failed to confirm the 
existence of favorable economies of scale or scope within giant 
financial conglomerates. Indeed, those conglomerates have failed to 
produce consistently positive returns, even under the current 
regulatory system that allows them to exploit extensive federal 
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subsidies.518 In December 2009, a prominent bank analyst suggested 
that if Congress prevented nonbank subsidiaries of FHCs from 
accessing the low-cost deposit funding provided by their affiliated 
banks, large FHCs would not be economically viable and would be 
forced to break up voluntarily.519  
Many of the largest commercial and industrial conglomerates 
in the United States and Europe were broken up during the past three 
decades by hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures after they 
proved to be “‘less efficient and less profitable than companies 
                                                 
 518. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 369, at 89, 144, 270 n.31, 290 n.29; 
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 90, at 212-13; Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 63, at 
1427; Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation, supra note 23, at 748-49; see also 
Christine Harper, Breaking up Big Banks Hard to Do as Market Forces Fail, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 27, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2012-06-27/breaking-up-big-banks-hard-to-do-as-market-forces-fail 
(reporting that the stock prices of JPMorgan Chase, BofA, Citigroup, Goldman, and 
Morgan Stanley were “languishing at or below tangible book value” despite the 
massive assistance they received from the federal government during the financial 
crisis, and describing the views of fund managers Michael Price and Phillip Purcell, 
who contended that big banks should be broken up to increase shareholder returns); 
Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan Worth One-Third More in Break-Up, Mayo Says, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 27, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-02-27/jpmorgan-would-be-worth-more-if-split-up-mayo.html (quoting a report 
issued by analyst Michael Mayo, who pointed out that JPMorgan’s stock was 2% 
below its value at the end of 2004 and also stated, “‘[e]ight years is a long time to 
wait for a higher share price when the top five executives at JPM from 2004-2010 
received over $600 million in compensation’”); Hugh Son, Goldman Says 
JPMorgan Should Break Itself into Pieces, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 5, 2015, 11:38 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/goldman-says-
jpmorgan-should-break-itself-into-pieces (describing a report issued by a team of 
Goldman analysts, who argued that Chase could provide greater returns to its 
shareholders by splitting itself into two or four parts). 
 519. Karen Shaw Petrou, the managing partner of Federal Financial 
Analytics, explained that “‘[i]nteraffiliate restrictions would limit the use of bank 
deposits on nonbanking activities,’” and “‘[y]ou don’t own a bank because you like 
branches, you own a bank because you want cheap core funding.’” Stacy Kaper, Big 
Banks Face Most Pain Under House Bill, AM. BANKER (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewContent.act?clipid=411892257&mode=cnc&ta
g=3.7343%3Ficx_id%3D1004692 (quoting Ms. Petrou). Ms. Petrou therefore 
concluded that an imposition of stringent limits on affiliate transactions “‘really 
strikes . . . at the heart of a diversified banking organization’” and “‘I think you 
would see most of the very large banking organizations pull themselves apart’” if 
Congress passed such legislation. Id. (quoting Ms. Petrou); see also Nixon, supra 
note 445 (reporting that Barclays Capital, a large securities firm, received “cheap 
funding for a major trading operation” from the “retail deposits” held by Barclays 
Bank, but the stock of Barclays Bank still traded “at just 0.8 times tangible book 
value” even with the “implicit subsidy between the two businesses”).  
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pursuing more focused business strategies.’”520 It is long past time for 
financial conglomerates to be stripped of their safety-net subsidies 
and their presumptive access to TBTF bailouts so that they will 
become subject to the same type of scrutiny and discipline that the 
capital markets have applied to commercial and industrial 
conglomerates. My proposal provides a workable plan to impose 
such scrutiny and discipline on financial behemoths, which currently 
enjoy far too much power and influence within our financial and 
political systems. In addition, my proposal would align U.S. 
regulatory policy with financial restructuring plans for SIFIs that 
have already been adopted in the U.K. and are under active 
consideration in the EU.521 The time for action is now—we dare not 
wait any longer. 
 
 
                                                 
 520. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank, supra note 15, at 1047.  
 521. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking as a Structural Remedy 
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